KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. In this case the plaintiffs allege that the Department of the Air Force de facto rejects every request it receives for a religious exemption to its COVID-19 vaccine mandate—while granting requests for medical and administrative exemptions relatively freely. The district court preliminarily enjoined the Department from taking, during the pendency of this suit, certain punitive measures against a class of service members with sincere faith-based objections to receiving the vaccine. The Department has appealed that order and now moves for an emergency stay of the class-wide injunction, challenging for the most part the district court’s reasoning in certifying the class. We deny the Department’s motion but expedite our consideration of its appeal.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Indiana, Ohio, and Kentucky suspended in-person, “non-essential” business through respective “Stay at Home” orders. So plaintiff Wild Eggs1 halted dine-in operations at its restaurants in those states and then sought insurance coverage for lost revenue from defendant State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company. Wild Eggs claims in this lawsuit that State Auto breached the parties’ insurance contract when it denied coverage. The district court granted State Auto’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Wild Eggs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants—Ronald Weiser, a Republican donor and chair of the Michigan Republican Party (MRP), and the MRP—filed this action against Defendant-Appellee, Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson, alleging that an interpretative statement and a declaratory ruling issued by the Michigan Secretary of State in the 1980s (the recall exception) violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it allows supporters of Governor Gretchen Whitmer to make or receive contributions on more favorable terms than Weiser or the MRP with respect to the 2022 gubernatorial election. The district court dismissed the action for lack of standing after concluding that neither Weiser nor the MRP had suffered an injury in fact. Because Weiser and the MRP fail to plausibly demonstrate that the recall exception prevents Weiser or the MRP from equally supporting their preferred gubernatorial candidate, we AFFIRM.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The Social Security Administration (SSA) failed to perform a statutorily obligated duty to pay claimants the total amount of benefits to which they are entitled. To ensure that claimants receive the entirety of these benefits, Congress enacted two provisions in the Social Security Act: a judicial-review provision to keep the agency honest and an attorney-fees provision to incentivize lawyers to represent claimants. Because the SSA may not hide behind these statutory provisions merely because it erred at the end, rather than at the beginning, of the benefits-award process, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Nobody would dispute that El Salvador has a serious problem with violence from private gangs like MS-13. That gang’s repeated crimes—including robbery, extortion, and death threats—drove Iris Lisseth Rodriguez de Palucho; her husband, Jose Miguel Palucho Lara; and their two children to seek asylum and withholding of removal in the United States. Yet those remedies have long been interpreted to contain a “state-action” element, meaning that immigrants must show that they fear violence in their countries from the government or from parties that the government is unable or unwilling to control. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied relief to Iris and Jose because they failed to show that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to control MS-13. Iris and Jose now claim that the Board overlooked reports about the general conditions in El Salvador. They also argue that these reports would compel any reasonable factfinder to conclude that the Salvadoran government could not protect them from the gang. This case thus requires us to consider when the Board’s failure to expressly discuss certain evidence compels a remand for it to reconsider factual findings. It also requires us to consider when a country’s general conditions can permit a presumption that its government cannot protect its populace from private harm. Ultimately, because the Board recited the proper legal standards and because we must defer to its factual findings, we deny the petition for review.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mark Messing received long term disability benefits from Defendant Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company (“Provident”) from 2000 until 2018, at which time, Provident terminated Messing’s benefits. Messing commenced this action seeking the reinstatement of his benefits. Provident counterclaimed that it was entitled to reimbursement for the benefits it had paid Messing over those eighteen years. The district court denied Messing’s motion for judgment on the administr ative record, which sought to reinstate his benefits, finding that Messing had failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he remained unable to work; but the court granted Messing’s motion for summary judgment on Provident’s counterclaim. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Hobart-Mayfield, Inc. (Mayfield) is the maker of a football helmet accessory. The accessory is purported to reduce the severity of football helmet impact when it is installed on an existing football helmet. Defendants are National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment (NOCSAE); Riddell, Inc. (Riddell); Kranos Corp. (d/b/a/ Schutt Sports); and Xenith, LLC (Xenith) (collectively “Helmet Manufacturers”). NOCSAE is a nonprofit organization that develops and promotes safety standards for athletic equipment. It has a safety certification that can be applied to football helmets that meet NOCSAE’s standards. Helmet Manufacturers are makers of football helmets. Mayfield filed a complaint alleging that NOCSAE and Helmet Manufacturers are restraining trade in the football-helmet market, engaging in an overarching conspiracy to limit competition, and subjecting Mayfield to tortious interference of business relationships or expectations. Mayfield’s complaint was met with Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis that Mayfield failed to state a claim for plausible relief. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. We AFFIRM.

The Defendant, Zachary Rye Adams, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and three counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury after a change of venue. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder); 39-13-305 (2018) (especially aggravated kidnapping); 39- 13-502 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated rape). The State sought the death penalty. However, after the jury returned guilty verdicts, the parties agreed to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first degree murder, twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping, and twenty-five years for aggravated rape, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying a motion to recuse, (3) the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to disqualify an attorney from the defense team, (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), (5) the trial court erred by excluding a prior inconsistent statement, (6) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence, (7) the trial court erred by excluding impeachment evidence, (8) the trial court erred by excluding “witness reactive conduct evidence,” (9) the trial court erred by failing to strike testimony from an undisclosed witness, and (10) the cumulative error doctrine entitles him to relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The general contractor on a park and marina project brought a professional negligence action against the engineering firm that designed the project and administered the construction contract. The jury returned a verdict for the general contractor. And the trial court approved the verdict. On appeal, the engineering firm argues that it is entitled to a new trial. It contends that: (1) the jury verdict must be set aside because it is irreconcilably inconsistent; (2) the general contractor’s expert witness was not qualified to testify on the engineering standard of care; (3) and there is no material evidence to support the jury’s findings as to liability or delay damages. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is a multi-party premises liability and general negligence action among a roofer who fell from the homeowner’s roof, the homeowner who erected the scaffolding at issue, and the scaffolding company that rented the scaffolding to the homeowner, but did not erect the scaffolding. The complaint alleged that the roofer slipped and fell on the roof and then bounced over to the scaffolding before falling to the ground. The complaint also alleged that had a safety rail been installed on the scaffolding it could have prevented the roofer’s fall. The homeowner filed an answer denying liability and alleging comparative fault against the scaffolding company. Consequently, the roofer filed an amended complaint adding the scaffolding company as a codefendant. After discovery, the scaffolding company filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it owed no duty to the roofer or the homeowner because it had no control over the premises nor actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the premises. The roofer and homeowner opposed the motion contending, inter alia, that this is a case of general negligence against the scaffolding company because the homeowner relied on the scaffolding company for guidance during the installation process and the scaffolding company assumed the duty of care to ensure the scaffold was installed safely. They also contend that summary judgment was not appropriate because material facts are in dispute. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the scaffolding company, and this appeal followed. We find that the material facts are not in dispute and that the scaffolding company was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on claims sounding in premises liability and general negligence. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of all claims against the scaffolding company.