In this interlocutory appeal, the employee asserts he sustained multiple injuries while performing errands for the employer. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court denied benefits, concluding the employee failed to show he is likely to prevail at trial in establishing he provided timely notice of a work injury, in establishing his injuries were work-related, or in establishing his injuries occurred in the course and scope of his employment. The employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

Although the Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his claims, we dismiss the appeal due to the absence of a final appealable judgment.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff, Scott Tomei, sued Parkwest Hospital and Covenant Health for discrimination under the Affordable Care Act. But Parkwest says Tomei’s suit is dead on arrival because it’s time-barred. We disagree.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendants, Richard G. Williams, Kipling Colbert, Jr., and Christopher Bassett, Jr., of multiple felonies based on the December 17, 2015 shooting death of fifteen-year-old Zaevion Dobson. On appeal, all of the defendants challenge the trial court’s admission of a YouTube video of the defendants rapping. Defendant Bassett appeals the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress his statement to the police. Defendants Colbert and Williams challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and Defendant Williams, solely, asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his involvement in an April 2016 shooting and that the effect of cumulative errors during the trial warrants appellate relief. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this consolidated appeal, the Petitioner, Asata Dia Lowe-El, appeals from the Morgan County Circuit Court’s summary dismissals of his petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for a writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in dismissing the petitions, rather than granting relief. The appeal from the habeas corpus proceeding is dismissed, and we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Following a two-vehicle car accident in DeKalb County, Tennessee, between plaintiff James E. Cryer and a police officer, Mr. Cryer filed suit against the City of Algood alleging various acts of negligence. The case proceeded to a bench trial and at the close of Mr. Cryer’s proof, the trial court granted the City’s motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2). The trial court ruled that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude Mr. Cryer was less than 50% responsible for the accident and that Mr. Cryer’s claims were therefore barred. Mr. Cryer appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

For the week of January 10, 2022 - January 14, 2022

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In pursuit of over $2 million of a taxpayer’s unpaid liabilities, the IRS issued administrative summonses to the banks of the taxpayer’s wife and lawyers, Petitioners in this case. The IRS did not notify Petitioners of the summonses, relying on relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code excluding summonses issued “in aid of the collection” of tax assessments from its notice provisions. We conclude that the summonses were issued in aid of the IRS’s collection efforts and that Petitioners were not entitled to notice. Because the United States waives sovereign immunity only when a taxpayer entitled to notice challenges a summons, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Petitioners’ proceedings to quash the summonses. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. In 1949, Congress passed a statute called the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (“Property Act”) to facilitate the “economical and efficient” purchase of goods and services on behalf of the federal government. See 40 U.S.C. § 101. The Property Act serves an uncontroversial purpose; who doesn’t want the government to be more “economical and efficient”? Yet that laudable legislative-branch prescription, in place for the last seventy years, has recently been re-envisioned by the executive. In November 2021, the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force, under the supposed auspices of the Act, issued a “Guidance” mandating that the employees of federal contractors in “covered contract[s]” with the federal government become fully vaccinated against COVID-19.1 That directive sweeps in at least one-fifth of our nation’s workforce, possibly more. And so an act establishing an efficient “system of property management,” S. Rep. 1413 at 1 (1948), was transformed into a novel font of federal authority to regulate the private health decisions of millions of Americans.

In response, three states (Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee) and two Ohio sheriffs’ offices filed suit. They collectively alleged that nothing in the Property Act authorizes the contractor mandate, that the contractor mandate violates various other federal statutes, and that its intrusion upon traditional state prerogatives raises serious constitutional concerns under federalism principles and the Tenth Amendment. The district court agreed. It enjoined enforcement of the contractor mandate throughout Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. It also denied the subsequent motion of the federal-government defendants2 to stay the injunction pending appeal. The government now comes to us with the same request. But because the government has established none of the showings required to obtain a stay, we DENY such relief.

The defendant, Kemontea Dovon McKinney, appeals his Robertson County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and theft, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting his pretrial statement into evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the evidence established that he acted in self-defense. Because the trial court erred by admitting the defendant’s statement into evidence and because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s convictions are reversed and remanded for a new trial. Because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of first degree premeditated murder but sufficient to support a conviction of second degree murder, that conviction must be modified to one of second degree murder. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdicts of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and theft. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on two counts of felony murder, one count of second degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and, one count of theft of property.