A wife and husband obtained a “Final Decree of Divorce.” The wife then remarried. Her first husband claimed their divorce was not final, and thus filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that her second marriage was bigamous. The declaratory judgment action was ultimately dismissed. The wife and her new husband filed a defamation action against the first husband, claiming that he had falsely accused them of bigamy. The trial court dismissed the defamation action. Because the first husband’s allegedly defamatory statements are entitled to the absolute litigation privilege, we affirm.

This case arises from a single-vehicle motorcycle accident at the intersection of State Route 1 and State Route 36 within the city limits of Kingsport, Tennessee. The cyclist contends the accident was caused by the failure of the State of Tennessee and the City of Kingsport to properly maintain the state highways; specifically, he alleges that their failure to repair a pothole caused the accident. The plaintiff filed a claim against the State with the Tennessee Division of Claims Administration, and shortly thereafter he commenced this action against the City in the Sullivan County Circuit Court. The claim against the State was later transferred and consolidated with the action against the City. Both the State and the City claimed immunity and moved for summary judgment. The State asserted that it had immunity because the City contractually agreed to maintain the highways where the accident occurred. The City asserted that it had immunity because the State owned the highways where the accident occurred. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City upon the finding the City had immunity because it did not “own” the state highways; however, it denied the State’s motion because “[t]o hold that both the State and the City [were] immune from suit would be against public policy.” We granted this interlocutory appeal to address whether the State owed a duty to the plaintiff even though it contracted with the City to maintain the highways where the plaintiff’s accident occurred. Having closely reviewed the State’s contract with the City of Kingsport, we find nothing in the contract or in Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 54-5-201 and -203 that authorizes the State to delegate its responsibilities under § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) “to exercise reasonable care under all the attendant circumstances in . . . maintaining the State system of highways” and (J) for “[d]angerous conditions on state maintained highways.” On the contrary, and as § 54-5-201 expressly provides, “the state’s obligation for maintenance of its system of highways shall be governed by those limitations now set out by law, it being the intent of this section neither to enlarge nor to diminish present obligations for this maintenance.” Because the State bears the ultimate responsibility for inspecting and maintaining state highways, we find the contract did not absolve the State of potential liability for failing to do so. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The employee, a construction laborer, reported experiencing knee and neck pain when a large metal pipe struck his left leg and pinned him momentarily. The employer accepted the compensability of the claim and initiated benefits by directing the employee to a walk-in clinic. After several weeks of evaluation and treatment, the provider at the walk-in clinic made a “stat” referral to an orthopedic specialist, and the walk-in clinic’s staff scheduled the employee an appointment with a specific orthopedic physician to occur two business days after the referral. Approximately one month later, the employer’s representative provided the employee a panel of orthopedic specialists and informed the employee that treatment with the orthopedic physician he had already seen was unauthorized. The employee declined to select a new orthopedic physician from the employer’s panel. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court ordered the employer to authorize treatment with the orthopedic physician the employee had seen upon the referral of the original medical provider, and the employer appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Thomas Fox and others like him failed to pay some of their property taxes. So the counties they owed foreclosed on their property and sold it. But the counties did not just keep the money owed; they kept all of the sale proceeds—sometimes tens of thousands of dollars beyond the taxes due. None of it went back to the property owners. Seeking to receive the rest of their money back, Fox filed this class action against the counties.

After learning about the property owners’ plight, Asset Recovery Inc. contacted potential plaintiffs about pursuing relief on their behalf. Fox believed that ARI was improperly soliciting class members, so he asked the district court to order ARI to (1) stop contacting class members and (2) allow class members to back out of their agreements with ARI. The district court granted Fox’s motion. ARI appeals that order. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

A jury convicted Douglas E. Linville of multiple drug offenses that occurred in a drug-free zone, in this case within 1,000 feet of a city park. Because the offenses occurred in a drugfree zone, the trial court imposed sentences that required full service of at least the minimum term within the appropriate sentencing range prior to release. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(c) (2014) (amended 2020 & 2022).2 On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected challenges to the convictions. However, consistent with Mr. Linville’s brief, the intermediate appellate court noted that the judgment for one of the convictions erroneously referred to the controlled substance at issue—Xanax or Alprazolam—as Schedule III when it was actually Schedule IV. In so noting, the court also concluded sua sponte that the felony class reflected on the judgment for that conviction was incorrect because Tennessee law required a one-class enhancement for an offense that occurred in a drug-free zone. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(b)(1) (2014). We accepted Mr. Linville’s appeal. Based on our review of the relevant statutory provisions, we conclude that because the drug-free zone in this case related to a public park, the offenses were not subject to a one-class enhancement. We, however, further conclude that the offenses were subject to the requirement to serve in full at least the minimum sentence for the appropriate range prior to release. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in part, affirm the judgments of the trial court, and remand this matter to the trial court for correction of a clerical error in one judgment.

The petitioner, Gregory Arnez Goff, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, George John Byrd, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his three aggravated rape convictions, his aggravated assault conviction, and the resulting effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by “opening the door” to evidence that was detrimental to the Petitioner, inadequately preparing for trial, failing to interview and call certain defense witnesses, and failing to prepare the Petitioner to testify at trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals this ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This appeal involves the consideration of several issues contested among family members, including those pertaining to the fiduciary duties owed by a son who served as a trustee of trusts created by his parents. The trial court granted significant monetary relief to the son’s sisters following a bench trial, including for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, but it rejected other aspects of the sisters’ requested relief. The son presently maintains that he should be absolved of liability for his breach of fiduciary duties, whereas his sisters complain that the trial court did not award them sufficient relief. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal is a parentage action involving a same-sex domestic partnership, in which the petitioner filed a petition seeking to be recognized as a legal parent of a child born by artificial insemination after the parties made the mutual decision to have the child. The juvenile court granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss finding that the petitioner lacked standing. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.