In this interlocutory appeal, the employer alleges the trial court erred in awarding temporary disability and medical benefits following an expedited hearing. The employee, a paramedic, was responding to a call with his partner when, while moving a patient in a “stair chair,” he fell down porch stairs and struck the ground headfirst. He reported injuring his neck and low back. The employee acknowledged that he had been treating for chronic low back symptoms prior to the accident. The employer initially accepted the claim but later denied it and ceased all benefits. At the expedited hearing, the employer admitted that the fall occurred but asserted that the accident did not arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of the employment and that the employee’s actions constituted willful misconduct. The trial court concluded the employer had not come forward with sufficient evidence supporting its affirmative defense and determined the employee had come forward with sufficient evidence to indicate a likelihood of prevailing at trial. The trial court ordered the employer to pay temporary disability and medical benefits, and the employer has appealed. We conclude the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s order. We further conclude the employer’s appeal is frivolous. On remand, the trial court shall determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses to be paid by the employer as a result of its frivolous appeal.

SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. This § 1983 action involves the shooting death of Brian Puskas after police officers responded to a 911 domestic disturbance call from Brian’s wife, Plaintiff Deanna L. Puskas. The district court found that the defendant officers’ actions were nonetheless reasonable under the circumstances. The camera footage confirms that conclusion. We therefore affirm the court’s decision.

In this delayed appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, Roosevelt Pitts, III, challenges his Rutherford County jury convictions of robbery, three counts of felony reckless endangerment, misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, and felony vandalism, for which he received an effective sentence of eighteen years in prison. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his challenge to two peremptory challenges based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Upon our review, we affirm.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Jane Doe, a high-school student, suffers from a condition that makes her hypersensitive to the everyday sounds of eating food and chewing gum. Doe’s parents asked her school to ban students from eating or chewing in her classes. It refused. So they sought this ban by suing the Knox County Board of Education under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. While considering their preliminary-injunction motion, the district court decided to dismiss the suit. It reasoned that Doe’s parents could obtain the requested relief in administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Until they exhaust this administrative process, the IDEA bars Doe’s parents from using the ADA or Rehabilitation Act to seek “relief that is also available” under that law. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Doe’s parents now argue both that they need not exhaust their claims under the IDEA and that we should grant Doe a preliminary injunction under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act on appeal.

We agree with their first argument but not their second. The IDEA provides relief only to students who need “specially designed instruction.” Because no ordinary English speaker would describe a ban on eating and chewing as “instruction,” her parents did not need to go through the IDEA’s review process to attempt to seek this ban under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. But just because Doe’s parents need not exhaust their claims does not mean that Doe is entitled to a preliminary injunction under those laws. Knox County has offered significant justification for its policy allowing students to eat in class at the magnet school that Doe chose to attend—a school designed to operate like a college. Ultimately, though, we leave this issue for the district court to consider in the first instance. We thus reverse the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, reject Doe’s request that we grant a preliminary injunction, and remand for further proceedings.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Darius Mack, of first-degree premeditated murder and tampering with evidence for which he received an effective sentence of life plus three years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Brian Keith Wells appeals his below-Guidelines sentence, challenging the district court’s refusal to appoint substitute counsel, the application of a four-level role enhancement to his Guidelines range, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. The Department of Labor (DOL) alleged that KDE Equine violated various provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, including the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 211. The district court granted judgment to the DOL on its overtime claims but found for KDE Equine on the DOL’s claims for willful violations and liquidated damages. Both parties appeal. For the following reasons, this Court AFFIRMS in part, VACATES in part, and REMANDS for further proceedings.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Undisputed in this case is that, in January 2016, the prosecutor in Amaury Villa’s case emailed Villa’s counsel, Donald Meier, with an offer to enter into a cooperation agreement with Villa. What the parties dispute is when Villa learned about that offer. The government says that Meier told Villa about the offer the day it was made. Villa says that he learned about that offer only years later, when he obtained the relevant portion of Meier’s case file. By then Villa had pending with the district court a motion for relief from sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which he promptly moved to amend with a claim based on Meier’s alleged omission. Villa attached two affidavits (including his own) in support of his motion to amend; the government attached an affidavit from Meier in opposition. Yet the district court summarily adopted the government’s view of the facts and denied Villa’s motion to amend as untimely. We vacate the court’s decision and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. David McCall, a federal prisoner with a long drug-dealing career, pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015. Five years into his 235-month sentence, McCall moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Although he cited several “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction under that statute, the heart of his motion rested on our opinion in Havis. Invoking that opinion, McCall argued that if he were sentenced today, he would receive a shorter sentence than he received in 2015. The district court denied his motion, reasoning that a nonretroactive change in sentencing law could not amount to an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction. We agree and affirm.