This appeal arises from a healthcare liability action wherein the plaintiff initially sued the doctor, the hospital, and two other defendants. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice against all defendants except for the doctor. The doctor subsequently filed an answer to the complaint, stating that the action should be dismissed under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because the hospital, a governmental hospital entity and the doctor’s employer, was not a party to the action. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend,” seeking to set aside the Trial Court’s order of dismissal in order to withdraw his voluntary dismissal of the hospital as a party. The Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend, determining that the voluntary dismissal order was a final order and that the plaintiff knew about the doctor’s employment with the hospital prior to the voluntary dismissal. We determine that the Trial Court erred by treating the plaintiff’s motion as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 motion, instead of a motion to revise pursuant to Rule 54.02, and further hold that the Trial Court erred by denying the plaintiff’s motion to revise the non-final order of voluntary dismissal.

The Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to challenge a series of executive orders issued by the Governor of Tennessee in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Namely, the Plaintiffs challenged the Governor’s legal authority to close entertainment and recreational gathering venues, arguing, among other things, that the executive orders were a constitutionally- prohibited implementation of martial law. Although the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, we conclude that the underlying matter is moot given the repeal of the complained of closure requirements. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for dismissal of the complaint in light of its mootness.

Week of July 12, 2021 - July 16, 2021

In his first appeal, defendant Charles Ray Sands challenged the district court’s application of a four-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm that had an “altered or obliterated serial number.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). We clarified the law on that enhancement and remanded the case. At resentencing, the district court applied the enhancement again, and Sands appeals that application. Because the district court—the second time around— applied the correct legal framework, and because we see no clear error with the district court’s factual finding that the gun had an altered serial number, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Evelio Sanchez Gonzalez petitions for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals’s denial of his motion to reopen his 2008 removal order. Because the Department of Homeland Security reinstated the 2008 removal order twice upon Sanchez’s illegal reentries into the country, the BIA determined that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen the order. The relevant section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), mandates that if “the prior order of removal is reinstated . . . [the order] is not subject to being reopened.” We cannot, therefore, give Sanchez the relief he seeks. See Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 2013); cf. Moreno-Martinez v. Barr, 932 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir. 2019). The petition for review is therefore DENIED.

The Petitioner, Ray Armstrong, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, two counts of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, tampering with evidence, and resisting arrest. The drug charges were merged, and the Petitioner was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of fifty and one-half years in prison. He filed a timely post- conviction petition, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post- conviction court held a hearing and denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals, asserting that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform the Petitioner of his sentencing exposure, failing to review relevant discovery with him, failing to call a witness, and waiving on appeal the trial court’s refusal to instruct on a lesser included offense. We conclude that with respect to each claim, the Petitioner has either failed to establish deficiency or has failed to establish prejudice, and we affirm the denial of relief.

In this action for conversion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who is her brother, unilaterally surrendered an annuity fund that had been titled jointly in their names, received a check for the proceeds, endorsed her signature without her permission, and deposited the proceeds in a bank account to which the plaintiff had no access. Upon the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in which he asserted that the plaintiff had been an owner of the annuity in name only and that the three-year statute of limitations had expired well before she filed the complaint, the trial court found that the plaintiff was a titled co-owner of the annuity and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations had been tolled by the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the cause of action from the plaintiff. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant had fraudulently concealed the cause of action from the plaintiff and that he had committed conversion of the plaintiff’s one-half interest in the check representing the annuity proceeds. The trial court awarded to the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of one-half of the annuity proceeds plus pre-judgment interest calculated from the date of the check’s endorsement. The defendant has appealed. Having discerned a minor mathematical error in the judgment, we modify the amount to reduce it by $90.00, affirming the trial court’s award to the plaintiff in the amount of $59,674.22 rather than $59,764.22. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

In this second interlocutory appeal, the employee appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for temporary partial disability benefits. After the first expedited hearing, the trial court concluded the employee did not violate a safety rule such that his claim was barred and awarded medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits. Thereafter, the employee was unable to return to work for the employer because he refused to undergo a drug rehabilitation program after testing positive for marijuana. The employer asserted that, but for the positive drug screen, which prevented it from re-hiring the employee, it would have offered the employee work within his restrictions. The trial court found the employer was justified in terminating the employee for drug use and, therefore, the employee was not entitled to temporary partial disability benefits. The employee has appealed, asserting that such a decision is unsupported by the law. In addition, the employer asserts the trial court incorrectly calculated the amount of its credit for overpaid temporary disability benefits. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s expedited hearing order and remand the case.

The Gibson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Ivin Lee Robinson, for first degree premeditated murder in Count 1, first degree felony murder in Count 2, and especially aggravated robbery in Count 3.1 Immediately prior to trial, the Defendant entered an “open” guilty plea to the especially aggravated robbery charge in Count 3, with the trial court to determine the appropriate sentence for this conviction at a later sentencing hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-403. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder in both Count 1 and Count 2. See id. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Thereafter, the trial court merged the two second degree murder convictions, imposed a forty-year sentence in Count 1, imposed a forty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction in Count 3, and ordered these sentences served consecutively for an effective sentence of eighty years at one hundred percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to establish causation for his second degree murder convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide as lesser included offenses of the felony murder charge; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Elizabeth Harrison, pled guilty to theft over $1,000 and burglary of a motor vehicle, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to eighteen months in Community Corrections for each count. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 14-103, -402. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw her guilty pleas and petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied both the motion and the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the pleas. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.