In this appeal from a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting her counsel leave to withdraw. She further contends that she lacked the capacity to agree to the settlement. We discern no error in granting counsel leave to withdraw. And because the appellant failed to file a transcript or statement of the evidence, we must presume that the trial court’s findings relating to the appellant’s capacity are supported by the evidence. So we affirm.

After a borrower defaulted on a note and deed of trust, the lender sent a cure notice and, later, a notice of foreclosure. But the borrower did not receive either notice. When the borrower failed to cure the default, the home was sold at foreclosure. The borrower then sued to set aside the sale, arguing that the lender breached the deed of trust and violated Tennessee law by failing to deliver proper notice. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender, concluding that the notices only needed to be sent to, not received by, the borrower. We agree and affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to her minor child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (3) persistence of conditions; (4) severe abuse; and (5) failure to manifest the ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interests of the minor child. Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her rights. The Department of Children’s Services concedes on appeal one of the grounds, and we find three others to be unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. We find, however, the termination ground of severe abuse to be supported and the best interests of the child to favor termination. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The appellant in this case challenges the trial court’s entry of an order of protection against her. She argues that an order of protection should not issue when the sole incident for which the appellee sought the order of protection occurred more than a year and a half before appellee filed the petition for an order of protection. Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the appellant and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Kayla Nicole Pauze was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length, range, and manner of her sentences. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Riley Gaul, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, stalking, tampering with evidence, and theft of property valued over $500. After merging the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant raises twelve issues on appeal, which we have condensed and reordered as follows: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the especially aggravated stalking count of the presentment; (2) whether the trial court erred by not sequestering the jury and by allowing the trial to be livestreamed by the media outlet Law and Crime; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting a Snapchat message between the Defendant and the victim; (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to present character evidence in the form of testimony that the Defendant was controlling, manipulative, and possessive in his relationship with the victim; (5) whether the Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial by the State’s introduction of his use of the video game “Call of Duty” and the related evidence that the game included “wall banging,” or killing individuals by shooting through the walls of a building; (6) whether the trial court erred in allowing Bobby Jones, Jr., to testify as an expert and to offer trajectory evidence; (7) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s uncharged criminal conduct relating to the theft charge; (8) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions for first degree murder, felony murder, stalking, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and theft of property valued over $500; (9) whether the jury returned mutually exclusive and patchwork verdicts; and (10) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors deprived the Defendant of his right to a fair trial. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s felony theft conviction in count three must be modified to a Class A misdemeanor and a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days pursuant to the savings statute. The Defendant’s remaining convictions are affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for an amended judgment in count three.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Andrea A. (“Mother”) to her minor children Serenity M., Alfred M. (“Alfie”), Chloe M., and Zoey M. (“the Children,” collectively). The Children’s father, A.M. (“Father”), surrendered his parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children on four grounds. Mother appeals. DCS concedes the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. We vacate that ground. However, we find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the other three grounds found—substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody—were proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm as modified, resulting in affirmance of the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

This appeal involves a claim by a surviving spouse against the decedent’s estate. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the surviving spouse’s petition for specific property, year’s support allowance, and elective share filed more than nine months after the date of the decedent’s death was time barred pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-4-102. Further, the trial court held that the surviving spouse was not prevented from timely filing for specific property, year’s support allowance, and elective share by fraud of the personal representative. The surviving spouse appeals. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

This divorce action involves a marriage of twenty-one years’ duration wherein the husband maintained a significantly greater earning capacity than that of the wife. The trial court ordered the husband to pay transitional alimony to the wife during the time she sought to obtain her Ph.D. and for two years thereafter, or for seven years from the time of the divorce, whichever time period was shorter. The amount of the husband’s child support obligation was reduced to zero because he had agreed to pay the minor children’s private school tuition. Furthermore, the trial court’s net division of the parties’ marital assets and liabilities was nearly equal, and the trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the wife. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. We further determine that the wife is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, and we remand this matter for the trial court’s determination concerning the proper amount to be awarded.

For the week of February 20, 2023 - February 24, 2023