A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellants, Glenn Roby, Jr., and Kevyn Deshawn Allen, of first degree premediated murder, and the trial court sentenced them to life in confinement. On appeal, Roby contends that the trial court erred by allowing proof of a robbery and shooting that occurred just hours prior to the events in this case, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to play portions of a witness’s recorded interview for the jury as a prior inconsistent statement, that the trial court erred by denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and that he was denied his right to subpoena witnesses. Allen contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his severance motion. In addition, both Appellants contend that the trial court erred by allowing inflammatory crime scene and autopsy photographs into evidence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this mandamus action, the petitioner/relator, acting on relation to the state, sought to have the trial court, inter alia, issue writs requiring the state governor and county health department administrator to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 68-5-104, which pertains to “[i]solation or quarantine.” The relator named the governor and health department administrator as respondents in both their official and “personal” capacities. Upon the respondents’ respective motions to dismiss the petition and following a hearing, the trial court entered separate orders granting the motions to dismiss as to each respondent, finding, as pertinent on appeal, that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to the claim against the governor in a mandamus action, (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to the claim against the health department administrator because the relator lacked standing, and (3) the relator otherwise failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The trial court also granted the health department administrator’s motion for a reasonable award of attorney’s fees and costs in defending against the lawsuit in her personal capacity pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113. The relator filed motions to alter or amend, which the trial court denied following a hearing in orders certified as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The relator timely appealed. Concluding that (1) the trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction is dispositive as to the action against the governor in his official capacity, (2) the relator’s lack of standing is dispositive as to the action against the county health administrator in her official capacity, and (3) the relator’s actions against both respondents in their personal capacities failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal orders. We clarify, however, that the relator’s lack of standing with respect to his claim against the county health administrator did not equate to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court.

Petitioner/Appellee filed a petition in chancery court against Respondents/Appellants, alleging various claims related to allegedly false and defamatory statements made by the Respondents/Appellants. An objection was made to the chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction, seeking dismissal or transfer of the action to circuit court. The chancery court denied the motion to dismiss or transfer and ultimately rendered judgment in favor of Petitioner/Appellee. We conclude that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the judgment of the chancery court regarding subject matter jurisdiction, vacate all other orders of judgment entered by the trial court, and remand the case for transfer to circuit court.

For the week of May 16, 2022 - May 20, 2022

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. NOCO Company manufactures and sells battery chargers and related products. Although it sells these products itself, NOCO also authorizes resellers if they sign an agreement. This dispute began when NOCO discovered that OJ Commerce (OJC) was selling NOCO’s products on Amazon without authorization. NOCO complained to Amazon that OJC was selling NOCO’s products in violation of Amazon’s policy. And around the same time, another company also complained to Amazon about OJC. Amazon asked OJC for proof that it was complying with its policy. But OJC didn’t provide adequate documents and Amazon temporarily deactivated OJC’s account. Now, OJC blames NOCO. It argues that NOCO submitted false complaints, and it brings three claims against NOCO: defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, and a violation of the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

To succeed on these claims, though, OJC must establish that NOCO was the proximate cause of its injury. But it can’t do this because three intervening causes broke the causal chain, relieving NOCO of any liability. Thus, the district court rejected OJC’s claims on summary judgment, and we AFFIRM.

This case concerns the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers imposed by an interim final rule of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). See Vaccine and Mask Requirements To Mitigate the Spread of COVID-19 in Head Start Programs, 86 Fed. Reg. 68,052 (Nov. 30, 2021). Head Start is a federal program that funds early childhood education for low-income children and provides other resources and education to the children’s families. See 42 U.S.C. § 9831. Plaintiffs Livingston Educational Service Agency and Wayne-Westland Community Schools, both Head Start grantees in Michigan, brought suit to challenge the interim final rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Congressional Review Act, and several provisions of the United States Constitution. The district court granted a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) but later denied a preliminary injunction and dissolved the TRO. Plaintiffs appeal the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. At issue here is plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal.

Because the plaintiffs do not show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, we do not address the other factors that govern whether plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction pending appeal. The motion for an injunction pending appeal is DENIED.

This case involves the interpretation of a commercial lease provision containing a tenant improvement allowance. Following a hearing, the trial court initially entered an order in August 2020, granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs/assignees and directing the defendant/assignor, Young Street Partners II, LLC (“Young Street”), to reimburse the plaintiffs for $92,000.00 they had paid to a tenant claiming the improvement allowance, as well as costs, attorney’s fees, and statutory prejudgment interest. Upon the filing of subsequent competing motions for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court confirmed its prior judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and further dismissed Young Street’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees and costs in an order entered in January 2021, thereby denying Young Street’s motion for partial summary judgment. Following entry of an order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice against all defendants except Young Street and upon the plaintiffs’ motion, the trial court entered an order certifying its January 2021 order as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Young Street has appealed. Determining that the trial court improvidently granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, we vacate the judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. We deny the plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Kola Hasanaj, a teacher certified in Michigan, was employed by the Detroit Public Schools Community District (District) as a teacher for ten years under a series of contracts. After about seven years, the District stopped sending contract renewal notices to Hasanaj. He received “ineffective” ratings in the three years that followed, so the District dismissed him as required by state law. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1249(2)(j). Hasanaj sued the District and various school officials for alleged violations of state and federal law, including denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. He alleges that he and defendants “acted with the understanding that he had tenure,” the evaluation ratings violated Michigan’s statutory evaluation system, and now he cannot use his certificate to teach in Michigan. At the pleading stage, the district court dismissed the lawsuit.

Because Hasanaj has not satisfied Michigan’s statutory tenure system, he has no protected property interest in continued employment. Nor has he been deprived of his liberty to pursue his profession because he still holds a valid Michigan certificate to teach. Finding that Hasanaj’s other claims also fail under the Family Medical Leave Act and state law, we affirm.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Jane Doe and Sally Doe,1 two female students at Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (“MNPS”), were videoed by other students engaging in sexual activity with male students at school. Through their parents, they sued MNPS alleging violations of Title IX and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MNPS on the students’ claims. We vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand. 

Roy Michael Ford, Defendant, was indicted for several offenses in relation to the death of Scotty Brogan, the victim. Defendant sought severance of the second degree murder charge from the remaining offenses.1 The trial court granted the request and Defendant proceeded to trial on the second degree murder charge. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to 17 years in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the second degree murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the deceased victim; (3) the trial court improperly permitted a witness to testify about what she would have done had she been in Defendant’s position; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.