CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Skatemore, Inc., Slim’s Rec, Inc., Mr. K Enterprises, Inc., M.B. and D. LLC, and R2M, LLC, operators of bowling alleys and roller-skating rinks in Michigan, sued Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, former Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (“MDHHS”) Director Robert Gordon, and the MDHHS alleging that various orders limiting the use of Plaintiffs’ properties early in the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article X of the Michigan Constitution. The district court found that Defendants were entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and accordingly dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The district court also denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint. We AFFIRM for the reasons set forth below.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Attorney E. Covington Johnston filed bare-bones Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions on behalf of Gayle Bagsby in 2016 and 2018 at the request of Gayle Bagsby’s daughter, Elizabeth Pace Bagsby. There was only one glaring issue with this arrangement—one cannot file for bankruptcy on behalf of a deceased person and Gayle Bagsby died on February 28, 2006. Elizabeth Bagsby was Administratix of her mother’s probate estate. After the dismissal of the 2018 petition, Elizabeth Bagsby, proceeding pro se, filed three more Chapter 13 petitions on Gayle Bagsby’s behalf.

In March 2019, the Chapter 13 Trustee filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions against Elizabeth Bagsby after she filed yet another Chapter 13 petition, pro se. As a result, the bankruptcy court ordered Mr. Johnston to appear and show cause as to why he should not be subject to sanctions for filing the two Chapter 13 petitions on behalf of Gayle Bagsby, a deceased person, back in 2016 and 2018.1 After the show cause hearing, the bankruptcy court reopened the first two cases filed in Gayle Bagsby’s name and issued sanctions sua sponte against Mr. Johnston and Elizabeth Bagsby. In particular, the bankruptcy court determined that 1) Mr. Johnston failed to conduct any inquiries or legal research, 2) there was no basis in existing law to support a reasonable possibility of success, and 3) the cases were filed for the express purpose of delaying foreclosure actions. Therefore, the bankruptcy court concluded Mr. Johnston violated Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and issued sanctions. Mr. Johnston appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit (“BAP”), which affirmed after finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See In re Bagsby, Nos. 19-8017/2018/8019, 2020 WL 2025906 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2020). For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order imposing sanctions against Mr. Johnston.

Defendant, Ronnie Lee Clayborn, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of rape of a child and incest, for which he received a sentence of twenty-seven years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court committed plain error by the admission of prior uncharged sex crimes to bolster the victim’s testimony; (3) rebuttal testimony from the lead detective infringed upon Defendant’s right to remain silent; (4) the trial court erred when it excluded testimony from Defendant’s father about text messages sent from Defendant to the victim’s mother on the night of the offense; (5) the prosecutor engaged in improper prosecutorial argument; (6) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the use of a facility dog during the testimony of two minor witnesses; (7) he is entitled to plain error relief based on the prosecutors’ and the lead detective’s repeated use of the term “victim” to refer to the complaining witness; and (8) cumulative error necessitates a new trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

Petitioner, Randy Champion, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) failed to use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who was an active Tipton County prosecutor and (2) failed to object to the State’s inconsistent theories, thereby waiving this court’s plenary review of the issue on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Andre Anthony, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In this dispute between Appellant, homeowner, and Appellee, homeowners’ association, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant’s property is bound by a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions. Appellant painted his home’s trim without first seeking approval from the homeowners’ association in violation of the declaration. Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to show a dispute of material fact regarding his affirmative defenses. As such, the trial court did not err in granting the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, nor in awarding attorney’s fees to Appellee under the declaration. Affirmed and remanded.

In this divorce, one of the former spouses appeals the court’s division of certain marital debt. She claims that the division was inconsistent with the court’s final judgment and that there was no basis to revisit its previous decision absent a request for relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because we conclude that the previous decision addressing debts was not a final judgment, we affirm the court’s division of marital debt.

Deanna Lynn Akers (“Wife”) and Neil E. Powers (“Husband”) were divorced by the Circuit Court for Bradley County (the “trial court”) in 2016. Wife was awarded $1,100.00 per month in alimony in futuro. Following a slew of post-trial motions and proceedings, Husband filed a petition to terminate Wife’s alimony on August 6, 2019. A hearing was held after which the trial court terminated Wife’s alimony and entered a judgment against Wife for the overpaid amount. Because the trial court erred in terminating Wife’s alimony altogether, the trial court’s decision is vacated and remanded for reinstatement of Wife’s in futuro support. Because Husband established, however, a substantial and material change in his earning ability, a modification of the amount of alimony is appropriate and should be determined by the trial court on remand.

The employee sustained a compensable injury to his shoulder while reaching to retrieve a package from a shelf. During the course of authorized medical treatment, the treating physician ordered a third round of physical therapy, which the employer declined to authorize based on a utilization review decertification. On administrative appeal, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation’s Medical Director agreed with the decertification. In addition, the employee submitted a claim for mileage reimbursement, some of which was approved by the employer and some of which was denied. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court ordered the employer to authorize the additional physical therapy and to reimburse additional mileage, and the employer appealed. Upon careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s order in part, vacate it in part, and remand the case.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. The University of Kentucky investigated two dentistry professors for entering false data about whether they, or their students, had performed services for patients at a university clinic and whether they, or the clinic, should be paid for those services. While the investigation proceeded, the provost barred the professors from seeing patients in the clinic but allowed them to perform their other duties. After the investigation ended, both professors left the University. The professors sued, alleging the University violated their rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and retaliated against them in violation of their rights to free speech under the First Amendment. Because the administrators did not violate clearly established law, qualified immunity protects them from each claim.