A father filed a petition to modify his monthly child support payments. Due to several delays, the trial court did not resolve the father’s petition for approximately four years. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court drastically reduced the father’s monthly support obligation and ordered the modification effective as of the last day of the modification hearing. The father appeals the trial court’s decision not to make the modification retroactive to the date the petition to modify was filed. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Under federal antitrust law, a private plaintiff generally must be a “direct purchaser” to have suffered injury and thus have standing to sue a manufacturer or supplier. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, however, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the direct-purchaser rule, holding that an “indirect purchaser” might have standing to sue if it purchased from an intermediary that was “owned or controlled” by the ultimate seller. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The present dispute raises the question whether Illinois Brick has any effect on the interpretation of certain antitrust class-action settlement agreements under Michigan law.

Specifically, we consider Illinois Brick to address whether Plaintiffs, who purchased automotive anti-vibration rubber parts, are barred from maintaining a purported direct-purchaser class-action lawsuit against the manufacturers and sellers of those parts. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs settled all their claims as part of a class composed of certain “persons and entities” that “indirectly purchased” anti-vibration rubber parts. Plaintiffs argue that, in accordance with Illinois Brick, they are not part of the settlement class because they purchased “directly” from subsidiaries of a manufacturer. As explained below, regardless of whether Illinois Brick applies to Plaintiffs’ underlying claims, Plaintiffs fit within the class definition because they “indirectly purchased” parts under the plain meaning of the settlement agreements. Their suit is therefore barred by those agreements. We reverse the district court’s contrary holding.

Jeffery Brian Wills, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's order denying his motion for sentence reduction filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order denying Wills's motion for a sentence reduction.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. The government charged Defendant Demetrius Pitts with serious offenses including planning terrorist attacks against his fellow Americans and threatening the President. The parties ultimately agreed to resolve this case with a plea agreement that carried a 168-month sentence, which was substantially below what the sentencing Guidelines recommended. Pitts now challenges that resolution.

The FBI began monitoring Pitts after he made social media posts encouraging Muslims to pursue military training. Eventually, Pitts expressed a desire to meet with an al-Qaeda operative, and the FBI deployed an undercover agent (“UA”) to play this role. The two planned a bombing in downtown Cleveland, and the FBI arrested Pitts after he pitched follow-up attacks in Philadelphia and San Francisco.

Ultimately, the government charged Pitts with attempting to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”), threatening the President, threatening the President’s immediate family, and making false statements to law enforcement. Pitts pleaded guilty to the first three charges, and the government dismissed the fourth. He now complains that the district court improperly accepted his plea because there was no factual basis for it in the record, because he was not competent to enter it, and because he did not understand its terms. Because we find these arguments meritless, we don’t address the sentencing arguments barred by the appellate waiver in Pitts’s valid plea agreement, and we AFFIRM the district court.

Defendant, Douglas E. Alvey, was indicted by the Rhea County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, vehicular homicide, and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death. By motion of the State, the trial court dismissed the charge of vehicular homicide. A jury convicted Defendant as charged on the remaining counts, and the trial court imposed a life sentence for Defendant’s first degree murder conviction and a sentence of two years, to be served concurrently, for his leaving the scene of an accident conviction. Defendant appeals his first degree murder conviction, asserting that the evidence at trial of premeditation was not sufficient to support his conviction. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction.

This appeal arises from a financial dispute between a drug testing laboratory, H & H Testing, Inc. (“H & H Testing” or “H & H”), and Wesley Young, for whom H & H performed 64 qualitative drug screens while Mr. Young was a client of Transcend Recovery Community (“Transcend”), which operates recovery communities nationwide. Upon commencing treatment for drug addiction at Transcend, Mr. Young agreed to adhere to treatment guidelines that included abstaining from drugs and alcohol and submitting to a rigorous drug screening protocol. Pursuant to this protocol, Transcend forwarded 64 of Mr. Young’s random urine samples to H & H Testing for comprehensive laboratory testing. After H & H performed each drug screen, it submitted a claim to Mr. Young’s health insurance provider, BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee (“BlueCross” or “BCBST”). BlueCross approved each and every claim submitted by H & H Testing and remitted payment for the services rendered by H & H in the aggregate of $85,837.11. Because H & H Testing was an out-of-network provider, BlueCross remitted payment for the services rendered by H & H to its insured, Mr. Young, expecting he would forward the proceeds to H & H. Instead of remitting the funds to H & H Testing, Mr. Young entrusted the money to his parents, but they did not forward the proceeds to H & H. When H & H Testing demanded payment, Mr. Young and his parents commenced this action to declare the rights of the parties to the funds. They contended that H & H Testing was not entitled to the insurance proceeds because Mr. Young did not have a contract with H & H Testing, its services were not medically necessary, and the charges were exorbitant. H & H Testing filed an answer and counterclaims for breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Following a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of H & H Testing without identifying the claims upon which the judgment was granted and imposed a constructive trust over the insurance proceeds. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of H & H Testing based on its claims of conversion and unjust enrichment. But we vacate the trial court’s decision to impose a constructive trust over the proceeds because the parties failed to raise the issue in any of the pleadings.

A property development company brought suit against a property owner for specific performance to enforce an option agreement entered into between the company and the property owner. The trial court held that the option agreement was enforceable and awarded specific performance and damages to the development company. We have concluded that the option agreement is not sufficiently definite with respect to the option price and, therefore, is not an enforceable contract. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings regarding the development company’s alternative cause of action for unjust enrichment.

This appeal concerns the dismissal of a complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02 and denial of a motion to alter or amend under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59. The court dismissed the complaint after finding the plaintiffs consistently violated court orders and unnecessarily delayed litigation by, inter alia, violating discovery and procedural deadlines. The plaintiffs moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the trial court already excused any past violations and their latest violations were due to circumstances outside of the plaintiffs’ control. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. We have determined that the court’s basis for dismissing the case is properly supported by evidence in the record, the court identified and applied the appropriate legal principles, and its decision was within the range of acceptable alternatives dispositions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. When an insured motorist gets into a car accident, American Family Insurance Company caps the amount it will pay for damage to the car. American Family’s standard insurance policy indicates that it will pay no more than the lesser of the car’s “actual cash value” or “the amount necessary to repair or replace” it. If the car is a total loss, the insured typically must pay various taxes and fees when buying a replacement. This appeal addresses how these expenses fit within American Family’s payment obligations. Should the taxes and fees be included in the estimate of the damaged car’s “actual cash value” if American Family opts to pay that amount? Or are they included only if American Family decides to pay the “amount necessary to . . . replace” the car? After Nanika Wilkerson got into a car accident, American Family took the latter position and refused to add these taxes and fees to its estimate of the “actual cash value” of Wilkerson’s damaged car. Wilkerson brought this breach-of-contract suit on behalf of a class of individuals who also were not paid these expenses. The district court dismissed her complaint, reasoning that the “actual cash value” of a damaged car under American Family’s policy unambiguously excludes the taxes and fees necessary to buy a replacement. We agree and affirm.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Stephen L. Purcell, Jr., of felony reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, auto burglary, and theft of property valued at more than $10,000. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and especially aggravated kidnapping. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.