In this post-divorce action, Douglas Patrick Hoering (“Husband”) petitioned for a modification of his periodic alimony payment to Marlita Dapar (“Wife”), alleging that “she is no longer suffering from a financial disadvantage, as she has obtained housing and support from her paramour for some time.” The trial court ordered a reduction in Husband’s monthly spousal support payment from $1,200 to $600, in a judgment containing no findings of fact. Based on our de novo review of the record, we hold that Husband failed to demonstrate a substantial and material change of circumstances that would warrant decreasing his payment of alimony in futuro to Wife. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

On December 4, 2006, the Defendant entered a guilty plea to rape of a child and received an agreed seventeen-year, six-month sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On January 11, 2021, the Defendant filed a Motion to Correct Judgment pursuant to Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming that he had not received all the pre-trial jail credit he was owed. After review, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Nicholas Nunley pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 112 months in prison. He now challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his below-Guidelines sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Steven P. McDonald filed for individual Chapter 7 bankruptcy in late 2015. As part of those proceedings, the United States Trustee filed a complaint seeking denial of McDonald’s discharge of his debts. The Trustee argued that 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) prevented discharge of those debts because McDonald had failed to satisfactorily explain the dissipation of many of his assets. The bankruptcy court agreed and granted summary judgment to the Trustee in part. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. We affirm as well.

A majority of the Judges of this Court in regular active service has voted for rehearing en banc of this case. Sixth Circuit Rule 35(b) provides as follows:

The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to vacate the previous opinion and judgment of this court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on the docket sheet as a pending appeal.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the previous decision and judgment of this court are vacated, the mandate is stayed and this case is restored to the docket as a pending appeal. 

The Clerk will direct the parties to file supplemental briefs and will schedule this case for oral argument as soon as possible.

The Petitioner, Jamarcus Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murder, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to subpoena critical defense witnesses. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Lance Falcon, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the trial court’s questioning of the Petitioner during his testimony before the jury and that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for not raising an objection to the lack of merger and/or violation of double jeopardy as to count three of the indictment. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief.

Defendant, Kenneth Cox, was acquitted of premeditated murder and convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of especially aggravated robbery and three counts of the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide. The trial court properly merged Defendant’s convictions and imposed an effective sentence of 38 years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police following his invocation of his right to counsel and that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Having reviewed the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This personal injury action arose following a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff timely commenced an action in which she sought $1 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. After the defendant was served but failed to file an answer to the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment, which the trial court granted as to liability only, leaving open the amount of damages to be awarded. The case remained dormant for seven years until the plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint that increased the request for compensatory damages from $1 million to $2 million. The amended complaint, however, was never served on the defendant. Thereafter, a final judgment was entered in which the plaintiff was awarded the monetary damages she sought in the amended complaint, that being $2 million for compensatory damages and $1 million for punitive damages. Seventeen months later, and after paying $30,000 toward the $3 million judgment, the defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) motion to set aside the default judgment on the ground the judgment was void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff opposed the motion arguing, inter alia, that the Rule 60.02(3) motion was untimely and that it should be denied based on exceptional circumstances as recognized in Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 2015). Following a hearing and finding the motion timely, the trial court determined (1) that the defendant had not been served with the amended complaint, (2) that the judgment was void, and (3) that the plaintiff had not proven the requisite exceptional circumstances to deprive the defendant of Rule 60 relief due to the plaintiff’s failure to establish another person’s detrimental reliance on the void judgment. We affirm.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. When contract negotiations broke down between an Ohio juvenile court and the union that represents the court’s employees, the union took the court to federal court. Because the juvenile court is an arm of the State, the district court correctly held that sovereign immunity bars most of the union’s claims. And because the union’s remaining contentions fail to state a claim for relief, we affirm across the board.