The Defendant, Tyrone De Angelo Shaw, appeals from his guilty plea conviction for aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the agreed-upon ten-year, Range II sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dan E. Durell, acting pro se, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for habeas corpus relief. We affirm.

JOHN P. GUSTAFSON, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. This appeal concerns the “uses as a residence” requirement in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).1 Kathy Ellen Richards (“Debtor”) appeals from the bankruptcy court’s order sustaining an objection to a claimed exemption in $23,298.78 that was held in escrow when Debtor filed her bankruptcy petition. Debtor claimed the funds as exempt pursuant to § 522(d)(1). The Trustee, Mark Little (“Trustee”), objected because although the funds are directly traceable proceeds of Debtor’s prepetition sale of her residence, the proceeds were not being “used as a residence” at the time the petition was filed.2 The bankruptcy court sustained Trustee’s objection, holding that the plain language of § 522(d)(1) does not apply to proceeds from a prepetition sale of a residence. The Panel AFFIRMS.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Taxes may well be “what we pay for civilized society,” Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting), but that doesn’t mean the tax collector is above the law. This case arises from the IRS’s efforts to circumvent basic contract law.

The Tax Court sided with Eaton on the major issues, concluding that the IRS had wrongfully cancelled the APAs. The parties raise a much-narrowed subset of arguments in their dueling appeals. For the reasons below, we affirm in part and reverse in part, siding with Eaton on all issues presented.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s decision to allow expenses and claims against an insolvent estate to have priority over a recorded deed of trust to the proceeds of the courtordered sale of the decedent’s encumbered real property. We hold that the statutes governing the administration of insolvent estates do not affect amounts due under a perfected deed of trust. Accordingly, proceeds from the sale of decedent’s real property must first be used to satisfy the deed of trust. Any remaining surplus is available for distribution in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-317. The judgment of the probate court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tony Latrell Greer, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of thirty-three years, ten years, and ten years, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Rikealyn L. Fain, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective sixteen-year sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-12- 101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-17-1324(b)(1) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony) (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.

Petitioner, Robert Beham, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because (1) counsel failed to request a “mental evaluation” and (2) counsel failed to present mitigating evidence in sentencing, specifically a psychosexual evaluation. Following our review, we affirm.

The plaintiff, the title holder of the disputed real property, filed a detainer action seeking the removal of the defendants from a portion of her property. The defendants were residing in a mobile home owned by the mother of one of the defendants. The defendant’s mother had lived in the mobile home, which was located on the disputed parcel of real property, from 1984 until 2020 when she decided to relocate to an apartment and allow the defendants to live in her mobile home. The defendants asserted adverse possession as a defense to the plaintiff’s detainer action, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-2- 103, tacking the mother’s years of possession onto their own. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, determining that the defendants had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother’s possession of the property had been adverse for the requisite seven-year period. The defendants appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to award Father equal parenting time with the child, arguing that limitations are warranted under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36- 6-406. We affirm the trial court’s findings that neither abandonment nor abusive conflict support limitations on parenting time under section 36-6-406. We vacate the trial court’s finding that limitations are not warranted due to physical abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse because the trial court made no finding as to whether such abuse occurred. Finally, Mother’s argument as to the exclusion of evidence is waived, as she made no offer of proof