At issue is an election commission’s decision to set an election on proposed referendum measures to a local government’s charter. In pre-election litigation over this decision, the trial court concluded, for various reasons, that the election commission’s decision to hold the election should be reversed. The election commission now urges this Court to reinstate its decision to hold an election and to remand this matter to it with instructions to schedule a referendum election at a future date pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-3- 204(a). As explained in more detail in this Opinion, we conclude that this requested relief is not proper under the cited statute. Moreover, because this appeal cannot serve as a vehicle to grant the election commission any relief, we consider the matter moot. Notwithstanding this posture in the case, we do find it appropriate, in the exercise of our discretion, to address one of the specific legal issues presented by this appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine. As to that issue, which concerns the interpretation of a form requirement the local government’s charter places on petitions to amend the charter by referendum election, we agree with the trial court that the referendum petition at issue in this case ran afoul of the requirement in dispute.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will. Mary Bell McGraw Marlin (“Decedent”)1, a property owner in Rutherford County, left her farm to her surviving children. Decedent’s holographic will provided equal acres to each heir, although a survey purporting to show how to divide the land was missing. After years of futile discussions over how to divide the farm, Decedent’s grandson Harry Marlin, III filed suit in chancery court seeking to partition the land. The matter was referred to the Probate Court for Rutherford County (“the Probate Court”). After a hearing, the Probate Court entered an order dividing the land amongst the heirs. Harry Marlin, III appeals. He argues that the Probate Court erred by dividing the land into equal acres without regard to the economic value of the respective tracts. We hold, inter alia, that Decedent’s will controls and it provided for equal acres, not equally valued acres. We further find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Probate Court’s determination as to which tract each heir was to receive. We affirm.

This is a premises liability case arising from injuries sustained by Appellant Anthony Walker when he attempted to mow a section of ground within the common area controlled by Appellee, Rivertrail Crossing Homeowner’s Association. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The police seized a vehicle and commenced a forfeiture proceeding. The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security notified the vehicle owner that a forfeiture warrant for the vehicle had been issued. And the owner filed a written claim and request for a hearing. But before the hearing could take place, the administrative law judge granted the Department’s request for a voluntary dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding. In a subsequent order, the administrative law judge awarded attorney’s fees to the owner under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325(a). The Department petitioned for judicial review of the fee award. The owner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the administrative decision was not final because the order did not address her request for attorney’s fees under a federal statute. After denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that the fee award violated the state statute. So it vacated the administrative decision. On appeal, the owner argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss and in ruling that the fee award violated the state statute. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dashun Shackleford, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury as charged in a twenty-count indictment; four alternative counts each of aggravated robbery against four victims and four corresponding counts of criminal gang offense enhancement. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into four counts and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration to be served at 85 percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his gang enhancement convictions; and (2) the gang enhancement counts violate his constitutional rights to due process and expressive association. Upon our review, we conclude that the State failed to sufficiently prove the gang enhancement counts and failed to comply with the notice requirements mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35- 121(g). Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the judgments in Counts 13 through 16, and remand for resentencing as to those counts. Because the gang enhancements are no longer applicable to the Defendant’s case, we decline to address the constitutional questions raised in this appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, McArthur Bobo, was convicted by a Shelby County criminal court jury of second-degree murder in 2009. Following a remand from our supreme court, the trial court held a new hearing on the Defendant’s motion for new trial on May 12, 2021, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred 1) in denying the motion for new trial because it was unable to act as thirteenth juror in determining the sufficiency of the evidence; 2) in failing to grant a mistrial or striking the testimony of a witness whose written statement was allegedly not provided to the Defendant; 3) in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress; 4) in admitting jailhouse calls into evidence; 5) in allowing testimony that children were present near the shooting scene; and 6) in failing to grant a mistrial based on a totality of all errors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this action alleging violations of a federal securities law due to purported misrepresentations and omissions in an initial public stock offering, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of all persons who purchased common stock during the initial public offering. The trial court certified the class, determining that the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23 had been satisfied. The defendants have appealed. Although we dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77l, due to lack of standing, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s certification of the proposed class.

Father appeals the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time and an award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Specifically, Father argues that Mother is a high risk for abduction of the parties’ children and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her unsupervised visitation. We affirm the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time to Mother, but we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that seven grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to support; (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard; (4) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (5) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (6) persistent conditions; and (7) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Additionally, the juvenile court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the ground of abandonment by failure to visit. We reverse the juvenile court in part and affirm in part, affirming the ultimate termination of parental rights.

In this interlocutory appeal, the employee reported suffering various injuries as a result of a truck accident. The employer provided workers’ compensation benefits, including a panel of orthopedic surgeons from which the employee selected an authorized physician. The authorized physician opined, in part, that the employee had severe arthritis in both knees necessitating total knee replacements but did not believe the accident was the primary cause of the need for the knee replacement surgeries. The employee sought unauthorized treatment with another physician who attributed more than fifty percent of the cause of the need for bilateral knee surgeries to the accident. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court determined the employee would likely prevail at trial in proving the need for bilateral total knee replacements arose primarily from the work accident. The court ordered the employer to pay the medical expenses for the employee’s left knee replacement that had already been performed and to provide ongoing medical care, including a right knee replacement as recommended by the employee’s physician. The court additionally awarded the employee temporary disability benefits and reimbursement for mileage expenses incurred for her travel to obtain medical care. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to the extent it orders the employer to provide reasonable and necessary medical benefits causally related to the work accident. However, we reverse the trial court’s finding that the employee has shown she is likely to prevail at trial in establishing that her need for bilateral knee replacements arose primarily out of the work accident, and we remand the case.