This case involves a post-divorce modification of the parties’ parenting plan for their minor child. The trial court suspended Appellant/Father’s visitation. Because the trial court failed to make any findings concerning the child’s best interest, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-404(b), 36-6-106(a), we vacate the trial court’s order.

This is an appeal of a trial judge’s denial of a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B motion for the recusal of the trial judge from the case. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion.

Tyshon Booker challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender. In fulfilling our duty to decide constitutional issues, we hold that an automatic life sentence when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender with no consideration of the juvenile’s age or other circumstances violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mr. Booker stands convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery—crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old. For the homicide conviction, the trial court automatically sentenced Mr. Booker under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(2) to life in prison, a sixty-year sentence requiring at least fifty-one years of incarceration. But this sentence does not square with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. When sentencing a juvenile homicide offender, a court must have discretion to impose a lesser sentence after considering the juvenile’s age and other circumstances. Here, the court had no sentencing discretion. In remedying this constitutional violation, we exercise judicial restraint. We need not create a new sentencing scheme or resentence Mr. Booker—his life sentence stands. Rather, we follow the policy embodied in the federal Constitution as explained in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) and grant Mr. Booker an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be properly considered. The timing of his parole hearing is based on release eligibility in the unrepealed version of section 40-35-501(h)(1), previously in effect, that provides for a term of sixty years with release eligibility of sixty percent, but not less than twenty-five years of service. Thus, Mr. Booker remains sentenced to sixty years in prison, and after he has served between twenty-five and thirty-six years, he will receive an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be considered. Our limited ruling, applying only to juvenile homicide offenders, promotes the State’s interest in finality and efficient use of resources, protects Mr. Booker’s Eighth Amendment rights, and is based on sentencing policy enacted by the General Assembly.

Decedent created a trust and named one of the beneficiaries and Appellee, a third-party bank, as co-trustees. The trust beneficiaries petitioned for Appellee’s removal and for the substitution of another beneficiary as co-trustee. The petitioners also sought an order directing Appellee to reimburse the trust for fees paid to Appellee as co-trustee. The trial court held that Appellee administered the trust diligently and without any malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance. As such, the trial court implicitly found that Appellee was entitled to its fees. The trial court further found that it would violate a material purpose of the trust to appoint, as co-trustee, another related beneficiary. Ultimately, the trial court declined to remove Appellee and to substitute another beneficiary as co-trustee. Appellant is the only petitioner/beneficiary to appeal. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in its material purpose finding, for reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s decision not to remove Appellee as co-trustee. Further, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ request that Appellee reimburse the trust for its fees. Appellee’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.

This is the second appeal of this action concerning the father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his two children. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for submission of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The father now appeals the decision on remand. We vacate the order of the trial court and remand for entry of a new permanent parenting plan for the remaining minor child.

Lori S. Fernandez (“Appellant”) was employed by the Tennessee Department of Revenue from 2014 until March 6, 2020, when she resigned. Following her resignation, Appellant sued the Department and several of its employees (the “Appellees”) for various causes of action including, inter alia, racial and disability discrimination. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the trial court’s order, as well as an amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend and declined to address the outstanding amended complaint. Appellant timely appealed to this court. We conclude that the order appealed from is non-final. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.

Appellant/Husband voluntarily nonsuited his post-divorce lawsuit involving issues of alimony and the parties’ alleged settlement of an IRS debt. Appellee/Wife moved for an award of her attorney’s fees on alternative grounds, i.e., the abusive lawsuit statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-106; the parties’ MDA; and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5- 103(c). The trial court granted Wife’s motion and entered judgment for her attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court specifically held that Husband’s lawsuit was not abusive, and Wife does not raise this as an issue on appeal. As such, we conclude that she is not entitled to her attorney’s fees under the abusive lawsuit statute. As to her claim for attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c), both grounds require that Wife be a “prevailing party” in the underlying lawsuit. Because Husband took a voluntary nonsuit, neither party prevailed in the action, and Wife is not entitled to her attorney’s fees and costs. Reversed and remanded.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Bassil Mati Yousif challenges a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his application for deferral of removal and his motion to remand to consider new evidence. Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of his application, and because the BIA acted within its discretion in denying Yousif’s motion to remand, we deny Yousif’s petition for review.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Edward Render (“Render”) sued his former employer, FCA US, LLC (“FCA”), under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq., alleging that FCA wrongfully denied him FMLA medical leave in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), and that FCA retaliated against him for requesting FMLA leave in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). FCA moved for summary judgment on both claims, which the district court granted. Render v. FCA US LLC, No. 19-12984, 2021 WL 3085401, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2021). For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Lee Jones pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, but the district court did not ensure that his plea was knowing and voluntary. Thus, we vacate Jones’s sentence.