The Petitioner, Paul Buchanan, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

This appeal arose from a termination of parental rights proceeding where a mother’s parental rights were terminated on several statutory grounds. The original adoption petition contained no grounds for termination of the parents’ rights, and therefore, the Trial Court used the four months prior to the amended petition, which included grounds for termination, for purposes of the abandonment grounds. We affirm the trial court’s use of this time period before the amended petition. We hold that the record is insufficient for us to conduct a meaningful appellate review in this case and that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to financially support, and mental incompetence based on the statutory authority in effect at the time of the filing of the amended petition alleging grounds for termination. These grounds are vacated and remanded to the trial court to allow the trial court to develop a proper record from which this Court can conduct a meaningful appellate review and to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(k). The amended petition seeking termination of parental rights was filed prior to the 2018 statutory amendments of the relevant termination statutes. Because the Child was never adjudicated as dependent and neglected, we reverse the ground of persistent conditions under the statute in effect when the amended petition was filed. Additionally, the statutory ground located at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) was not pled in the termination petition and was not tried by express or implied consent; therefore, we reverse this ground as to the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Sidney Eugene Watkins, was convicted by a jury of alternative counts of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of a firearm during the commission of those dangerous felonies, as well as simple possession of methamphetamine, simple possession of alprazolam, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Following the jury verdict, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the firearm counts (counts 7 and 8). The State appealed, and we reversed, concluding that the trial judge applied the wrong standard in ruling on the Defendant’s motion for judgment of aquittal. On remand, the trial court affirmed the jury’s verdict in its role as thirteenth juror and found the evidence sufficient to support the firearm counts. The Defendant now appeals challenging the trial court’s ruling. Following our review, we affirm. We remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in count 8 due to clerical errors.

In 1998, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Derwin V. Thomas, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. The Defendant unsuccessfully sought review on multiple occasions, by direct appeal, post-conviction petition, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Most recently, the Defendant filed a “Motion for Life Imprisonment,” alleging that the State failed to give him proper notice of its intention to seek life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and a Motion for Rule 36.1 relief1, alleging that the trial court failed to charge the jury with relevant lesserincluded offenses. The trial court summarily dismissed both the Defendant’s motions, and the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his motions. After review, because the notice of appeal in this case was untimely filed and because the Defendant has offered no facts supporting a waiver of this untimely filing in the interests of justice, the appeal is hereby dismissed

Tony R. Hearon ("Employee') allegedly developed an occupational disease during the course and scope of his employment with the State of Tennessee ("Employer"). Employee gave notice of his injury to Employer but his claim was denied. The denial letter advised Employee that he must file a petition for benefit determination within ninety days or risk dismissal of his claim. Employee filed his petition several months after the expiration of the ninety-day period. Upon receiving a dispute certification notice dismissing his claim, Employee filed a workers' compensation complaint in the Claims Commission, which is the agency responsible for handling disputed claims of state workers. Employer moved for summary judgment, asserting Employee failed to meet the ninety-day statutory deadline. The Commissioner granted summary judgment concluding that Employee failed to timely file his petition for benefit determination and therefore failed to exhaust the benefit review process as required by statute. Employee appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel ("Panel") for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Commissioner.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee from the chancery court’s denial of a motion to recuse. A new chancellor, during the course of a judicial election and shortly after the election was held, made extremely critical comments regarding the personal and professional character of his opponent, the incumbent chancellor. The challenger won the election, and the former chancellor, who has returned to practice, is now representing a party before the new chancellor. The former chancellor moved for the new chancellor’s recusal in cases in which the former chancellor is appearing as counsel as well as recusal from cases involving the law firm which the former chancellor joined after losing the judicial election. The new chancellor denied the motion. On appeal, we conclude that, even in the absence of actual bias, based upon concern about the appearance of bias toward the former chancellor, recusal is warranted. This concern does not extend to the law firm the former chancellor has joined. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the former chancellor but affirm the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the law firm.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Sheila Mikel claims that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took her two foster children without due process of law. She sued the Department, its Commissioner, and a private Department subcontractor, seeking damages along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed Mikel’s claims against the Department and Commissioner for want of jurisdiction and held that Mikel had failed to state a claim against the subcontractor. We affirm.

In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the probate court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants on two separate grounds – res judicata and the statute of limitations. On remand, the appellant filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to set aside the same order granting summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that a recent order from a circuit court necessitated that the probate court’s summary judgment order be “voided and set aside.” The probate court denied the motion. The appellant appeals. We affirm and remand.

This appeal follows the trial court’s grant of the employer’s motion for summary judgment in which the employer asserted the employee could not establish his alleged back injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. Specifically, the employer provided two expert medical opinions indicating that the employee’s alleged injury was not more than fifty percent related to the employment. The employee filed a late response to the motion, but he did not provide any medical documentation of an injury or any expert medical opinion that the injury was primarily related to the reported incident or his employment. The trial court concluded that the employer presented affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the employee’s claim and that the employee failed to show the existence of any genuine issue of material fact for trial. The employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and certify it as final.

The Petitioner, Joe G. Manley, appeals from the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions for aggravated domestic assault, domestic assault, and false imprisonment. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he received effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Specifically, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective based upon trial counsel’s failing to (1) communicate and maintain contact with the Petitioner; (2) thoroughly investigate the case and speak with the victims prior to entry of the Petitioner’s plea; (3) request a remand to general sessions court for a preliminary hearing; and (4) explain that Corrections Management Corporation would supervise the Petitioner’s relea