The Defendant, Darick A. Hinerman, was convicted by a Robertson County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, and (3) the trial court erred during jury instructions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, appeals the post-conviction court’s refusal to vacate his guilty plea to second-degree murder after the vacating his guilty plea to attempted aggravated rape based on trial counsel’s failure to inform Petitioner that he would be subject to mandatory lifetime community supervision for the attempted aggravated rape conviction. The State argues that the post-conviction court erred by vacating the attempted aggravated rape conviction. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for reinstatement of the original judgment of conviction and sentence previously imposed for attempted aggravated rape.

As part of a divorce decree, the trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan for three minor children. The court’s plan provided for substantially equal parenting time and joint decision making for major decisions. The plan was expressly conditioned on the parents remaining within the children’s current school district after the divorce. The father argues that neither equal parenting time nor joint decision making were appropriate based on the evidence presented. And he maintains that the court lacked authority to include a residency requirement in the plan. He also contends that the court failed to address some of his claims. We conclude that the court, either expressly or implicitly, resolved all claims between the parties. And because the court did not abuse its discretion in establishing the parenting plan, we affirm.

Following the return of his seized property under the forfeiture statutes, claimant asked the administrative law judge to award him attorney’s fees under two separate statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The administrative law judge awarded fees under only the former statute. Upon review by the chancery court, the decision to award fees under section 4-5-325(a) was reversed; the chancery court also ruled that claimant’s request for fees under the federal statute was waived or abandoned. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that claimant is not entitled to fees under section 4- 5-325(a). We remand to the trial court for consideration of the previously pretermitted claim for attorney’s fees under section 1988(b).

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Felicia Morgan has long suffered from mental illness and has spent a large portion of her life incarcerated. While imprisoned, Morgan was temporarily moved to United Community Hospital (UCH), a private contractor that housed severely mentally ill inmates for Wayne County, Michigan. Three Wayne County deputies were scheduled to supervise the inmates in the UCH ward at all times. But on the afternoon of November 15, 2005, one deputy took his lunch break and a second left to use the restroom, leaving only one deputy in the unit. During those moments, there was a sexual encounter between Morgan and another inmate. After her release from prison, Morgan filed this lawsuit, alleging that the county and the on-duty deputies were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm to her. The district court entered judgment in favor of defendants, and we affirm.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Federal law makes it a crime for so-called “straw purchasers” to tell licensed firearms dealers that they are buying a firearm for themselves when, in fact, they are buying it for someone else. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6); Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179–89 (2014). Straw purchasers sometimes engage in these stealth transactions because the true buyers (for example, felons) cannot buy guns themselves. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). These types of straw purchases raise heightened safety concerns, so the Sentencing Guidelines instruct courts to increase a straw purchaser’s potential sentence in certain cases if the purchaser had “knowledge” or “reason to believe” that the true buyer could not lawfully possess the firearm. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B).

What does it take for a straw purchaser to have “reason to believe” that the true buyer cannot lawfully possess the gun? This case raises that question. Dominique McKenzie admits that he was a straw purchaser for two individuals but disputes that he had “reason to believe” that they could not possess firearms. We interpret that phrase—one commonly used in the probable-cause context—to require, at most, that a straw purchaser know of facts creating a fair probability that the true buyer could not possess a firearm. And we agree with the district court that McKenzie had knowledge of such facts in this case. We thus affirm its use of this guideline.

Aggrieved of his Madison County Circuit Court Jury convictions of simple possession of marijuana, possession with intent to deliver not less than one-half ounce of marijuana, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, the defendant, Larry Donnell Higgins, Jr., appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the denial of his motion for a mistrial. Because the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Randy Oscar Blakeney, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery and received a sentence of life plus forty years in confinement. Subsequently, he filed a petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court summarily denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The employee reported an injury to her right arm and shoulder when it was struck by a large cart at work. The employer initially accepted the claim as compensable and authorized medical treatment. Following two missed medical appointments, the employer denied the claim and refused to authorize additional medical care. After an expedited hearing, the trial court concluded the employee had come forward with sufficient evidence to show a likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to her claim for additional medical benefits. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

King’s Daughters Health System, Inc., doing business as King’s Daughters Medical Center (“KDMC”), petitions for a writ of mandamus, asking that we compel the district court to vacate its order granting a motion to compel and, further, that we compel the court to deny the motion to compel. For the following reasons, we deny KDMC’s petition for a writ of mandamus.