The Defendant, Sterling White, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, a Class B felony; unlawful possession of a handgun, a Class E felony; and simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. After merging the unlawful possession of a handgun/firearm counts into a single conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm having been previously convicted of a crime involving violence, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of twelve years for the firearm conviction and eleven months, twentynine days for the cocaine conviction, for a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s sentence in a case for which the Defendant was on bond at the time of the instant offenses. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Riccy Enriquez-Perdomo appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claims against Defendants-Appellees United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers Ricardo Newman, Joseph Phelps, John Korkin, and Shawn Byers (collectively, “Defendants”), brought under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court dismissed Enriquez-Perdomo’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). We AFFIRM the dismissal of Enriquez-Perdomo’s First Amendment retaliation claim, VACATE the judgment with respect to her other claims, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Shaina Kirkland served as a patrol officer with the City of Maryville’s police department. While in that role, Kirkland periodically used her Facebook account to criticize the county sheriff. Kirkland’s supervisors became concerned that her posts would undermine the Department’s relationship with their sister law enforcement agency. So they asked her to stop. They also reprimanded her for other behavioral issues.

Matters came to a head following a Facebook post by Kirkland claiming the sheriff had excluded her from a training event because she was female and opposed his reelection. At that point, the City fired Kirkland. Kirkland responded by suing the City, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in the City’s favor. We now affirm.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. In the 1950s, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (DuPont) began discharging vast quantities of C-8—a “forever” chemical that accumulates in the human body and the environment—into the Ohio River, landfills, and the air surrounding its plant in West Virginia, contaminating the communities’ water sources. By the 1960s, DuPont learned that C-8 is toxic to animals and, by the 1980s, that it is potentially a human carcinogen. Despite these and other warnings, DuPont’s discharges increased between 1984 and 2000. By the early 2000s, evidence confirmed that C-8 caused several diseases among the members of the communities drinking the contaminated water, which led to a class action lawsuit against DuPont. The parties undertook negotiations and ultimately entered into a unique settlement agreement in which DuPont promised to carry out treatment of the affected water and to fund a scientific process that would inform the class members and communities about the dangers of and harms from C-8 exposure. In service of that process, the class voted to make receipt of the cash award contingent on a full medical examination to test for and collect data on C-8 exposure. A panel of scientists then conducted an approximately seven-year epidemiological study of the blood samples and medical records of over 69,000 affected community members, during which litigation against DuPont was paused. The parties’ agreement limited the legal claims that could be brought against DuPont based on the study’s determination of which diseases prevalent in the communities were likely linked to C-8 exposure. The resulting cases were consolidated in a multidistrict litigation (MDL).

After two bellwether trials and a post-bellwether trial reached jury verdicts against DuPont, the parties settled the remaining cases. That did not end all the C-8 litigation, as more class members filed suit when they became sick or discovered the connection between their diseases and C-8, including this case brought by Travis and Julie Abbott. At the Abbotts’ trial, the district court applied collateral estoppel to specific issues that were unanimously resolved in the three prior jury trials, excluded certain evidence from the trial based on the initial settlement agreement, and rejected DuPont’s motion for a directed verdict on its statute-of-limitations defense. The jury found for the Abbotts. On appeal, DuPont challenges those three district court decisions. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in full.

Question:

Is the Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority required to comply with the Municipal Purchasing Law of 1983?

Opinion:

When a transit authority is created by a municipality or county under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-56-101 to -109, the transit authority is subject to the same purchasing laws that apply to the municipality or county that established it. And when there is more than one municipality or county participating in a transit authority created under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-56-101 to -109, the transit authority must take into account the purchasing laws applicable to each participating entity and follow the most stringent applicable law to assure that each participating entity satisfies its legal obligations. Thus, in the case of the Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority, which both the City of Chattanooga and Hamilton County participate in and subsidize, the Authority must consider the purchasing laws applicable to both the City and the County and follow the most stringent law applicable to the particular purchase.

Question:

Once a judge decides to place a child in detention before the adjudication of a delinquency petition, who or what entity is responsible for the transportation of the child to and from court?

Opinion:

Once a court orders a child to be placed in pre-adjudication detention, the person who took the child into custody is responsible for transporting the child from the court to the court-ordered detention facility. Once the child has been placed in a court-ordered detention facility, the detention facility is responsible for transporting the child to and from court, but law enforcement shares that transportation responsibility.

The defendant, Gary Wood, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Roberto Digma, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his eight-year sentence for possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Andre Bowen, Petitioner, claims that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis. Discerning no error, we affirm the dismissal.