The Defendant, Charles Lafayette Stinson, was convicted of two counts of possession with intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; two counts of simple possession of a Schedule IV drug, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2018) (simple possession); -425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia); -434 (2018) (possession with intent to sell). He received an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) allowing the State to introduce testimony regarding the Defendant’s prior criminal charges, (2) allowing the State’s rebuttal witness to testify regarding evidence beyond the scope of evidence presented in the State’s case-in-chief, and (3) failing to consider the required statistical information when sentencing the Defendant. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Markreo Quintez Springer, appeals from the Davidson County’s postconviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we dismiss the petition as untimely.

Appellants, board members and members of Appellee homeowner’s association, filed a pro se lawsuit against the homeowner’s association and other board members, who are also Appellees. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on the ground that Appellants failed to bring a proper derivative action. Appellants filed voluntary nonsuits before the trial court heard the motion to dismiss. Despite the voluntary nonsuits, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the voluntary nonsuits. The trial court also awarded Appellees a portion of their attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-56-401(e), and, alternatively, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12- 119(c). Because the trial court should have allowed Appellants’ nonsuits, we: (1) reverse the trial court’s denial of the nonsuits; (2) vacate the trial court’s order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss; and (3) vacate the trial court’s order granting Appellees’ attorney’s fees. The trial court’s order dividing the special master fees equally between the parties is affirmed.

Appellant, James D. Duncan, has appealed an order of the Hardeman County Chancery Court that was entered on December 15, 2021. We determine that the December 15, 2021 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises out of delinquency proceedings that originated in the Madison County Juvenile Court. The State filed an initial delinquency petition, but the petition was unverified. The defect in the petition remained undiscovered by the State until the first witness was sworn at the adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court dismissed the petition and found that jeopardy attached. The State filed a second verified delinquency petition. However, the juvenile court dismissed the petition finding that it violated principles of double jeopardy. The State appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the petition finding that jeopardy attached on the initial petition. The State appeals. We reverse and remand.

This appeal involves a challenge to a circuit court’s award to a landlord for a deficiency in lease payments. The landlord and tenant offered conflicting testimony regarding the terms of the parties’ agreement. The circuit court judge found the landlord’s description of the agreement more convincing than the tenant’s and awarded the landlord a judgment in the amount of $9,800 as well as costs. On appeal, the tenant insists the circuit court judge erred in his assessment of the conflicting testimony. We find the trial court’s determination to be supported by the record and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

For the week of September 19, 2022 - September 23, 2022

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of motions for recusal of the trial judge. Having carefully reviewed the record provided by the appellant, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motions.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Alexander Sittenfeld, a criminal defendant convicted by a jury in the district court, has filed a motion in this court to compel a forensic examination of a juror’s cellphone, computer, or “any electronic device that [the juror] used to make electronic communications.” Sittenfeld presented this same motion to the district court, which denied it. United States v. Sittenfeld, No. 1:20-cr-142, Dkt. 234 (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 3, 2022) (sealed). We construe Sittenfeld’s motion as an appeal from that order.

Because a court’s inherent or statutory authority in conducting a Remmer hearing does not include an unlimited, inquisitorial power to order jurors to surrender their personal possessions, such as their electronic devices, or to divulge their passwords, we hold that the district court had no power to order a forensic examination of the juror’s devices. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Sittenfeld’s motion and alert the district court that any further aspects of the Remmer hearing must comply with this opinion.

Appellant appeals the assessment of costs against him following the dismissal of his petition for a writ of certiorari. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.