Question 1:

Is Senate Bill 1937, 112th Gen. Assem. (2022)—a proposed amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-13-104 that would prohibit political parties from requiring individuals to pay fees to run for office as candidates for those parties—constitutional?

Opinion 1:

Yes. Tennessee, like all States, has broad authority to regulate its elections so long as those regulations do not violate the U.S. or Tennessee Constitutions. Because this amendment does not conflict with any provision of the U.S. or Tennessee Constitution—and in fact makes it easier for prospective candidates to associate with the State’s political parties—it appears to be a permissible exercise of the General Assembly’s authority to regulate elections.

Question 1:

Does the prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons “inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress” apply only to the building in which the court’s chambers or courtroom exists, or does the prohibition extend to the private residence of a judge or to another similar building from which a judge participates in “judicial proceedings” by conference call or video conference?

Opinion 1:

The prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons in buildings in which judicial proceedings are in progress may be reasonably construed to apply only to those buildings in which a judge customarily conducts judicial proceedings, such as courthouses and criminal justice facilities. It does not appear that the General Assembly intended Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 to apply to buildings from which a judge conducts a judicial proceeding remotely by conference call or videoconference, such as the judge’s private residence or another similar building.

Question 2:

Does the prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons “inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress” include buildings other than the building in which the judge is physically present, such as an attorney’s private residence or law office or similar buildings from which non-judicial participants take part in judicial proceedings remotely by conference call or video conference?

Opinion 2:

The prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons in buildings in which judicial proceedings are in progress may be reasonably construed to apply only to those buildings in which a judge customarily conducts judicial proceedings, such as courthouses and criminal justice facilities. It does not appear that the General Assembly intended Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 to apply to other buildings such as private residences, business offices or other similar buildings from which non-judicial participants—e.g., attorneys or witnesses—might participate in judicial proceedings by conference call or videoconference.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) sued Stryker Corporation in the Western District of Michigan, alleging a complex scheme in which Stryker bribed Mexican government officials to facilitate the sale of its products in Mexico. The district court granted Stryker’s motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, and IMSS appealed. For the reasons below, we affirm.

The Appellant, Joshua V. Lowe, pled guilty in the Maury County Circuit Court to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Appellant received a sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and was placed on probation. The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $52,000 to be paid in monthly installments of $773. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the Appellant’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the Open Courts Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Michael Halliburton (“Halliburton”), an inmate, filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Board of Parole (“the Board”) seeking judicial review of his March 10, 2020 parole proceedings before the Board. The Trial Court dismissed Halliburton’s petition. In so doing, the Trial Court relied on Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812, which provides that “on notice of assessment of any fees, taxes, costs and expenses under this part, a clerk of a court may not accept for filing another claim by the same inmate until prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses are paid in full.” This Court affirmed, holding in part that Halliburton waived his issue of whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 violates the Open Courts Clause in Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that Halliburton sufficiently raised the issue in his answer to the Board’s motion to dismiss. Our Supreme Court granted Halliburton’s application for permission to appeal, and remanded for this Court to consider his Open Courts issue.1 We hold, inter alia, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 places a constitutionally permissible limitation on the right of inmates to file civil actions. The statute does not permanently bar inmates from seeking redress; it simply requires they pay outstanding fees first. Therefore, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 does not violate the Open Courts Clause. We affirm.

The petitioner, Troy Springfield, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, James A. McCurry, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Jerry P. Haley, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Lauderdale County Circuit Court, arguing the coram nobis court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists which is material to his case. After our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Wilson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Rashad Dewayne Seay, Jr., of two counts of the sale of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of eighteen years for each offense. The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the court summarily dismissed as untimely. On appeal, we reversed the summary dismissal. Rashad Dewayne Seay, Jr. v. State, No. M2017-01128-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 3203442, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 29, 2018), no perm. app. filed. On remand, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing after which it filed a written order denying the Petitioner relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure the Petitioner was present during the jury instructions, failing to ensure that the jury was properly instructed, failing to adequately investigate and prepare an identification expert, and failing to inform the Petitioner of the consequences of withdrawing his direct appeal. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Misty Rose Brown, acting pro se, was convicted of one count of child abuse and neglect and one count of facilitation of rape of a child following a trial.1 The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years for the facilitation conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the child abuse and neglect conviction, to be served concurrently. The Defendant, again acting pro se, appeals her convictions and argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.