A former wife sued her former husband for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of the disclosure warranty in the marital dissolution agreement entered in their divorce fifteen years earlier. Finding that the former wife released those claims through an agreed order entered three years before the underlying action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the former husband. We affirm.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. John Helton appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and its decision to excuse a juror during trial. Because the district court found that the search warrant for Helton’s home established both probable cause and nexus to the home, it denied the motion to suppress. The court excused the juror based on concerns that the juror could not set aside her personal knowledge of a trial witness. We find no error in the district court’s decision to excuse the juror. We hold that the search warrant did not satisfy constitutional requirements. But because the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

The Defendant, Ronald Edward Boykin, Jr., pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced to concurrent fifteen-year sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction with release eligibility after serving thirty percent of the sentences. The Defendant was also required to register as a sex offender and to be subject to community supervision for life. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that “[t]he trial court erred in holding that the lifetime community supervision portion of [the Defendant’s] sentence is legal, where the statutory authority for that provision mandates lifetime supervision for certain offenses but not the offenses for which [the Defendant] was convicted.” The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

This is a declaratory judgment action concerning an express ingress/egress easement that provides access via The Garden Inn at Bee Rock in Monterey, Tennessee, to a neighboring natural landmark owned by the Town of Monterey, Tennessee. After years of public use of the easement to access the landmark, The Garden Inn took steps to physically hinder the public’s use of the easement. As a consequence, the Town of Monterey and others commenced this action against The Garden Inn, LLC, to declare the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties. After years of litigation, The Garden Inn contended that a conservation foundation was an indispensable party. In doing so, The Garden Inn contended that failure to add the conservation foundation, which holds a conservation easement by which it may prohibit certain uses of the landmark property, would subject The Garden Inn to multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations. The trial court disagreed, holding that the conservation foundation “has no interest in the fight with respect to the interpretation of this easement for ingress and egress.” Thereafter, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town of Monterey concerning the scope and uses of the easement. The Garden Inn appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that the conservation foundation was not an indispensable party. We affirm.

This appeal arises from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a construction dispute involving the purchase of a newly constructed townhome in Nashville. The plaintiffs brought suit in the Davidson County Circuit Court, asserting claims of promissory fraud, breach of contract, and breach of implied warranty, while also attempting to pierce the corporate veil of one of the involved companies. The defendants filed motions to dismiss and/or compel arbitration, contending that the contract between the parties required the matter to be resolved via arbitration. The trial court denied the motions in an order finding that the arbitration clause relied upon by the defendants was part of a warranty that was not included in the initial contract and to which the plaintiffs had not agreed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motions.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a hearing with respect to the mother’s request to relocate to Ohio with the parties’ minor child, a request which the father opposed. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order permitting relocation and modifying the parties’ permanent parenting plan to provide the father with more co-parenting time. The trial court also granted an award of attorney’s fees to the mother. The father has appealed. Based on the trial court’s failure to render sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning its award of attorney’s fees to the mother, we vacate the attorney’s fee award and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the basis for its decision to award attorney’s fees to the mother and the reasonableness of the amount awarded. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

This appeal is a health care liability case involving issues of pre-suit notice and the statutory requirements under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment; granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice after determining she failed to give the defendant pre-suit notice in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

In this appeal, the employer contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. The employer asserted that the employee did not file a timely petition for benefit determination while the employee claimed he filed a petition prior to the employer’s last payment of benefits. The trial court determined a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations barred the employee’s claim and denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment. The employer has appealed, arguing the trial court erred in concluding there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of the employee’s petition for benefits. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude there are no genuine issues of material fact. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the case for the trial court to enter an order granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the employee’s case with prejudice.

The petitioner, Harold Allen Vaughn, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in relying on our supreme court’s decision in Cordarius Maxwell v. State, No. 2018-00318-SC-R11-PC (Tenn. Sept. 3, 2019) (order) and finding his petition procedurally deficient. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the dismissal.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Mammoth Cave National Park in Kentucky is home to the world’s longest known cave system, spanning more than 400 miles. It is also where Jason Zabel committed abusive sexual contact against a female National Park Service employee—a crime for which he pled guilty and received a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, followed by a life term of supervised release. On appeal, Zabel argues that the district court erred in denying his pre-guilty-plea motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to park rangers and that his sentence—both the term of incarceration and lifetime supervision—was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He also contends that his statutory maximum term of supervised release violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment and sentence.