Petitioner, Charles Edward Meriweather, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argues that his judgments of conviction are void because the trial court was without jurisdiction to accept his 2011 guilty pleas. Following a thorough review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Douglas Mac Richmond, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to nine counts of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective sixteen-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that he was denied due process at sentencing because the trial court allowed unreliable hearsay testimony, “infused” the court’s religious beliefs into the court’s sentencing decision, failed to consider required statistical information from the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”), and considered information outside the Defendant’s actual criminal conduct. The Defendant also claims that we should review the trial court’s sentencing decision de novo because the court did not follow the purposes and principles of sentencing and that we should grant his request for full probation or split confinement. Based on the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Defendant has not shown a violation of due process by the trial court but that a de novo review of the denial of alternative sentencing is warranted. Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the trial court properly ordered that the Defendant serve his effective sixteen-year sentence in confinement.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination existed as to the father: (1) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and (2) incarceration under a ten-year sentence. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the children. The father appeals. We affirm.

In this divorce case, we do not reach the substantive issues concerning the trial court’s division of the marital estate due to the fact that the trial court failed to designate all property as either marital or separate, failed to assign values to all property, and failed to consider the factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c). As such, we vacate the trial court’s division of the marital estate and its denial of alimony. Because the trial court failed to resolve the parties’ dispute over the Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 statement of the evidence by providing this Court with one cohesive statement, we reverse the trial court’s order concerning the statement of the evidence.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. James Mammone, a death-row prisoner in Ohio, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mammone raises four issues on appeal: whether pretrial publicity was so prejudicial that he did not receive a fair trial; whether the jurors unconstitutionally prayed before penalty-phase deliberations; whether trial counsel was ineffective; and whether appellate counsel was ineffective. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the denial of habeas relief.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. This case dealing with the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) judgment bar is on remand from the Supreme Court, and we must determine whether our published holding in Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 2005), should be overruled based on language in three subsequent Supreme Court cases. We squarely held in Harris that the FTCA judgment bar applies to other claims brought in the same action, including claims brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Harris has not been overruled by later precedent and, as a binding decision of this court, requires that we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s remaining claims.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. (“JHP”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants James H. Griffith and Lisa Lesley (collectively, “Defendants”) in this copyright infringement suit brought under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Griffith, No. 20-cv-382, 2021 WL 4899466, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 21, 2021). For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and REMAND with instructions to grant Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as to copyright standing and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. During his sophomore year of high school, Andrew (“Will”) Bannister tragically committed suicide. Will’s parents, Candace and Mark Bannister, have sought to hold his school’s administrators liable for allegedly imposing discriminatory discipline that they say led Will to take his life. For years, however, their suit has failed to make it past the pleading stage. The suit bounced back and forth between state court and federal court as their initial attorney disclaimed raising federal claims while their next attorney asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. The belated federal claims themselves have substantially evolved between the briefing in the district court (which dismissed them on statute-of-limitations grounds) and the briefing in this court. For the most part, therefore, we find that the Bannisters have forfeited their current arguments that they timely filed these claims. This case thus highlights the risks for counsel who do not develop a coherent legal theory at the outset of their case and who instead continuously adopt new arguments when problems emerge with their old ones. That approach not only delays the case’s outcome for their clients but also increases the chances that their clients will lose on something other than the merits. We affirm.

The State of Tennessee appeals the trial court’s dismissal of two counts of animal cruelty on the basis that an emu met the statutory definition of livestock under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-201, that the animal control officer was not a statutorily qualified livestock examiner and that the animal control officer’s consultation with a licensed veterinarian failed to satisfy the requirements of the livestock examination statute. See T.C.A. § 39-14-211. We conclude that the emu was not livestock under the plain language of the statute and thus no livestock examination was required to proceed with charges under the animal cruelty statute. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of counts one and two and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Mark Brian Dobson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for: failing to investigate the facts of the case or interview witnesses; failing to “prepare cross examination of State’s proof;” failing to file pretrial motion to redact from jail phone calls statements made by Petitioner’s mother referring to a gun; failing to “preserve a defense pursuant to State v. White, 382 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012);” failing to discuss mandatory consecutive sentencing with Petitioner; advising Petitioner to plead guilty “to a single count during the trial” and by failing to inform Petitioner of the consequences of his plea; failing to preserve issues for appeal; and failing to advise Petitioner to testify at trial in support of his claim of selfdefense. Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to the cumulative effect of the errors of counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.