The petitioner, Aaron Reinsberg, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of rape, assault, and official misconduct, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Patrick L. Moore, Petitioner, appeals from the dismissal of two petitions for habeas corpus relief which were consolidated by this Court on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the dismissal of the petitions.

The petitioner, Darius Jones, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court determined that there were statutory grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, we conclude that the father was given sufficient notice of three statutory grounds: abandonment by failure to visit or support the expectant mother, abandonment by wanton disregard, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of his child. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support two of the grounds for termination. But, because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient findings regarding the child’s best interest, we vacate and remand.

In this interlocutory appeal, the employer asserts the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude there were genuine issues of material fact as to the cause of the employee’s accident and its relation to the employment, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Makini Jackson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to her former employer defendant Genesee County Road Commission (“GCRC”). Jackson claims that GCRC terminated her employment in retaliation for her investigations of employees’ claims of racial discrimination and her attempts to ensure that GCRC’s contracts complied with equal employment opportunity regulations. The district court granted GCRC’s motion for summary judgment because it found that Jackson had failed to prove that she engaged in protected activity and had not established causation. Because Jackson engaged in protected activity and there remains a genuine factual dispute as to causation, we reverse.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Even before the Supreme Court declared the issue of partisan gerrymandering a nonjusticiable political question in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019), some states had begun to address the issue head on. This case involves one such endeavor: Michigan’s Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”), which was established by ballot initiative in the state’s 2018 general election. The Commission is composed of thirteen registered voters—eight who affiliate with the state’s two major political parties (four per party) and five who are unaffiliated with those parties—who must satisfy various eligibility criteria designed to ensure that they lack certain political ties.

Plaintiffs here are Michigan citizens who allege that they are unconstitutionally excluded from serving on the Commission by its eligibility criteria, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. They appeal the district court’s dismissal of their Complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We rejected similar—if not identical—arguments to those that Plaintiffs raise here when we affirmed the district court’s earlier denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction in Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Daunt I”). Plaintiffs’ arguments are no more persuasive this time around. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Commission’s eligibility criteria do not offend the First or Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Carhartt sued its fabric supplier, Innovative Textiles, for breach of contract and breach of warranty, among other claims, after discovering alleged defects in Innovative’s flame-resistant fabric. The sole issue on appeal is whether Carhartt failed to notify Innovative of the alleged breach within a reasonable time after Carhartt should have discovered the breach. The district court granted summary judgment to Innovative, holding that Carhartt was barred from seeking any remedy under Michigan’s Uniform Commercial Code § 440.2607(3) because Carhartt’s notification was too late. Because reasonable minds could differ as to whether Carhartt should have discovered the breach sooner—whether Carhartt should have been performing regular, destructive fire-resistance testing on the fabric it received from Innovative—we REVERSE and REMAND for a jury to decide this question.

The Bradley County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Donald Ray Pennington, Jr., for two counts of rape of a child. Following a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of rape of a child in count 1 and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in count 2. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child; (2) he is entitled to relief under plain error due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An inmate filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari seeking review of the Tennessee Department of Correction’s disciplinary decisions. Because the inmate’s petition failed to comply with constitutional and statutory requirements, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.