Jonathan Howell, the Defendant, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of probation following his plea of guilty to theft of property valued at $60,000 or more. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence and by basing its denial solely on deterrence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A restaurant supplier brought suit for breach of a guaranty. The guarantor admitted liability. So the trial court entered partial summary judgment on that issue. The supplier then moved for summary judgment on damages. The guarantor challenged the admissibility of the evidence submitted in support of the motion. But the trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible under the business records exception. And, based on the undisputed facts, the court granted the motion for summary judgment. We conclude that some of the supplier’s evidence should have been excluded. So we vacate the summary judgment on damages.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Kentucky imposes a severance tax on coal extracted within its borders. At the same time, Kentucky directs its utilities to buy the most competitive coal, with cost being one of the most important factors. Predictably, this combination of measures, along with the fact that many coal-producing states don’t impose a severance tax, makes Kentucky utilities less likely to buy Kentucky coal. Recognizing the problem, the Kentucky legislature decided to have its cake and eat it, too. The legislature directed the agency that regulates Kentucky utilities to evaluate the reasonableness of coal prices after subtracting any severance tax paid from the actual bid price. In practice, the policy makes coal from states with severance taxes, like Kentucky, cheaper for the utilities by the amount of the severance tax.

A coal producer from Illinois, where there is no severance tax, challenged the policy as a violation of the Commerce Clause. The Commission responded that it wasn’t discriminating against interstate commerce because it was only leveling the playing field tilted against Kentucky coal by its own severance tax. Twice the district court bought this argument. We do not.

The Petitioner, Edwin Orlando Millan, appeals from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his filing a false police report and tampering with evidence convictions. The post-conviction court granted relief in connection with the filing a fraudulent insurance claim conviction after determining that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief on his remaining convictions because (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the State elicited false trial testimony in violation of his due process rights, (3) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 376 U.S. 83 (1986), and (4) he is entitled to relief pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This action involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination for each parent: (1) abandonment; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (3) the persistence of conditions which led to removal; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the child. The court also found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

The defendants in this action failed to timely answer the plaintiff’s complaint. Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court entered judgment by default against the defendants. The defendants moved to set aside the default judgment. The trial court denied the motion to set aside. Because the trial court’s order lacked findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

A landlord appeals from the grant of summary judgment to a commercial tenant in the landlord’s breach of contract action. The lease contained a provision requiring the tenant to obtain fire insurance on the “Premises.” The trial court concluded that the lease failed to define the term “Premises” and that such failure rendered the fire insurance provision unenforceable. We reverse because we find the term “Premises” as used in the fire insurance provision to unambiguously refer to the space within the commercial building that the tenant rented and occupied during the lease. We further conclude that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact regarding whether it was possible for the tenant to obtain fire insurance on only the portion of the building which it rented and occupied. Consequently, we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The City of Orlinda filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the Robertson County Planning Commission’s rezoning of property from “Agricultural Residential” to “Neighborhood Commercial,” alleging the rezoning was “illegal spot zoning” and was also procedurally deficient. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

The employee suffered a compensable injury for which she received workers’ compensation benefits. After the employee reached maximum medical improvement, the employer sent correspondence to the employee in an effort to resolve the claim, but no settlement was reached. The employee filed a petition for benefit determination and, prior to participating in a mediation, the employer filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired. In its brief filed in support of its motion, the employer argued that the employee’s petition was filed more than one year after the last voluntary payment of benefits was issued. At a hearing on the employer’s motion, the trial court concluded that, because the parties had not yet participated in mediation and because no dispute certification notice had been filed, the motion to dismiss was premature. The employer appealed, asserting the trial court erred in finding it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion to dismiss. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

The Defendant, Melvin Summerville, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony about a previous domestic assault against the victim in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) allowing cellular telephone records into evidence when the State did not establish relevance for the records; and (3) failing to suppress the testimony of a material witness when the State did not reveal the name of the witness and turn over police body camera video involving the witness until the “eve” of trial. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.