KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Tim Shoop, the warden of the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, appeals from the district court’s order (“transport order”) requiring the warden to transport Raymond Twyford, an Ohio death-row inmate, to The Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center, affiliated with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, for neurological imaging (a CT/FDG-PET scan) in support of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court issued the transport order under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, in aid of its jurisdiction over Twyford’s habeas petition. For the following reasons, we hold that we have jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine to review the warden’s appeal, and we AFFIRM the district court’s transport order.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Jermaine Clark appeals the sentence entered by the district court after he pleaded guilty to two bank robbery counts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). For the reasons stated below, we VACATE Clark’s sentence and REMAND the case to the district court for resentencing.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Lee Briggs, a Black man, worked as a compensation analyst for the University of Cincinnati (UC) Human Resources department. In July 2013, the HR department hired Cassandra Wittwer, a Caucasian woman, in the same position but at a much higher salary than Briggs. Over the next several years, Briggs’s pay stagnated while Wittwer’s rapidly increased. Briggs contends that after he submitted a claim of discrimination, UC retaliated by revising a job posting for which he had been encouraged to apply so that he was no longer eligible. Briggs sued UC, asserting claims of wage discrimination on the basis of race and sex, and retaliation for filing his complaint. The district court granted UC’s motion for summary judgment. Because there remain genuine disputes of material fact as to Briggs’s claims, we REVERSE.

The pro se petitioner, David Yost, Jr., appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The petition was filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services against the biological mother of three minor children. The petition listed seven grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights. After a final hearing on the petition, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failing to visit; (2) persistence of conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) failure to manifest an ability or willingness to parent; and (5) severe child abuse. We affirm the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Following a car accident involving an employee of the State of Tennessee, Irene Howard (“Claimant”) sought damages against the State based on alleged injuries arising from the accident. The claim was denied by the Division of Claims and Risk Management (the “DCRM”), and Claimant thereafter appealed to the Claims Commission (the “Commission”). Because Claimant failed to appeal the DCRM’s decision within ninety days, however, the Commission concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the case and dismissed the appeal. We affirm.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. The City of Saginaw routinely chalked car tires to enforce its parking regulations. In our prior opinion, we held that doing so is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that “based on the pleadings stage of this litigation, . . . two exceptions to the warrant requirement—the ‘community caretaking’ exception, and the motor-vehicle exception—do not apply here.” Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2019) (Taylor I). However, we left for another day whether the search could be justified by “some other exception” to the warrant requirement. Id.

We consider one of those other exceptions today—specifically, whether suspicionless tire chalking constitutes a valid administrative search. Because we conclude that it does not, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. But because we conclude that the alleged unconstitutionality of suspicionless tire chalking was not clearly established, the City’s parking officer, defendant Tabitha Hoskins, is entitled to qualified immunity. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Charles Andrews, Sr., Trustee of the Gloria M. Andrews Trust Dated April 23, 1998 (“the Trust”), appeals from a final judgment entered against the Trust by the district court after it granted the City of Mentor, Ohio’s (“the City”) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Trust takes issue specifically with the district court’s resolution of the Trust’s claims arising under the Takings Clause and Equal Protection Clause, both of which stem from the City’s denial of the Trust’s application for rezoning of approximately sixteen acres of real property. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, James Black, was convicted of two counts each of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder and was sentenced to a concurrent life sentence by the trial court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from trial counsel’s legal use of prescribed opioids during his trial, specifically asserting that 1) the prescribed opioids caused him to perform deficiently at trial; 2) that trial counsel’s offering of the Petitioner’s criminal history tainted the jury; and 3) that trial counsel’s use of prescribed opioids combined with his severe back pain created a conflict of interest. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff. After two hearings, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.