MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Dominique Wallace tried to rob a convenience store just weeks after his release on probation from a three-year detention for attempted murder. This crime left an accomplice dead and a victim terribly disabled. Wallace pleaded guilty to, among other things, discharging a firearm during a “crime of violence” that resulted in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), and illegally possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In this collateral challenge, Wallace asserts that we should vacate these convictions because of a pair of decisions that the Supreme Court issued after he pleaded guilty.

Wallace is right with respect to his crime-of-violence conviction under § 924(j). In United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), the Court found part of § 924’s definition of “crime of violence” to be unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2336. Given Davis, Wallace did not violate § 924(j) because his attempted robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the constitutional part of § 924’s definition. Despite his specific crime’s violent nature, his offense falls outside § 924 under the “categorical approach” to answering this crime-of-violence question.

But Wallace is wrong with respect to his felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g)(1). In Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the Court held that defendants do not violate § 922(g)(1) unless they know that they have been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison when they possess firearms. Id. at 2196. Citing Rehaif, Wallace argues that the district court erred by not informing him during his plea hearings that the government must prove that he knew his prior offense (attempted murder) was punishable by more than a year in prison. Yet Wallace procedurally defaulted this claim because he did not raise it in his criminal proceedings, and he has offered no valid reason for us to excuse this default. We thus affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s denial of Wallace’s motion to vacate his convictions.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Almost a decade ago, inmate Christopher Alan Mitchell moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that he had been erroneously designated as a career offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act. At first, Mitchell’s efforts bore fruit. Relying on then-existing law, the district court granted Mitchell’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, vacated his sentence, and set the case for resentencing. The resentencing process began but, before it was completed, developments in other cases revealed that Mitchell was a career offender after all. So the court vacated the order granting relief, denied Mitchell’s § 2255 motion, and reinstated the original sentence.

Notwithstanding the denial of his § 2255 motion, Mitchell claims that the district court enjoyed the discretion to resentence him de novo. We disagree. After finding Mitchell ineligible for § 2255 relief, the court was required to reinstate his original sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We also decline Mitchell’s request to expand his certificate of appealability.

Cody W. Bales, Defendant, pled guilty to statutory rape in July of 2019 and received a sixyear sentence to be served on supervised probation after the service of 12 months in incarceration. A probation revocation warrant was issued in April of 2021. After a hearing, the trial court revoked probation in full, ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The plaintiff was injured when his car was hit by an uninsured driver. The plaintiff was initially paid $5,000.00 from the medical payments coverage of his automobile policy. A jury then found the plaintiff’s compensatory damages to total $80,000.00. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier then paid the plaintiff $45,000.00, representing the policy limit of $50,000.00 less the prior $5,000.00 payment. The plaintiff then sought to compel the uninsured motorist carrier to pay the additional $5,000.00 owed under the uninsured motorist policy. The trial court agreed and ordered the uninsured motorist carrier to pay the plaintiff an additional $5,000.00, resulting in total payment by the carrier to the plaintiff of $55,000.00. The uninsured motorist carrier appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 28, 2022. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for relief. We granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on four issues: an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claim concerning an alleged conflict of interest, a Brady claim concerning the FBI’s method of analyzing hair samples, an IAC claim concerning the investigation at the guilt stage, and an IAC claim concerning the mitigation investigation and presentation at the penalty stage. We find no merit to any of these claims and AFFIRM. 

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the father upon concluding that the petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit the child, (2) abandonment by failure to support the child, (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the father’s custody, (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child as a putative father, and (5) risk of substantial harm to the child’s physical or psychological welfare if returned to the putative father’s legal and physical custody. The father timely appealed. Upon review of the final order, we conclude that the trial court did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) due to its failure to include sufficient findings of fact in its written order. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for the expedited entry of sufficient written findings of fact. We deny the petitioners’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Racoon Mtn. Caverns and Campground, LLC (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the judge in this case involving issues regarding real property. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Marvin Dewayne Bullock, appeals his convictions for four counts of rape of a child, five counts of rape, nine counts of incest, three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, one count of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of 178 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that due to a hearing impairment, he was unable to hear the witnesses’ testimony at trial; that the prosecutor improperly coached jurors during voir dire in how to avoid jury service; that his sentences are excessive; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the untimely filing should not be waived in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal, and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments as set forth in the opinion.

Plaintiff, a Tennessee limited liability company headquartered in Blount County, sued defendants, a former employee and a limited liability company both residents of the U.S. territory of Guam, alleging breach of a non-compete agreement. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to enforce the non-compete agreement’s forum selection clause and its express waiver of the inconvenient forum defense. We reverse, holding that the forum selection clause dictates the proper forum.