Following the dissolution of the law firm formerly known as Hill Boren, PC, Appellant brought, inter alia, the following claims: (1) Count 1: “Joint Enterprise/Venture/Aiding and Abetting Fiduciary Breach;” (2) Count 2: “No Derivative Cause of Action: Negligence and/or Fraud;” (3) Count 4: “Attempted Cover Up: Punitive Damages;” (4) Count 6: “Strict Liability in Tort for Misconduct of a Lawyer;” and (5) Count 7: “Liability of Lawyer Misconduct Causing Harm/Damage to a Foreseeable Non-Party Non-Client Ethical Differentiation Standard.” The trial court dismissed Appellant’s lawsuit on grant of Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss and on grant of Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. In part, the dismissal was based on a final judgment in the underlying lawsuit, Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, No. W2019-02235-COA- R3-CV, 2021 WL 1109992 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 23, 2021). Subsequently, however, this Court dismissed the appeal of the underlying lawsuit on the ground that the order appealed was not final. As such, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of a portion of Count 2 and Count 4 on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed, and the Appellant’s request for stay is denied.

The Defendant, Antonio D. Blaylock, entered an open plea to multiple charges resulting from a high-speed chase through Jackson, which culminated in an automobile crash injuring the other driver, a collision with a telephone pole, and damage to the front porch of a house. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him probation. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Calvin Murray, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his “Motion for Rule 36 Clerical Mistakes” and denial of his motion to reconsider, which he argues should be liberally construed as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that he was not awarded all the credits for time served in the community corrections program to which he was entitled. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Michael Broyles, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of four counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202(a)(2) (2018). The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction and imposed the sentences concurrently. The court ordered split confinement consisting of ninety days’ jail service followed by probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the animal cruelty statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in denying judicial diversion, (4) the court erred in imposing a sentence involving confinement, and (5) the court erred in imposing fines and restitution without making the appropriate factual findings. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A preferred service employee appealed the termination of his employment. After failing to obtain relief at the Step I or Step II reviews, the employee requested a Step III hearing before the Board of Appeals. At the conclusion of the employee’s proof, the state agency moved for an involuntary dismissal. The Board of Appeals found the employee had failed to present sufficient evidence to show a right to relief. The Board dismissed the appeal and upheld the dismissal decision. The employee sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court affirmed. Finding no basis to reverse or modify the Board’s decision, we also affirm.

A collecting bank sued the drawer of a check, claiming that the drawer stopped payment on the check with fraudulent intent. The general sessions court, as well as the circuit court on de novo appeal, ruled in favor of the drawer. The bank argues that, because it was a holder in due course, the drawer was still liable on the check despite the stop-payment order. And it seeks an award of interest, court costs, attorney’s fees, and treble damages from the drawer, contending that the proof showed the drawer acted with fraudulent intent. We affirm the dismissal of the claim based on the drawer’s alleged fraudulent intent, but we vacate the dismissal of any claim based on the drawer’s obligation on the check.

Plaintiff employee appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on her claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. We affirm, as modified, the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.

An inmate filed a complaint alleging theft against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction and against the prison Warden. The Commissioner and the Warden moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motion. We have determined that the trial court failed to provide reasons for the dismissal of the complaint. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand.

This appeal arose from a personal injury action. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a statement of material facts in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. The plaintiff responded to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment but failed to respond to the separate statement of material facts. As a result of the plaintiff’s failure to respond to the statement of material facts, the Trial Court deemed those facts as stated by the defendant as admitted and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant upon its determination that the defendant had negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a real estate transaction that fell through. The Estate of Katherine N. Mounger (“the Estate”), as well as executors Katherine M. Lasater and E. Jay Mounger (“Defendants,” collectively), seek reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) whereby they were ordered to return $150,000 in earnest money to Nelson E. Bowers, II (“Plaintiff”), successor in interest to would-be purchaser of the property at issue, McKenzie Loudon Properties, LLC (“MLP”). Defendants appeal to this Court, arguing, among other things, that MLP first materially breached the contract for sale (“the Agreement”) by failing to perform a title examination and failing to notify it of a defect in title stemming from oral claims of ownership made by Charles Mounger. However, we find, as did the Trial Court, that the Estate had actual notice of the defect in title. Further, it was the Estate, rather than MLP, that materially breached the Agreement by failing to provide marketable title. Aside from an award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees incurred on an earlier appeal in this matter which Plaintiff did not request from this Court in that earlier appeal, which we reverse, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for an award to Plaintiff of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on this appeal as requested.