This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s decision to deny a motion to compel arbitration. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s order.

A landlord and tenant entered into a lease-purchase agreement. Near the end of the lease term, the tenant sought to exercise the purchase option. The landlord claimed that the tenant could not do so because she defaulted on rent payments. The landlord also argued that he terminated the agreement before the tenant exercised the option. The trial court rejected both arguments and granted the tenant specific performance of the purchase option. We affirm.

Upon competing petitions for adoption of a minor child whose parents are deceased, the trial court conducted a bench trial and a comparative fitness analysis of the petitioner, who is the child’s maternal grandmother, and the intervening petitioner, who is the child’s paternal aunt. The trial court found that it was in the best interest of the child to be adopted by the paternal aunt while also maintaining visitation with the maternal grandmother. Prior to the bench trial, the trial court set aside its own previously entered order granting what had been presented to the trial court by the maternal grandmother as an uncontested petition for adoption of the child despite the paternal aunt’s status as custodian of the child pursuant to a juvenile court order. In the trial court’s final order, it granted the paternal aunt’s petition for adoption and directed that the maternal grandmother would have unsupervised visitation with the child on alternate Sundays. The maternal grandmother has appealed both the order setting aside the initial grant of her adoption petition and the judgment granting the paternal aunt’s petition. Discerning no error in the trial court’s decision to set aside the initial adoption decree, we affirm the set-aside order. However, having determined that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court committed reversible error by conducting an in camera interview with the child without counsel or a court reporter present and then withholding the court’s summary of the testimony until entry of the final judgment, we vacate the court’s judgment granting the paternal aunt’s petition. We remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing solely to afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence in response to the child’s testimony and to enter a judgment after consideration of all proof presented during the trial and on remand.

Question 1: If a local governmental entity is using the professional services of an insurance producer under 2022 Tennessee Public Acts, chapter 719

Opinion 1: No. Tennessee Code Annotated § 12-3-1209(a), as amended by 2022 Tennessee Public Acts, chapter 719, does not relieve a local governmental entity from complying with competitive-bidding requirements when it purchases insurance.

Question 2: If not, to what extent may an insurance producer assist a local governmental entity in obtaining insurance?

Opinion 2: While Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-3-1209(a), as amended by 2022 Tennessee Public Acts, chapter 719, does not relieve a local governmental entity from complying with competitive-bidding requirements when it purchases insurance products, by adding “services from an insurance producer” to the other professional services that were already expressly exempt from competitive bidding under Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-3-1209(a), Public Chapter 719 does relieve a governmental entity from competitive-bidding requirements when it is procuring the services of an insurance producer. To the extent that an insurance producer is providing services in assisting a local governmental entity, competitive bids for those services are not required. Services rendered by an insurance producer to a local governmental entity could include, for instance, designing a comprehensive insurance program for the entire entity, identifying risks, recommending ways of reducing risks, and performing analyses to minimize costs while maximizing protection.

Defendant, George Steven Waters, was convicted by a jury of one count of reckless homicide. The trial court imposed a sentence of four years, suspended to ten years of supervised probation after service of 364 days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion; and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A wife sought relief from a default judgment that granted her husband a divorce and awarded him alimony. The wife argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default because she was not properly served with the complaint and that jurisdiction was not proper under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-214. The trial court denied the wife’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. Finding that the wife was entitled to a hearing on her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Deborah Lacy brought this action against Dr. Nagendra Ramanna, alleging that he committed a battery upon her by shaking her hand too forcefully during a visit in which Plaintiff was seeking medical treatment for an alleged heart condition. Following discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted after finding no evidence that the handshake caused injury to Plaintiff’s right hand. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a circuit court order dismissing an appeal from a general sessions court judgment. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal to this Court within thirty days after entry of the circuit court’s final order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

The former manager of a country music recording artist sued the artist and related business entities for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. He also sought damages from the artist’s business manager for inducement of breach of contract. The defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued, in part, that the undisputed facts showed that the parties had mutually agreed to modify the contract. And the former manager had been paid in full under the terms of the modified contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the manager argues that genuine issues of material fact as to whether he agreed to modify the contract preclude summary judgment. We conclude that the unambiguous course of dealing between the parties showed mutual assent to the modification. So we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the employer’s motions to compel a second employer’s examination of the employee and to continue a previously scheduled compensation hearing. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to continue, noting that the parties had set all deadlines by agreement, including the date for the compensation hearing, at a scheduling hearing and that the employer waited until after the hearing to file its motions despite knowing it wanted the employee to undergo a second employer’s medical examination prior to the scheduling hearing. The employer has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the employer’s motion to continue, find the appeal frivolous, and remand the case for the trial court to determine an appropriate award of attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the frivolous appeal.