JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Appellant Mark Charlton-Perkins, a male research scientist, applied for a professorship at the University of Cincinnati (“UC”) in late 2017. Yet after UC determined him the most-qualified candidate for the position, or so he alleges, it refused to hire him on account of his gender. Adding insult to injury, UC then discriminatorily canceled the job search itself, ensuring that Charlton-Perkins could never fill the position. In response, he filed the present lawsuit. But the district court dismissed his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because nobody ever filled the canceled position, it reasoned, Charlton-Perkins’s claims never ripened into an adverse employment action, and thus he suffered no concrete injury cognizable in federal court. We now reverse. Charlton-Perkins has plausibly alleged a ripe employment-discrimination claim, so his suit may proceed.

In this appeal, creditor Penn Line Service, Inc. (“Penn Line”) argues that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it denied Penn Line’s application for an administrative expense claim and related motion for reconsideration and sustained Debtor’s objection to Penn Line’s proofs of claim without allowing Penn Line an opportunity to conduct discovery or hold an evidentiary hearing.

Because the Panel finds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Penn Line’s motion for reconsideration, and Penn Line did not appeal the original order denying its administrative expense or the order sustaining the objection to claims, the Panel AFFIRMS the judgment of the bankruptcy court.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Daniel Tymoc died in a car crash while speeding and driving recklessly. Tymoc’s mother, Judy Fulkerson, pursued accidental death benefits under Tymoc’s life insurance policy, issued by Unum Life Insurance Company. Unum, however, denied those benefits, invoking a policy exclusion for “losses caused by, contributed to by, or resulting from . . . commission of a crime.” Fulkerson successfully challenged Unum’s interpretation of the crime exclusion in the district court and was awarded the $100,000 accidental death benefit. Unum now appeals. Because reckless driving falls within the unambiguous plain meaning of crime, we reverse that aspect of the district court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Gary Ray Welden, appeals from the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for solicitation of a minor to engage in aggravated statutory rape and his one-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Kristopher Michael Martin, was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 210. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial erred in applying enhancement factors and that the trial court erred in failing to consider mitigating factors. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-113, -13-114. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Antonio Maurice Jackson, was convicted of three counts of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault after a bench trial. The trial court merged the homicide offenses and imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to admit the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness; the trial court’s various evidentiary decisions; the trial court’s rulings on self-defense; the trial court’s refusal to require the State to make an election on various charges; the trial court’s decision to convict the Defendant of second degree murder in Count 3 after announcing a verdict of acquittal from the bench and entering it in the minutes; and the sentencing determination. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the principles of double jeopardy prohibited the trial court from revisiting its acquittal, and we accordingly reverse the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder in Count 3. The Defendant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Roy Donald Coons, Jr., of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of first-degree felony murder, one count of attempted rape of a child, and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing the admission of the victim’s text messages, in permitting the State to introduce an excessive number of photographs of the victim, and in imposing consecutive sentences. The defendant also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms in counts one and three. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the

This is an appeal by Mother from the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment. Mother contends that her actions were not willful such as to warrant termination, while also arguing that termination is not in the best interest of the child. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court’s termination.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Chana Wiley (“Wiley”), as Administratrix for the estate of Jaron Thomas (“Thomas”), appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Columbus and some law enforcement officers, for allegedly using excessive force on Thomas resulting in his death. We AFFIRM.

The court received a petition for rehearing en banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision. The petition then was circulated to the full court. Less than a majority of the judges voted in favor of rehearing en banc.

Therefore, the petition is denied.