The trial court denied a defendant’s motion to amend to include a cross-claim against another defendant. We reverse.

This appeal involves requests for admissions of fact served pursuant to Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. After the employee failed to serve timely responses to the employer’s requests for admissions, the employer filed a motion asking the trial court to deem the statements admitted. In reply, the employee filed responses to the requests for admissions more than thirty days after the requests were served but did not otherwise respond to the employer’s motion. The trial court denied the employer’s motion, and the employer has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s order in part and remand the case.

The Appellant, David Ian Lemons, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of eleven drug and weapons offenses, ranging from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twenty-three-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his effective sentence is excessive because the trial court improperly applied an enhancement factor and improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. The State acknowledges that while the trial court may have partially misapplied an enhancement factor, the Appellant’s twenty-threeyear sentence is not excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Cedric Evans, Petitioner, sought post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for second degree murder and felon in possession of a firearm, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Corey Dendy, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contact a witness prior to the Petitioner’s guilty plea and that the Petitioner’s guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Crockett County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Tiffany T. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Miranda and Baylee (“the Children”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on four grounds and finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing solely that the Juvenile Court erred in its best interest determination. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that DCS proved four grounds for termination of parental rights against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. At issue in this case is whether Congress has plenary power to regulate the conduct of American citizens after they travel overseas. Micky Rife, a Kentucky-born U.S. citizen, travelled to Cambodia and, years later, sexually abused two girls. After returning to Kentucky, he pled guilty to engaging in illicit sexual conduct abroad in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). Rife now argues that Congress lacked power to regulate the conduct for which he was convicted. We agree with him that Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause does not support his conviction. But we also conclude—based on Supreme Court precedent alone—that § 2423(c) as applied here was within Congress’s power to enact legislation implementing treaties. We therefore affirm his conviction.

Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from the custody of Polly H. (“Mother”) and Billy H. (“Father”) in March 2020 after receiving a referral regarding the family and allegations of abuse, and after Mother’s partner was found at the home with Mother and the children in violation of a permanent restraining order against Mother’s partner. In December 2020, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. DCS alleged, as statutory grounds for termination, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse. Father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights on the day of the trial. The trial court found that DCS proved four of the five grounds for termination of Mother’s rights by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate holding that the parental rights of Mother should be terminated.

COLE, Circuit Judge. Paul Dorsa filed a retaliation claim under the False Claims Act against his former employer, Miraca Life Sciences, Inc., in November 2013. Miraca sought to dismiss this claim because Dorsa had agreed to binding arbitration as part of his employment agreement with Miraca. The district court denied Miraca’s motion to dismiss, finding that the arbitration clause did not cover Dorsa’s retaliation claim. Miraca appealed, but this court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Miraca then filed a petition to stay the action and to compel arbitration. The district court also denied that petition. On appeal, Miraca contests the district court’s authority to decide threshold questions of arbitrability and its ruling on the merits. But Miraca has forfeited and waived the arguments now before us, so we affirm.

Defendant, Corey Taylor, entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault and was sentenced to four years, suspended to supervised probation. Following a hearing on a warrant alleging a violation of probation based on new arrests and failure to report, the trial court found defendant in violation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the probation violation warrant on speedy trial grounds. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.