McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. This case arises out of the fatal police shooting of Antonino Gordon in a drive-thru line as Gordon attempted to flee from Defendant Police Officer Keith Bierenga. Gordon’s estate brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bierenga alleging excessive use of force. Bierenga moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity at summary judgment, holding that Bierenga violated Gordon’s Fourth Amendment rights when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the estate, and that the violation was “clearly established” by our decision in Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017). While Latits is similar in some ways, we do not think Latits is similar enough to the facts of this case to pass muster under the controlling standards for defining “clearly established” law. Because the estate is unable to point to a case that would place every reasonable officer in Bierenga’s position on notice that his use of force in this specific situation was unlawful, we must reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

The Petitioner, Telly Lamont Booker, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a weapon, as well as the resulting twenty-eight-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) by not pursuing a defense of simple possession; (2) by failing to object to the testimony of Officers Heitz and Noe regarding habits of drug dealers because they were not experts; (3) and by cumulative error. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief.

The petitioner, Larry Pittman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing entitlement to coram nobis relief on the ground that newly discovered evidence supported his claim that the warrant issued for his arrest was defective. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Gai D. Kuot, Petitioner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (the “petition”) claiming that his convictions are void because the indictment was defective, the capias was unsigned, and the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. We affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Leon Caudle, was convicted of two counts each of selling less than 0.5 gram of cocaine within a drug-free school zone and delivering less than 0.5 gram of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, and one count of possessing 0.5 gram or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone with the intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture. The trial court merged the two delivery convictions with the corresponding sale convictions and imposed an effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration. In this delayed appeal,1 the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Kevin Brazelton, of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years for each conviction and merged the convictions. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a court officer shocked him with a stun belt in the jury’s presence; that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge against the only African- American member of the venire in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on “flight.” Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a provision in an employment contract executed by a professor and Nashville State Community College. The appellant, a tenured faculty member, transitioned from a teaching position to an administrative position and back again, and asserts that Nashville State breached the terms of her employment contract when it refused to pay her 80% of her administrative salary when she returned to a faculty position. The Tennessee Claims Commission held a trial on the breach of contract issue and determined that the contract referred to a Tennessee Board of Regents policy that did not entitle the professor to 80% of her administrative salary, and therefore, the professor’s breach of contract action failed. The Commissioner recalculated the amount of money the professor was owed for her spring 2018 salary. The professor appeals, asserting that the Commissioner erred in refusing to consider parol evidence in rendering its decision. We agree with the professor that parol evidence is helpful to understanding the parties’ intent as expressed in the agreement, and we reverse the Commissioner’s decision. The case is remanded for calculation of the professor’s faculty salary at no less than 80% of her administrative salary.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that five grounds for termination were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) persistent conditions; and (5) mental incompetence. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child. The mother appeals. We reverse the trial court in part and affirm in part.

For the Week of December 6, 2021 - December 10, 2021

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Rodney Hymes pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. The district court initially sentenced Hymes to 188 months of imprisonment. But while Hymes’s appeal was pending, we decided United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam), which cast doubt over the district court’s reading of the Sentencing Guidelines in Hymes’s case. Accordingly, we vacated Hymes’s sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of Havis. The district court then resentenced Hymes to a within-Guidelines sentence of 124 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Hymes finds fault with numerous aspects of the district court’s sentencing analysis, including its failure to defer to national sentencing data accumulated by the Sentencing Commission. But as the district court was not required to even consider that data (let alone defer to it), and seeing no other basis to disrupt Hymes’s sentence, we affirm.