The employee was injured at work when a ladder fell onto his outstretched arm. After a period of authorized medical treatment, including surgery to repair a rotator cuff tear, the treating physician recommended additional testing of the cervical spine but informed the employee that he had authority only to treat the shoulder. After seeking authorization for additional medical treatment from the employer without effect, the employee sought treatment on his own. The employee’s chosen physician diagnosed a nerve entrapment condition in the injured shoulder and later offered an opinion that the medical treatment he provided for that condition was reasonable, necessary, and causally related to the work accident. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court accepted the opinion of the employee’s chosen physician and ordered additional medical benefits to be provided by that physician. It also ordered the employer to reimburse certain medical costs incurred by the employee. The employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record and arguments of counsel, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) oversees the Section 8 low-income housing assistance program. Owner New Lansing renewed its Section 8 contract with Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority in 2014. In 2019, at the contractual time for its fifth-year rent adjustment, New Lansing submitted a rent comparability study (RCS) to assist CM Authority in determining the new contract rents. Following the 2017 HUD Section 8 Guidebook, CM Authority forwarded New Lansing’s RCS to HUD, which obtained an independent RCS. Based on the independent RCS undertaken pursuant to HUD’s Guidebook requirements, the Housing Authority lowered New Lansing’s contract rents amount. New Lansing sued for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. The district court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Jovan Crawford, was convicted of aggravated assault, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years’ incarceration to be served consecutively to the defendant’s prior sentences in Shelby County Case Nos. 1308038 and 1501666. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves several consolidated actions that were filed by insurance companies concerning a wildfire that occurred in Sevier County on November 28, 2016. The insurance companies alleged that the fire was sparked by a decaying Northern Red Oak tree that fell on an electrical service conductor and that the fire quickly spread to neighboring properties, including properties owned by their insureds. The insurance companies urged that the vegetation management contractor should be held liable for the losses for failing to prune or remove the diseased tree before it fell on the conductor. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the vegetation management contractor, determining, inter alia, that the contractor owed no duty to prune trees located near service drops or to inspect or remove trees that were outside the right of way that the contractor had agreed to maintain. The insurance companies have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the vegetation management contractor.

This appeal involves several consolidated actions that were filed by insurance companies concerning a wildfire that occurred in Sevier County on November 28, 2016. The insurance companies alleged that the fire was sparked by a decaying Northern Red Oak tree that fell on an electrical service conductor and that the fire quickly spread to neighboring properties, including properties owned by their insureds. The insurance companies urged that the vegetation management contractor should be held liable for the losses for failing to prune or remove the diseased tree before it fell on the conductor. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the vegetation management contractor, determining, inter alia, that the contractor owed no duty to prune trees located near service drops or to inspect or remove trees that were outside the right of way that the contractor had agreed to maintain. The insurance companies have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the vegetation management contractor.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Before us are two appeals that arise from the same intellectual-property dispute. Relevant to both, the testing company ACT, Inc. (“ACT”) asserts that its former-partner-turned-competitor, Worldwide Interactive Network, Inc. (“WIN”), infringed ACT’s copyright in its “Skill Definitions.” Skill Definitions are, in essence, descriptions of the various workplace skills that ACT intends to test with its career-readiness assessments. ACT markets those assessments to schools, workplaces, and state departments of education.

We then turn to WIN’s second appeal, which concerns a distinct but related issue. After WIN began to infringe ACT’s Skill Definitions once again with a set of “revised” Learning Objectives, the district court ordered ACT to amend its complaint with new allegations that the revised Learning Objectives are likewise infringing. In response to the amended complaint, WIN filed an amended answer asserting a never-before-offered defense: that because WIN designed the Learning Objectives to bid on various state contracts, it was entitled to assert those states’ sovereign immunity from the copyright claims—so-called “derivative sovereign immunity.” See Am. Answer ¶¶242–44, R. 551. But the district court struck the new defense as both untimely and “frivolous.” Relying on the timeliness ground alone, we affirm that decision as well.

The petitioner, Larry Lee Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Charles Lawson, entered guilty pleas to unlawful possession of a weapon, evading arrest, attempted child abuse or neglect, felony escape, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and theft of property valued $10,000 or more, and he received an effective ten-year sentence, which he was to serve on probation. The Defendant was charged with new criminal offenses, and he entered into an agreement with the prosecution resolving both the new charges and the violation of probation. The trial court rejected the plea agreement. After a hearing, the court determined that the Defendant violated probation and ordered the sentences in the probation violation case to be served in confinement. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erroneously believed that the prosecution had no authority to make a plea offer for a violation of probation, that his due process rights were violated because the court relied on evidence outside the proceedings and interjected itself into the plea process, and that the sentences imposed were illegal. We conclude that the Defendant’s claims regarding the rejection of the plea agreement by the trial court are waived, that his due process rights were not violated during the hearing addressing revocation, and that the judgments, which reflect a thirty-five percent release eligibility date, are not rendered illegal by any error in the mittimus. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The pro se petitioner, Jamie Brock, appeals from the dismissal of his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“the Act”), which petition sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in seeking DNA testing of evidence related to his first degree murder conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, David Paul Beets, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a private school, simple possession of heroin, hydrocodone, and marijuana, and driving on a suspended license, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he sold drugs in a drug-free zone or that his license had been suspended. We affirm the drug conviction but reverse the conviction of driving on a suspended license and dismiss that charge.