NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Charles Michael pleaded guilty to first-degree sodomy and first-degree sex abuse in Kentucky state court. Now, he seeks collateral review of his conviction based on an alleged involuntary confession. The district court rejected his claim. Because the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Justine Welch, of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury, attempted first degree murder, vehicular homicide, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus sixty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress witnesses’ out-of-court and in-court identifications of him due to an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup; and (3) the trial court erred in declining to issue a special jury instruction on identification. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeffrey Michael Davis, of one count of attempted aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly allowed irrelevant testimony; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault; and (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the child. Concluding that clear and convincing evidence was presented of both the ground for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Jamael White challenges his designation as an armed career criminal, arguing that his Ohio aggravated robbery convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the Ohio offense can be committed with a mens rea less than purposeful or knowing conduct. He also argues that his juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery cannot serve as an ACCA predicate offense because the government failed to prove the subsection of the statute under which he was adjudicated, and not all subsections delineate violent felonies. Additionally, White challenges the constitutionality of using juvenile adjudications to enhance sentences under the ACCA. Finally, White argues that, to the extent his objections were not adequately preserved, his trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE White’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

Question:

May an elected board member of a county school system, or local education agency (LEA), simultaneously serve as a board member and/or executive director of an affiliate professional employees’ organization as defined in the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-602(9), and adhere to school board member expectations and fulfill obligations set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-202 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203?

Opinion:

Because the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act (PECCA) provides a process for a local board of education and professional employees to enter a binding memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding terms and conditions of professional employee service and envisions that professional employees’ organizations will participate in this process, it is foreseeable—and indeed likely—that an elected school board member who also serves as a board member or as the executive director of an affiliate professional employees’ organization will have conflicting interests and conflicting fiduciary duties to the parties on both sides of the collaborative conferencing process. A board member of a county school system is, by virtue of that position, a public officeholder. Under common law principles, when a public officeholder has such a conflict of interests, recusal of the officeholder from participation in the matter in which the conflict arises is appropriate. If the officeholder has a conflict of interests but nevertheless participates in the matter, the action taken by that public officeholder is considered tainted and must be invalidated.

Furthermore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-4-101 makes it unlawful for a public official to be directly or indirectly financially interested in a contract that the official has a duty “to vote for, let out, overlook, or in any manner to superintend.” Whether an official has an impermissible pecuniary interest will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of any given case, but if the official is “directly or unlawfully indirectly interested” in a contract, that official would be subject to a financial penalty and “shall be dismissed from such office the officer then occupies, and be ineligible for the same or a similar position for ten (10) years.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-4-102.

Finally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-10-124(a) makes it an offense for elected county officials to receive a fee, commission, or any other compensation for “consulting services” from any entity other than the State, a county, or a municipality. It appears that an elected county school board member who receives any compensation from an affiliate professional employees’ organization for “consulting services” would be in violation of this statute.

The Petitioner, Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for nine counts of rape of a child, two counts of rape, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, and three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and his 121-year sentence at 100% service. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following the trial court’s revocation of his probation, Defendant, David Chad Moss, appeals arguing that the trial court failed to award him jail credit while incarcerated in Kentucky for an unrelated offense. Upon our review, we conclude that Defendant has failed to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b). Accordingly, the issue is waived and the appeal is dismissed.

The owners of a restaurant in downtown Clarksville sued the City of Clarksville for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, interference with business relationship, diminution of value of land, and a takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the City’s failure to construct an alleyway on property Plaintiffs sold the City. Plaintiffs also filed a claim for inverse condemnation alleging that the City’s construction of a sewer line encroached on their land. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract, interference with business relationship, diminution of value of land, and section 1983 claim for failure to state a claim under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) and dismissed Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel claim on summary judgment. After a jury trial on the inverse condemnation claim, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $8,335 for the value of land on which the sewer was built, and the trial court awarded Plaintiffs $30,000 in attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees. Plaintiffs appeal each of the dismissals, the measure of damages from the jury trial, and the award of attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees, among other things. We affirm the decisions of the trial court and decline to award Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees on appeal.

Taylor M. (“Mother”) and Caleb G. (“Father”) are the biological parents of Isabella G. (the “Child”). Mother and her current husband, David M. (“Stepfather”) petitioned the Chancery Court for Giles County (the “trial court”) for termination of Father’s parental rights in April of 2021, and for Stepfather to adopt the Child. As grounds for termination, Mother and Stepfather alleged abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Mother and Stepfather failed to prove any statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights. The trial court then concluded, however, that termination would have been in the Child’s best interests. Mother and Stepfather appealed to this Court. Because clear and convincing evidence establishes multiple grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights, and because clear and convincing evidence establishes that termination is in the Child’s best interests, we reverse.