This is an appeal from a dismissal of Mother’s petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court found that Mother failed to carry her burden of proof in showing a material change of circumstances had occurred. Mother now appeals. Because we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm its denial of Mother’s petition.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that two grounds for termination had been established as to Father: abandonment by an incarcerated parent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and a sentence for child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(5). The trial court further found the termination of Father’s parental rights to be in the best interests of the two minor children at issue. Although we reverse one ground for termination found by the trial court, we otherwise affirm its order terminating Father’s parental rights.

The Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to challenge a series of executive orders issued by the Governor of Tennessee in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Namely, the Plaintiffs challenged the Governor’s legal authority to close entertainment and recreational gathering venues, arguing, among other things, that the executive orders were a constitutionally- prohibited implementation of martial law. Although the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, we conclude that the underlying matter is moot given the repeal of the complained of closure requirements. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for dismissal of the complaint in light of its mootness.

Week of July 6, 2021 - July 9, 2021

In 2017, the Petitioner, Winford Paul Wilhoite, pleaded guilty as charged in case number 25743 to possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, simple possession of Lortab, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal impersonation, and driving on a revoked license (second offense).1 See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-434, 39- 17-418, 39-17-425, 39-16-301, 55-50-504. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in part, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for the Petitioner was appointed, and an amended petition was filed. The post- conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the post- conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Madaryl Hampton, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury with multiple counts of drug and weapon related offenses, all stemming from a single encounter with the Jackson Police Department (JPD). These counts were severed into two trials, one dealing with the drug related offenses and the other the weapon related offenses. In the first trial, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of simple possession of marijuana. In his second trial, the Defendant was convicted of four counts of being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court merged each of these counts and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years’ imprisonment for the weapon offenses to be served consecutively to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment for the possession of marijuana convictions. While the issues presented in this appeal as of right involve facts from the Defendant’s first trial, the Defendant challenges only the felon in possession of a weapon convictions in arguing that: (1) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to admit evidence that the Defendant was in possession of marijuana, digital scales, and cash; (2) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to comment on the credibility of the Defendant and the witnesses during closing arguments; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In litigation regarding an automobile accident, Appellants Jerry and Debra Moorehead reached a mediation agreement with their uninsured motorist carrier, Appellee Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Farmers”). Under the mediation agreement, Farmers agreed to pay $50,000 to each of the Mooreheads in full settlement of the dispute. Farmers paid only $25,000 each to Mr. and Mrs. Moorehead, deducting amounts it had previously paid under the policy for medical expenses. The Mooreheads moved the trial court to enforce the agreement, arguing that they were due $50,000 each in “new” money. The trial court held that the mediation agreement was enforceable but that the amount owed to the Mooreheads was properly offset by the previous amounts Farmers paid. On review, we conclude that the plain language of the mediation agreement promised future payment of $50,000 to each of the Mooreheads without reference to or incorporation of either the insurance policy or previous payments made thereunder. Reversed and remanded.

This appeal arises from a mother and a stepfather’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. The mother and father were married and had a son and a daughter. When they divorced, they agreed to a permanent parenting plan allowing the father equal parenting time with their son but no parenting time with their daughter. In the three and a half years preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father’s rights, the father fully exercised his parenting time with their son, but he had no contact with their daughter and did not request a modification of the permanent parenting plan. The petitioners alleged three grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights to his daughter—abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 1-102(1)(A)(i) and -113(g)(1), and failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The trial court determined that the petitioners proved one of the three grounds, abandonment by failure to visit; however, it found that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the daughter’s best interests to terminate the father’s rights. Accordingly, the court denied the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. On appeal, the petitioners contend the trial court erred in denying their petition because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interests. They also contend the trial court erred in finding that they did not prove the father failed to manifest an ability or willingness to assume physical custody as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). For his part, the father contends his failure to visit was not willful; therefore, the petitioners failed to prove any ground for termination of his parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the father abandoned his daughter by failure to visit during the requisite period of time as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(i). We affirm its determination that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the essential elements of the ground codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the petitioners failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petition.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. In 1998, the Old Ben Coal Company (Old Ben) conveyed its rights to the methane gas in various coal reserves to the appellee in this case, Illinois Methane, LLC (Methane). As part of that $2.6 million transaction, Old Ben agreed to a “Delay Rental Obligation” that required the owner of the coal estate to pay rent to Methane while it mined the coal in areas that Methane had not yet exploited. A deed memorializing this conveyance (and setting forth the Delay Rental Obligation) was then recorded with the county treasurer.

The bankruptcy court held that Old Ben’s publication notice had been insufficient to satisfy due process as to Methane. Accordingly, the court ruled that the sale had not erased Methane’s interest and that Alliance was not entitled to an injunction barring the State Court Action. The district court affirmed. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM as well. 

The Petitioner, Gabriel Buchanon, was found guilty by a jury of three counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated burglary, and he received an effective twenty-three-year sentence. After this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending that trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.