JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Paul Copen was driving his daughter Kelly’s vehicle when it was struck by a driver for the United States Postal Service (USPS). Kelly was riding in the passenger seat. The vehicle was damaged, and both Kelly and Paul state that they were physically injured in the accident. This case concerns whether the Copens properly presented their claim for damages to USPS under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80. Kelly Copen alone filed a Standard Form 95, SF 95, with USPS stating that both Kelly and Paul had been injured, but they never provided a dollar amount for their personal injury damages. The district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Kelly Copen had failed to provide a sum certain on her claim for personal injury, and because Paul Copen had not met the jurisdictional requirement of submitting his own claim form.

Neither Kelly nor Paul provided a sum certain to USPS, a mandatory requirement. But because we conclude that the sum certain requirement in the FTCA is not jurisdictional, we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Marcel Holbrook, of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a photograph of an SKS rifle and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Gary Bush, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he challenged his life sentence resulting from his first degree murder conviction in 2008 for an offense that occurred in 1982. On appeal, the Defendant argues that he was sentenced under the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act rather than the law in effect when he committed the offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An insurance company denied coverage for an accident its insured had with an uninsured/underinsured motorist because the insured had a “non-owner’s” policy, and the car she was driving did not fit the definition of a “non-owned auto.” The trial court concluded, following a bench trial on the bifurcated issue of coverage, that the insured’s policy did not cover the accident, and the insured appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The petition was filed by the Department of Children’s Services against the biological mother of several minor children. In the petition, the Department alleged five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children prior to incarceration; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. After a trial on the petition, the trial court found that the Department established all five grounds and that termination was in the best interest of the children. As a result, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand.

In this post-divorce visitation dispute, the father appeals the denial of his petition to modify the permanent parenting plan and require the mother’s visitation to be supervised “indefinitely.” Before the divorce, the mother’s visitation was suspended after she falsely accused the father of sexually abusing the parties’ minor son. The mother’s visitation was restored when she presented evidence that she was in mental health therapy for her “obsessive” fears. Two months later, in early 2016, the parties agreed to a permanent parenting plan that required the mother to, inter alia, continue her therapy. The parties also agreed for their son to attend counseling to help him remain psychologically healthy despite the parties’ contentious relationship. The mother did not, however, continue her treatment as agreed, and she soon resumed making allegations against the father. Thus, just three months after the parenting plan was entered, her visitation was suspended again. The mother’s visitation remained restricted for a year, during which she struggled to comply with various court orders. In April 2017, the parties agreed for the mother’s visitation to be restored after she presented evidence she was progressing again in her mental health treatment. The parties also agreed for the son to continue counseling for another 18 months. Then, in November 2018, the mother made additional false allegations against the father. The father then filed a petition to modify the parenting plan and restrict the mother’s visitation “indefinitely.” Finding the mother’s behavior endangered the children, the trial court significantly restricted the mother’s parenting time and allowed only limited supervised visitation pending a final hearing. Due to several procedural delays, the final hearing was not held until January 2020, by which time the mother’s visitation had been severely restricted for a year. After the hearing, the court denied the father’s petition and restored the mother’s visitation. The court was persuaded, in part, by evidence that the mother was progressing again in her therapy. The court credited the opinion of the mother’s clinical psychologist, who stated the mother had “gotten better,” understood “that she cannot say things that would alienate [the father from] the children,” was “a loving and devoted parent,” and would “now follow the rules.” The court also agreed with the psychologist’s opinion that the son needed more counseling because he needed “to be able to talk to somebody [he could] trust.” Based on these and other findings of fact, the trial court found no material change in circumstance existed; however, it ordered that the mother and the parties’ son continue therapy. The court also denied the mother’s request for an award of attorney fees as the “prevailing party” under the marital dissolution agreement and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). Both parties appealed. Having determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that no material change of circumstance existed as of the time of trial, we affirm the denial of the father’s petition to modify the parenting plan. We vacate, however, the court’s order requiring the son to continue therapy because the issue was not before the court. We also affirm the denial of the mother’s request to recover her attorney’s fees.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Adamo Demolition Company sued the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150 (the Union) and its president for various tort claims arising out of a dispute over staffing one of Adamo’s projects. The district court found Adamo’s claims preempted under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §185, because the tort claims were inextricably intertwined with and depended on the requirements of the collective bargaining agreement governing the project. It dismissed the case. On appeal, Adamo argues that the district court committed a host of errors, including denying Adamo’s motion to remand to state court and misapplying the concept of federal labor law preemption. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Petitioner of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of sexual battery. The Petitioner was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective forty-year sentence. State v. Jasper L. Vick, No. W2005-00467-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 722173, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2006). This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal but remanded to the trial court to determine whether the “specific elements of the crime for which the Defendant was convicted in South Carolina” amounted to a Class C felony in Tennessee. Id. at *11. On remand, the trial court again classified the Petitioner as a Range II, multiple offender, and the Petitioner again appealed. This court determined on appeal that the trial court should have classified the Petitioner as a Range I offender and again remanded the case to the trial court. State v. Vick, 242 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). On remand, the trial court imposed an effective twenty-six-year sentence. The Petitioner filed an unsuccessful pro se petition for post-conviction relief in 2008. Jasper Lee Vick v. State, No. W2012-01477-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 2446280 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 4, 2013).

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. The claims in this case result from a mental health crisis suffered by Jack Huelsman, who lived with what family members describe as symptoms of paranoia and bipolar disorder. In the midst of the crisis, his wife, Cheryl Huelsman, a nurse, called their daughter and urged her to call 911. Clermont County Deputies Eric Gregory and Meredith Walsh responded to the call. They were aware of Mr. Huelsman’s mental health and that there might be guns in the house. When they arrived, Deputy Gregory called off the paramedics who had also responded. Deputy Gregory spoke with both Mrs. Huelsman, who expressed her desperate fear that her husband would commit suicide, and Mr. Huelsman, whom Deputy Gregory considered to be lucid. Mrs. Huelsman repeatedly exhorted Gregory not to leave Mr. Huelsman alone, but the Deputy left him inside the home, unattended, for about nine minutes. Mr. Huelsman committed suicide.

Mrs. Huelsman and her daughter Sarah Wilson (the “Huelsmans”) sued the Deputies and other County officials (the “Defendants”). They asserted claims for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; denial of public services under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); and multiple torts under Ohio law. The district court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We AFFIRM that decision as to the Huelsmans’ § 1983 and ADA claims and VACATE it as to their state law claims against Deputies Gregory and Walsh.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Kristen Brenner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The Government sought to enhance her sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on a Tennessee reckless aggravated assault conviction related to impaired driving. The district court agreed with Brenner’s argument that Tennessee reckless aggravated assault could not be a “violent felony” for the ACCA’s purposes. The Government appealed the district court’s order and we held this case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 2021 WL 2367312 (2021). Analyzing the same statute under which Brenner was convicted, Borden held that the ACCA’s elements clause does not “include[] offenses criminalizing reckless conduct.” Id. at *5 (plurality opinion). After Borden, the Government moved to dismiss its appeal. We GRANT that motion.

Accordingly, we GRANT the Government’s motion to dismiss this appeal.