Petitioner, Donte R. Swainer, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post- conviction relief challenging his 2018 conviction for attempted aggravated robbery. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court improperly determined that the petition was time-barred. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case stems from the sale of a 2000 Mercury Sable (“the vehicle”) purchased by Amy Jennings from John M. Lance Ford, LLC, an affiliate of AutoNation, Inc. (“AutoNation” or “Defendant”), in 2017. Ms. Jennings signed all of the paperwork associated with the sale, including an arbitration agreement. In September of 2018, Ms. Jennings and her husband, Dorian Jones, filed suit against AutoNation in the Chancery Court for Washington County (the “trial court”) alleging multiple causes of action arising from the sale of the vehicle. Generally, Ms. Jennings and Mr. Jones alleged that AutoNation breached several warranties and fraudulently induced Ms. Jennings into the sale. Eventually, AutoNation filed a motion to compel arbitration which the trial court granted on August 10, 2020. Mr. Jones filed an appeal to this Court. Because an appeal from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration and staying litigation is nonfinal, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Zackari Tennant, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; carjacking, a Class B felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of twenty-three years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Appellant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by precluding him from introducing evidence that he was only sixteen years old at the time of the offenses; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by not giving adequate weight to his youth as a factor in mitigation. Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Corey Paul Terry, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary in 2010, two counts of aggravated burglary in 2011, and tampering with evidence in 2018. Due to various prior probation violations, the Defendant was serving an effective six years on probation for all the offenses in 2019 when he was charged with violating his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court lacked substantial evidence to find that he violated the conditions of his probation and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Terrance B. Smith, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he challenged his life sentence resulting from his first degree murder conviction for an offense that occurred in 1998. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 2012, the Defendant, David Herl, entered a guilty plea to theft of property valued over $1,000, and he received a sentence of four years, suspended to probation. On July 2, 2013, a warrant was issued, alleging that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation. The warrant was not served on the Defendant until September 18, 2020. The Defendant moved to dismiss the prosecution, asserting that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court refused to dismiss the proceedings, found the Defendant to have violated the terms of his probation, and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the charges. We conclude that the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Robert Brooks, was convicted of reckless endangerment, aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment to be served consecutively to Defendant’s effective ten-year sentence for aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and assault. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court erred by denying his peremptory challenge to strike Juror 7. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Banks, pleaded guilty to first degree murder and aggravated cruelty to animals, and he received an effective life sentence. He filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, asserting that his life sentence is illegal because it is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole or a sentence of death. The trial court summarily denied relief, and the Defendant appeals. Because the Defendant did not raise a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. In addition to disputing the grounds for termination and best interest, Mother argues on appeal that she should have been appointed counsel in the termination proceeding and that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-401. We conclude that the record demonstrates that Mother expressly waived her right to counsel and failed to show that the waiver was ineffective. We further hold that section 33-6-401 was inapplicable in this case. Finally, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented of both the grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. As such, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The employee alleged he suffered an occupational disease due to workplace exposure to coal fly ash. Following unsuccessful mediation, the employer filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, alleging the employee “cannot establish that he has an occupational illness or disease.” After a period of written discovery, the taking of an expert medical deposition, and several motion hearings, the trial court conducted a hearing on the employer’s motion and requested supplemental briefs. Thereafter, the trial court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment, concluding the employer did not establish the insufficiency of the employee’s proof as a matter of law and there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.