SUTTON, Chief Judge. Last fall, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum to his deputies outlining the Department’s immigration enforcement priorities and policies. Arizona, Montana, and Ohio filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Ohio to enjoin its implementation. The district court issued a “nationwide preliminary injunction,” applicable to all 50 States, blocking the Department from relying on the priorities and policies in the memorandum in making certain arrest, detention, and removal decisions. The National Government asks for a stay pending appeal. For the reasons that follow, we grant the stay.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Kevin Lindke and his ex-girlfriend, Ami Moeller, engaged in a contentious child custody dispute, during which Moeller obtained a domestic personal protection order (PPO) against Lindke. After she sued Lindke for violating that PPO, defendant Judge John Tomlinson, a Michigan probate court judge, agreed and ruled in her favor. Rather than appeal that determination in Michigan state court, Lindke sued Judge Tomlinson and county sheriff Mat King in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to enjoin enforcement of Michigan’s domestic PPO statute. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that no subject-matter jurisdiction existed in the case against Judge Tomlinson and that Lindke failed to state a claim against Sheriff King. We agree and affirm.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Elmer Chelf, a former employee of Wal-Mart, was on long-term disability leave when he passed away. His widow, Ruth Mae Chelf, was denied benefits under his work-based optional term life insurance policy. She brought claims against Wal-Mart and the Plan Administrator (collectively, Wal-Mart) for breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (ERISA).1 Her suit alleges that Wal-Mart breached its fiduciary duty to Mr. Chelf in several ways, including by assessing certain premiums in error; by failing to inform him that his premiums were assessed in error; by failing to remit premiums to Prudential to cover his optional life insurance policy resulting in that policy’s termination; by failing to inform Mr. Chelf that his accrued paid time off (PTO) could cover his life insurance premiums; and by failing to notify him of his right to convert his term life insurance policy. Wal-Mart filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted, dismissing Ms. Chelf’s fiduciary breach claims with prejudice. We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Amanda L. Moore, Defendant, appeals after a jury convicted her of two counts of vehicular assault, one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court merged the DUI conviction into the convictions for vehicular assault. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of four years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court improperly admitted the results of a blood draw used by the hospital for medical treatment; (2) the trial court improperly allowed her to be questioned extensively about her driving history on cross-examination; (3) the trial court improperly allowed the State to meet with its expert during cross-examination; and (4) the trial court had improper ex parte communication with the jury during deliberation. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment form for DUI.

Defendant, Mark Dewayne McMurry, was indicted for and pleaded guilty to robbery. Prior to sentencing, Defendant moved to recuse the trial judge. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for recusal and, following a sentencing hearing, sentenced Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to serve 10 years in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges his sentence as excessive and argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for recusal. Following our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Wayne David Jones, was convicted by a jury of two counts of reckless homicide, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of child neglect, for which he received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficent to support his convictions because the jury improperly weighed conflicting expert medical testimony regarding the thirteen-month-old victim’s head trauma and cause of death. Following our review, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions. However, we determine error with the classification of the Defendant’s child neglect conviction as a Class A misdmeanor and the imposition of a misdemeanor sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the conviction and sentence for child neglect and remand for entry of a modified Class E felony child neglect conviction and for the trial court to impose a corresponding felony sentence. In all other respects, we affirm.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Derrick Himes, of three counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years for each rape of a child conviction and eight years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for each rape of a child conviction, concurrent sentences of eight years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, and ordered that the twenty-five- year sentence and the eight-year sentence be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to elicit irrelevant and prejudicial testimony from the State’s witnesses, and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Tut Mayal Tut, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgments.

The pro se Petitioner, Lamario Hill, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment and concurrent sentences of nine and four years, respectively. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the judgment for his life sentence is void (1) because it was imposed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 501(i), which he claims is invalid, and because it was imposed in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-501(a)(2) and 40-28-115(b)(1); and (2) because it was imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Markist Cole, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that due process considerations warranted the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.