The Defendant, Demon L. Adkins, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of possessing contraband in a penal institution, and he received an effective fifteen-year sentence as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his convictions are invalid because the indictment erroneously stated the incorrect mens rea and because the verdict forms and jury instructions conflated the crime of possessing contraband in a penal institution and introducing contraband into a penal institution. He also asserts that the savings statute operates to entitle him to a lesser punishment. We conclude that he is not entitled to reversal of his convictions but that the savings statute applies to provide a lesser penalty. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed, the sentences are reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing.

This case involves a divorce action and several motions for contempt. Prior to the final hearing, the wife filed multiple motions for civil and criminal contempt against the husband. At the final hearing, the trial court resolved the divorce-related issues and found the husband in civil contempt on eight counts. The husband only appealed the trial court’s contempt ruling. We affirm the trial court’s decision, award the wife attorney’s fees on appeal, and remand.

A property owner shot and injured a trespassing dog. The dog’s owner, a family member, and an unrelated party posted negative comments about the property owner during his campaign for public office. After losing the election, the property owner and his wife sued the three individuals for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. The defendants filed a countercomplaint seeking damages for trespass to chattels, conversion, negligence, and trespass. The trial court dismissed all claims. The court also issued a restraining order enjoining the parties from making public comments about each other. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the property owner was a public figure when the allegedly defamatory statements were published. But because we conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleged actual malice, we reverse the dismissal of the defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims. We further conclude that the countercomplaint stated a cause of action for trespass to chattels, conversion, negligence, and trespass. So we reverse the dismissal of those counterclaims. We also vacate the restraining order.

This appeal arises from the modification of a parenting plan in a post-divorce action, upon a petition filed by the minor child’s mother. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that there was a material change of circumstances under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) and 36-6- 101(a)(2)(C) and that modification of the parenting schedule and of primary residential parent was in the best interest of the child. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order.

This appeal arose from an order of the Hamilton County Chancery Court (“trial court”) determining that the decedent’s purported will did not meet the statutory requirements for proper execution of a last will and testament and that the decedent’s estate would therefore be probated as an intestate administration. The decedent’s surviving spouse had first attempted to probate the will via common form probate,1 alleging that the purported will met the statutory requirements for a holographic will. However, upon the decedent’s son’s motion to contest the proffered will in common form, the trial court determined that the purported will did not meet the statutory requirements of a holographic will pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-105. The trial court further instructed that the decedent’s estate would proceed as an intestate estate. After the estate was administered as an intestate estate for several months, the decedent’s wife filed a second petition to probate the purported will via solemn form probate as an attested will, contending that the proffered will met the statutory requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-104. Upon the decedent’s son’s notice and motion for a will contest concerning the petition in solemn form, the trial court determined, inter alia, that such action was not time barred. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final judgment, concluding that the purported will did not meet the statutory requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated 32- 1-104 and, as such, the decedent’s estate would be administered as an intestate estate. The decedent’s surviving spouse timely appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in proceeding with the solemn form probate proceedings because it did not halt the proceedings upon the decedent’s son’s filing of a second will contest to determine the decedent’s son’s standing in the subsequent action, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

For the week of May 17, 2021 - May 21, 2021

This appeal arises from a class action lawsuit against the City of Franklin. The plaintiffs are the owners of 188 properties, in five subdivisions, whose properties are subject to liens in connection with improvement assessments for sanitary sewer services. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the City had filed notices of liens against the properties in amounts greater than authorized pursuant to the relevant statutes governing improvement assessments. The trial court declared the notices of liens null and void and directed the City to file amended notices of liens. The next phase of the proceeding focused on damages. The owners of eight properties filed claims for monetary damages allegedly caused by the City’s error when the property owners had attempted to refinance or sell their properties. The trial court concluded that a hearing on damages was not necessary and denied all claims, finding that none of the claimants suffered an injury as a result of the City’s actions. The trial court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for an award of the attorney fees they had incurred. The plaintiffs appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in denying their claims for damages and attorney fees. The City of Franklin argues that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the substantive issue regarding the validity of the notices of liens. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. The difference between waiver and forfeiture has long bedeviled lawyers and judges alike. Lawyers often split the difference, using the terms interchangeably or even offering a formulation like “my opponent waived and/or forfeited that argument.” Sometimes they will also invoke invited error, which falls within the continuum between forfeiture and waiver. But the terms have different meanings and, especially in criminal cases, different consequences. For Edres Montgomery, the difference is dispositive. At his resentencing hearing, the district court applied the wrong Criminal History Category, placing Montgomery in a higher Sentencing Guidelines range. Had Montgomery waived the right to challenge that error, he would be stuck with the sentence he received under the incorrect range. But he only invited the error, which means that we have discretion to review it if the interests of justice demand that we do so. Here, they do. We therefore vacate Montgomery’s sentence and remand for resentencing under the correct Guidelines range.

The Defendant, Thomas Byrd, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to sell/deliver within 1000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance (marijuana), possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance (Alprazolam), and possession of a Schedule II controlled substance (oxycodone), all Class A misdemeanors; and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his person and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the felony convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, a Tennessee corporation in the timeshare exit business, brought suit against Appellee, a former employee, for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, and civil conspiracy. Appellant alleged that during Appellee’s employment, she conspired with a competing company to steal business from Appellant. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed the complaint in full with prejudice because the alleged employment contract, attached as an exhibit to the plaintiff’s complaint, did not name the plaintiff as a party to the contract. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the breach of contract claim but reverse the dismissal of the breach of the duty of loyalty claim and the civil conspiracy claim.