The Defendant-Appellant, Lloyd Crawford, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202 (first-degree murder), 39-12-101 (criminal attempt), 39-17-1324 (employing a firearm), 39-13-403 (especially aggravated robbery), 39-16-503 (tampering with evidence). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus seventeen years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Question:

Does a municipal airport authority operating a federally obligated airport have the authority to enact “Minimum Standards” that prohibit an airport tenant from engaging in fuel sales on airport premises to aircraft that are not owned by the airport tenant?

Opinion:

A municipal airport authority operating a federally obligated airport has the authority to enact reasonable “Minimum Standards,” including standards that may prohibit an airport tenant from engaging in fuel sales on airport premises to aircraft that are not owned by the airport tenant, but the validity of such a standard in any given case would depend on the reasonableness of, and the justification for, the prohibition evaluated in light of the specific facts and circumstances at the particular airport.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Attorneys in Michigan, like those in most other states, must join an integrated bar association in order to practice law. In this suit, Lucille S. Taylor, a Michigan attorney, argues that requiring her to join the State Bar of Michigan violates her freedom of association, and further that the State Bar of Michigan’s use of a portion of her mandatory membership dues for certain advocacy activities violates her freedom of speech. The district court rejected Taylor’s First Amendment claims, holding that they are foreclosed by two Supreme Court decisions that have not since been overruled. We AFFIRM.

A Gibson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Phillip Michael Martinez, for attempted aggravated sexual battery in Count 1 and solicitation of a minor in Count 2. Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi for the solicitation of a minor charge. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty as charged of the attempted aggravated sexual battery count. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101; 39-13-504(a)(4). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years’ incarceration at thirty percent release eligibility, sentenced him to community supervision for life, and ordered him to register as a sexual offender for life. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the forensic interviewer to testify as an expert; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s forensic interview as substantive evidence; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight; (4) the State made two improper comments during its closing argument; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the proof failed to show that he acted for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Alonzo Hoskins, of six counts of felony murder of the victim, based upon six underlying felonies, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and imposed a life sentence plus twenty years for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) all counts of the presentment failed to allege an offense; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the cell phone records; (3) the trial court erred by preventing defense counsel from making an inquiry or proper record into the competency of a juror; (4) the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Joseph Cox, was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, by a Knox County Criminal Court jury. See T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(1) (Supp. 2016) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with sixty days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the presentment because the State failed to comply with a procedural step in charging him by presentment and because the child abuse statute is unconstitutional,1 (2) the trial court erred in its jury instructions, and (3) the court erred in imposing split confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; three counts of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony; escape, a Class E felony; theft of property valued at $2500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and theft of property valued at $1000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 30-13-210 (second degree murder) (2018), 39-12- 101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-12-103 (criminal conspiracy), 39-13-103(a), (b)(2) (reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon), 39-16-605 (2018) (escape), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property), 39-14- 105 (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft). The trial court imposed an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Having determined that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded and possible further sanctions remain pending in this action, we further determine that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal stems from a dismissal pursuant to Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. Suit was filed against Appellant’s treating physician, among other defendants, for health care liability involving Appellant’s birth. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that, because the physician was an employee of a governmental entity at the time of the incident, Appellant was required by statute to name the physician’s employing governmental entity as a party defendant. Because Appellant failed to do so, the lawsuit against the treating physician could not proceed. Appellant now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This appeal arises from litigation concerning a fatal road accident. Steven W. Lawson (“Decedent”), by and through his wife, Penny Lawson, and on behalf of Corey Lawson, Decedent’s child (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued the Hawkins County Emergency Communications District Board (“ECD-911”), Hawkins County, Tennessee and Hawkins County Emergency Management Agency (“the EMA”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) alleging negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness in Defendants’ response to a road washout that led to Decedent’s death. Plaintiffs specifically alleged nepotism in Defendants’ hiring practices and a failure to train. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, which the Trial Court granted partly on grounds that claims of recklessness could not proceed against the Defendant entities under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Plaintiffs could, in fact, proceed with their claims of recklessness and gross negligence under the GTLA, and the facts pled by Plaintiffs were sufficient to state claims based upon recklessness and gross negligence. We hold further that, based on the facts alleged at this stage, the third special duty exception to the public duty doctrine applies so as to remove Defendants’ immunity. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.