A father filed a petition in Tennessee to domesticate and modify a Kentucky child-custody decree. The court later entered an agreed order granting the petition, which was not appealed. Three months later, the mother filed a motion to set aside the final judgment on the grounds of fraud and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied her Rule 60.02 motion and her subsequent Rule 59.04 motion. Because the court did not rule on the mother’s claims of fraud, we vacate the denial of the Rule 60.02 motion and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from proceedings in the Tennessee Claims Commission and follows a trial concerning care received by the decedent while at the Tennessee State Veterans Home. The Claims Commission ultimately found that the claimants had failed to establish a health care liability claim and therefore dismissed the case. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.

The defendant, Andrea Spencer, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 1983 guilty-pleaded convictions of robbery with a weapon, larceny from a person, and petit larceny. Discerning no error, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Petitioner, Dennis Joshua Cooper, was indicted by the Henderson County Grand Jury in four separate cases for 15 drug-related offenses. Pursuant to two plea agreements, Petitioner pled guilty as charged in exchange for a total effective sentence of 20 years. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were not freely or voluntarily entered and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Upon careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. However, we remand the case to the post-conviction court for correction of the judgment forms to reflect the sentences as imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, Travis Seiber, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated robbery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

UPON CONSIDERATION of defendants’ renewed motion for partial stay of preliminary injunction pending appeal, AND FURTHER CONSIDERING plaintiffs’ response in opposition and defendants’ reply, IT IS ORDERED that the motion be, and it hereby is, GRANTED.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Clayton Hall and Gregory Franklin, II were convicted by a jury for engaging in a drug-trafficking conspiracy. The district court then sentenced each of them to a 360-month term of imprisonment. They collectively raise six issues on appeal, ranging from Hall’s challenge to the composition of the jury to the sufficiency of the evidence against Franklin. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that none of the claims have merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

In 1999, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, James R. Wilson, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. His convictions were affirmed on appeal, as was the subsequent denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner’s first habeas corpus petition was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal. While this petition was still pending, the Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis, which the court summarily dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. The Petitioner filed this, his second petition for habeas corpus relief contending that the he was entitled to relief based upon the State’s oral motion to amend the indictment to change the offense date from November 14 to November 13. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. Shortly thereafter, the Petitioner filed a “Motion for New Trial.” Several months later, he requested a hearing on his motion. The State opposed the motion, stating that there was no procedure by which the Petitioner could file a “Motion for New Trial” from the habeas corpus proceeding and stating the Petitioner’s claims were meritless. The habeas corpus court agreed and denied the “Motion for New Trial.” On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred because it improperly dismissed his habeas corpus petition. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the Petitioner did not timely file his notice of appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ahren Presley, was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and theft, two counts of felony murder in the commission or perpetration of a robbery, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of felony murder in the commission or perpetration of a theft, one count of theft of property $10,000-$60,000, and one count of theft of property $1,000 or less. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-103 (conspiracy to commit theft); 39-13-202(a)(2) (felony murder in the commission or perpetration of, relevantly, a robbery or theft); 39-13-403 (especially aggravated robbery); 39-14-103 (theft of property). He received a total effective sentence of two life sentences plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that 1) the evidence was insufficient to support all of his convictions, and 2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an action by a dairy on a sworn account against the former owner of a dairy distributor who signed a personal guaranty that obligated him to pay any past-due debts accrued by the distributorship to the plaintiff dairy. When the former owner signed the personal guaranty, he was the sole member/owner of the distributorship; however, he sold his membership interest in the distributorship in May 2015. At the time of the sale, the distributor owed $60,484.95 to the plaintiff dairy. One month later, when the plaintiff dairy learned of the sale, it created a new account for the distributor and sent both the distributor and the guarantor a demand for payment of the old account balance, the amount owing when the guarantor sold his membership interest in the distributor. Neither the distributor nor the guarantor paid the old account balance, and the dairy sued them both. The dairy later voluntarily nonsuited the distributor, with whom the dairy was continuing to do business under the new account number, leaving the guarantor as the sole defendant. Thereafter, the trial court granted the dairy’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the guarantor’s liability and held an evidentiary hearing on damages. After the hearing, the court entered a judgment against the guarantor for $130,102.12, including the principal debt, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the guarantor argues that the creditor breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by not seeking payment from the distribution company. We disagree. The personal guaranty obligated the guarantor to pay all amounts not paid by the distributor, whether or not the dairy sought payment from the distributor. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.