In this interlocutory appeal, the employer asserts the trial court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees for a frivolous appeal following our earlier remand. Initially, the employee reported injuring her left knee at work as a result of two separate accidents that occurred approximately three weeks apart. It was only after the second accident that the employee reported both incidents to the employer. After the cases were consolidated, the employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the employee failed to give proper notice of the first alleged accident. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment and a separate order for continued medical treatment for any left knee condition found to arise primarily out of the employment. The employer appealed, and we concluded, in pertinent part, that the employer’s appeal was frivolous. As a result, we remanded the case for a determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs arising from the frivolous appeal. Following entry of the trial court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees, the employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record and the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

The Defendant, Joshua Beadle, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five years and to community supervision for life. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed an objection to the probate of Decedent’s will, and Appellee, the Executrix of Decedent’s estate, filed a motion to dismiss the objection. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion, dismissed Appellant’s objection for lack of standing, and admitted Decedent’s will to probate. Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing and also asserts that she received no notice of the hearing on Appellee’s motion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves matters of alimony and valuation of marital property upon the divorce of the parties, who were married for twenty-four years. Following its valuation of certain marital assets, the trial court distributed the parties’ substantial marital assets in near-equal shares. The trial court awarded to the wife rehabilitative alimony and alimony in futuro based on its determinations that the wife had demonstrated a need for alimony and that the husband had the ability to pay. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s spousal support award in its entirety. We also affirm the trial court’s value placed on the husband’s medical practice. Exercising our discretion, we decline to award attorney’s fees to the wife on appeal.

In this appeal, we address principles governing the imposition of consecutive sentencing for “an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2) (2019). Quinton Devon Perry pleaded guilty to twenty-four counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor that took place during the years 2016 and 2017, stemming from the discovery that he had uploaded 174 images or videos comprising child pornography or child erotica to his electronic file sharing account. Although Mr. Perry had no prior criminal convictions, the trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing after finding that he qualified as an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. A divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Perry, No. W2019-01553-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2563039, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2021), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Nov. 18, 2021). The dissenting judge, citing a lack of proof that Mr. Perry engaged in a continuous course of downloading and uploading materials over the alleged time period, concluded that the record did not establish him as an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. Id. at *6–7 (McMullen, J., dissenting).1 Mr. Perry sought permission to appeal, arguing that the lower courts improperly found him to be an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive based solely on the number of offenses to which he pleaded guilty. We accepted Mr. Perry’s appeal. In this opinion, we clarify certain principles for imposing consecutive sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(2) and set forth a non-exclusive list of considerations to aid determining whether a defendant qualifies as an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. Based on our review, we have determined that the trial court adequately articulated the reasons for ordering consecutive sentencing on the record. Affording the trial court’s decision a presumption of reasonableness, we conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Elijah Garrison, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (first degree murder); 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2018) (unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus ten years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his first degree murder conviction because it was based on the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Ronald Jones asks us to authorize the district court to consider his second or successive motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Jones’s motion is neither second nor successive, so we deny his request as unnecessary and transfer his motion to the district court.

Jones’s Johnson motion may well fail on its merits or on other procedural grounds. It is not, however, second or successive within the meaning of § 2255. We deny Jones’s request for leave as unnecessary and transfer his motion to the district court.

After a delinquent tax sale of land owned by a limited liability corporation, the managing member filed a motion to redeem the property pro se, signing only his own name. The trial court deemed admitted requests for admission propounded on purported redeemer individually after only the entity responded. Relying in part on the admissions, the trial court granted the tax sale purchaser’s motion to strike the attempt at redemption for lack of standing. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kevin Owens, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder, a class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101(a)(2), 39-13- 202(a)(1), 39-17-1324(b)(1). On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, he contends that the State’s evidence was inadequate to establish his identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jamarcus Dequan Murdock, Defendant, was convicted in a jury trial of two counts of aggravated robbery. He also pled guilty to separate charges of robbery and aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed ten-year sentences for each aggravated robbery conviction and a six-year sentence for the robbery conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences for two of the aggravated robbery convictions run consecutively to each other and concurrently to the sentences for the remaining convictions for an effective twentyyear sentence. On direct appeal, this court held that the trial court failed to make the requisite findings to support consecutive sentences based upon the dangerous offender category and remanded the case to the trial court. See State v. Jamarcus Dequan Murdock, No. W2020-00244-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1423125, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2021). On remand, the trial court again imposed partial consecutive sentences. Defendant asserts that the trial court again erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.