After counsel announced that the parties had settled their differences, the trial court entered a consent judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. One year later, one of the litigants moved to set aside the judgment arguing lack of consent and fraud. The moving party claimed that it never approved the settlement or consented to entry of the dismissal order. The trial court denied the motion. Because the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Marc Baechtle, was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. The trial court dismissed the aggravated sexual battery and rape convictions due to statute of limitations and ultimately imposed a 25-year sentence for the rape of a child conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that trial counsel advised him not to testify and failed to impeach a witness. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. In the early hours of June 19, 2020, the last day of the Tennessee General Assembly’s session, the state legislature passed one of the strictest abortion regulations in the country, House Bill 2263. There are two provisions of the Act at issue in this appeal. Section 216 criminalizes the performance of pre-viability abortions at cascading intervals of two to three weeks, beginning with the detection of a “fetal heartbeat” and continuing through a gestational age of 24 weeks. The scheme provides that if any earlier restriction is found to be invalid, the others remain in effect. Section 217 criminalizes the performance of an abortion if the physician “knows” the reason for the abortion is “because of” the race, sex, or a Down syndrome diagnosis of the fetus. Both sections contain an affirmative- defense provision when the abortion was performed because, “in the physician’s good faith, reasonable medical judgment,” the abortion was necessary to avoid a medical emergency. Plaintiffs—four reproductive-health centers and two physicians, suing on behalf of themselves and their patients—challenged the constitutionality of sections 216 and 217 and requested a preliminary injunction. They argued that both sections 216 and 217 substantively violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as an undue burden on pre-viability abortions, that section 217 is also void for vagueness, and that the medical-emergency affirmative-defense provisions are insufficient because they are unconstitutionally vague. The district court evaluated the submitted declarations and arguments and determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court issued a preliminary injunction banning implementation of sections 216 and 217 but declined to address the substantive due process challenge to section 217 because it found that the section was unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The State1 now appeals the issuance of the preliminary injunction, including the legal conclusions and factual findings on which it is based, and asks us to address, in the first instance, whether section 217 violates substantive due process principles. Because access to pre-viability abortion is a constitutionally protected right, we affirm.

SILER, Circuit Judge. In 1986, a Kentucky jury convicted Benny Hodge for the murder of Tammy Acker, the attempted murder of Dr. Roscoe Acker, first-degree robbery, and first-degree burglary. After finding Hodge and codefendant Roger Dale Epperson guilty, the jury recommended death for both. Hodge filed this habeas petition, claiming his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) at the sentencing phase. Bound by deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), we reject that claim. Hodge also alleges he was denied a fair trial because of jury tampering and the close relationship between the prosecutor and jury foreman. Those claims are also without merit.1 We affirm the district court and deny the writ.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Can a party’s later—arguably bad-faith—actions undermine its earlier perfected security interest so that payments made in connection with that security interest are fraudulent transfers under Ohio law? That’s the main question here.

The bankruptcy trustee now seeks to avoid payments from Fair Finance to Textron as fraudulent transfers under Ohio’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 1336.01, et seq. (“OUFTA”). The district court rejected the trustee’s attempt to unwind the transfers. The trustee appeals, arguing that the district court mistakenly rejected its arguments at summary judgment and erroneously instructed the jury at a trial on a related claim. We AFFIRM.

This is a case involving allegations of undue influence. The plaintiffs are the grandchildren of the decedent. The sole defendant at issue on appeal is the decedent’s niece, who also held power of attorney for the decedent during the last years of her life. The transaction at issue occurred roughly six months before the decedent died and consisted of a gift of $176,000 to the niece for the purchase of a house. The executor of the decedent’s estate declined to pursue the claim for undue influence and assigned the cause of action to the decedent’s four grandsons, who were the residuary beneficiaries of the estate. After a five- day bench trial, the trial court found that a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the defendant niece and that multiple suspicious circumstances existed to support a finding of undue influence. As such, the trial court entered a judgment against the defendant niece for $176,000. However, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees on the basis that they were “not available under the current caselaw relating to undue influence.” The defendant niece appeals, challenging the finding of undue influence. The plaintiffs appeal the denial of their request for attorney fees. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record, we affirm the finding of undue influence and the judgment against the defendant niece. We reverse the denial of the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees and remand for a reasonable award of attorney fees incurred by the plaintiffs in the trial court and on appeal.

Question 1: If, during his or her term, a member of a county school board moves outside the district where he or she was elected but remains a resident of the county, is the office deemed vacant?

Opinion 1: Yes

Question 2: If the answer to Question 1 is “yes”, does the county commission fill the vacant office for the remainder of the term of the member who moved outside the district?

Opinion 2: Yes

Question 1: In light of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-1313 and/or 39-17-1314, or other applicable law, may a Tennessee state- or local-government employer enforce an employment policy prohibiting its employees or independent third parties who are authorized to carry a handgun from storing that handgun in the person’s vehicle while the person is at work and the vehicle is parked in space provided by the governmental employer?

Opinion 1: No

Question 2: If a local government employer adopts an employment policy potentially in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313, would an employee have standing to seek a declaratory ruling pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g) on that issue?

Opinion 2: Whether a local government employee would have standing to seek a declaratory ruling that a particular employment policy violates Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313 would depend on the specific facts and circumstances in any given instance. Only a court of competent jurisdiction could determine, based on the specific facts and circumstances, whether a particular employee has demonstrated, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g)(1), that he or she has been “adversely affected” by the particular employment policy and whether the employee has presented a justiciable claim under the particular facts involved.

Question 3: In light of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 or other applicable law, may a local government adoptordinances,rules,orpolicies,includingemploymentpolicies, thatprohibitajudgeorjudicial magistrate from carrying a handgun if the judge or judicial magistrate has an enhanced handgun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351?

Opinion 3: A local government may not adopt an ordinance, rule, or policy that prohibits a judge or judicial magistrate who is vested with judicial powers under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16 -1-101 and who holds an enhanced handgun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 from carrying his or her handgun if that regulation or policy conflicts with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306.

In 2014, the Petitioner, Walter Shegog, was convicted of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000. The Petitioner received a twelve-year sentence as a Career Offender and later appealed his conviction to this court. We affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Walter Shegog, No. W2014-02440-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 12978195 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 13, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 19, 2016). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the State had committed a Brady violation by withholding exculpatory evidence and that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel on multiple bases. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Revail Murphy, pled guilty in two separate cases to aggravated assault and sexual battery, respectively. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range III, persistent offender to a total effective sentence of ten years, to be served at forty-five percent. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, contending that his guilty plea for aggravated assault was not “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.” Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.