The Petitioner, David H. Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He maintains that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over his case because the superseding indictment was returned after the expiration of the statute of limitations for aggravated rape. The habeas court summarily denied the petition because the record failed to establish that the judgment was void. After review, we affirm the habeas court.

The Petitioner, Sterling Carter, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed a twenty-two year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction relief petition, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner had not proven his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his arguments. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, DeShawn McClenton, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal concerns a penalty assessed against a company by the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“the Bureau”). The Bureau assessed a penalty against Jase Enterprises, LLC (“Jase”), a construction company owned by Jason Usery (“Usery”), for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage. After a contested case hearing, the administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) upheld the penalty assessment but modified its amount. Jase petitioned for judicial review in the Chancery Court for Henderson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court upheld the ALJ’s decision. Jase appeals to this Court, arguing among other things that it was not afforded due process and that the decision to assess a penalty against it was arbitrary. In particular, Jase argues that the evidence did not establish that Joe Sheldon (“Sheldon”) was a Jase employee. We find that Jase was afforded due process; it received adequate notice and had an opportunity to be heard. We find further that the penalty assessment against Jase was supported by substantial and material evidence, including Sheldon’s deposition. We affirm.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. When an employer refuses to pay into its employees’ benefit funds, two federal statutes step in and offer relief. The first statute, ERISA, requires employers to contribute to employee benefit funds in line with the terms of a contract. When an employer breaches those terms, ERISA offers the jilted fund a federal vehicle for its breach-of-contract claim. And that claim comes within the “exclusive jurisdiction” of a federal district court. The second statute, the NLRA, gives employers a statutory duty to continue their contributions even after a contract expires. When an employer breaches that duty, the NLRA provides an unfair-labor-practice claim. And that claim comes within the exclusive purview of an administrative body, the NLRB.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction in certain cases where there is complete diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the parties and the district court spent years in discovery and dispositive motion practice without properly establishing the parties’citizenship. Because we are not convinced that the parties are diverse, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for consideration of subject-matter jurisdiction.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Arbitrators have broad authority. The question here is whether that authority allows the arbitrator to bind a non-signatory (someone who hasn’t signed an underlying arbitration agreement) to an arbitration award. He could if there’s clear and unmistakable evidence that the non-signatory agreed to arbitrate that question. But the district court didn’t resolve this fact-intensive threshold issue. So we vacate and remand.

This consolidated appeal involves citizen challenges, via the common law writ of certiorari, to the procedure by which the Dickson County Planning Commission and Dickson County Commission approved a settlement agreement negotiated with Titan Partners, L.L.C. Specifically, the Petitioners allege that they were entitled to notice that the settlement agreement was going to be discussed at the regularly scheduled meetings of the Planning Commission and County Commission. They further allege that executive sessions were improperly utilized to discuss the settlement agreement in violation of the Open Meetings Act. The trial court found no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirmed the actions of the Planning and County Commissions. Upon our review of the record, we agree that there was no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirm the trial court in all respects.

For the week of August 1, 2022 - August 5, 2022

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.