Question 1: Is the State Capitol Commission a “public entity exercising control of a memorial” such that it may file a petition for a waiver under the Tennessee Heritage Protection Act to relocate the Nathan Bedford Forrest, David Glasgow Farragut, and Albert Gleaves memorials that are currently on display in the state capitol building?

Opinion 1: A proper petitioner for a waiver under the Heritage Protection Act need only be “[a] public entity exercising control of a memorial.” The Act does not require that the public entity exercise exclusive or even primary control of a memorial before it may file a petition for waiver. The State Capitol Commission does exercise some control of the three memorials by virtue of its power to establish plans and policies for the state capitol building. While there are public entities that arguably also exercise control over the three memorials, the State Capitol Commission is a public entity exercising control of the memorials within the meaning of the Heritage Protection Act and so appears to be an appropriate petitioner under the Act.

Question 2: If the State Capitol Commission is an appropriate entity to file a petition for waiver to relocate the three memorials, did it have authority to do so without the concurrence of the State Building Commission?

Opinion 2: The decision of the State Capitol Commission to file a petition for waiver could be viewed as establishing a plan or policy pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-8-302(a), which would require the concurrence of the State Building Commission. But it could also be viewed as a decision to pursue a legal remedy under the Heritage Protection Act, which, arguably, is not an action requiring the concurrence of the State Building Commission. The Tennessee Historical Commission implicitly found the latter when it granted the State Capitol Commission’s petition for waiver without requiring it to show concurrence of the State Building Commission.

Question 1: Is an energy authority allowed by state law to extend broadband, or other utility services, outside its electric service area?

Opinion 1: Generally, an energy authority may extend water and wastewater services outside its electric service area with the consent of any municipality or utility district into which service is to be extended. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-36-107(a)(4)-(6). An energy authority may provide telecommunications service—which includes telephone, cable television, and Internet (broadband) service—only within its electric service area and with the permission of any other municipality located within its service area, into which service is to be extended. Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-52- 601(a).

CLAY, Circuit Judge. On June 29, 2018, Larry Johnson, a pretrial detainee at the Cuyahoga County Correction Center ("CCCC"), hanged himself. Marie Moderwell, the administrator of Johnson's estate, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against twenty-one defendants.   After answering the Amended Complaint, four CCCC correctional officers moved the district court for partial judgment on the pleadings and four Cuyahoga County officials moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted in part and denied in part the motions, and Defendants appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court's decision.

This is the third interlocutory appeal in this case. The employee, a home health aide, sustained work-related injuries when she caught a falling patient, which resulted in shoulder, neck, and low back pain. The employer accepted the shoulder and low back injuries as compensable but denied that any compensable aggravation of the employee’s pre-existing cervical condition arose primarily out of the work incident. Following the first expedited hearing, the trial court ordered the employer to provide medical benefits for the employee’s cervical condition. The employer appealed, and we reversed the trial court’s order, concluding the expert medical proof did not support the court’s determination that the employee was likely to prove a compensable aggravation of her pre-existing condition. In the second expedited hearing, the parties submitted the same depositions and medical records as were previously considered by the trial court with the addition of lay witness testimony and an affidavit from the court reporter correcting a typographical error in one of the medical depositions. The trial court again ordered additional treatment for the employee’s cervical condition. The employer appealed, and we affirmed the trial court’s order. Thereafter, the employer provided a panel of orthopedists for evaluation and treatment of the employee’s neck complaints. After receiving a causation opinion from the authorized physician, the employer requested a third expedited hearing. In a decision on the record, the trial court concluded the employee was not likely to establish that the work incident primarily caused her current need for medical treatment. The employee has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

The defendant, Steven Michael Simpson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree felony murder, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Marcus Thurman Wade, filed for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of first degree murder and one conviction of especially aggravated robbery, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) advising the Petitioner not to testify; (2) failing to request a psychological evaluation of the Petitioner; (3) failing to introduce at the suppression hearing proof of the Petitioner’s mental capacity; (4) failing to challenge the racial composition of the jury venire; (5) failing to request funds for expert witnesses; (6) failing to investigate and review motel camera footage; and (7) failing to file a motion in limine to block evidence of the Petitioner’s drug transactions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding. Although the trial court found that certain grounds for termination were established against the children’s father, it determined that there was insufficient proof that termination was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the guardian ad litem and prospective adoptive parents challenge the trial court’s best interests determination, as well as the trial court’s failure to conclude that other grounds for termination were established. Our review of the record reveals that no grounds for termination were properly found by the trial court, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition to terminate on this basis.

After receiving a credit card receipt printed with the first six and last four digits of her credit card, Plaintiff Denece Thomas (Plaintiff) sued Defendants TOMS King (Defendants) for violating the “truncation requirement” of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA). That provision prohibits anyone who accepts credit or debit cards for payment from printing more than the last five digits of a customer’s card number on the receipt, and offers actual and statutory damages. The question before us is whether Defendants’ alleged violation of that statute resulted in harm sufficiently concrete for Article III standing purposes. The district court concluded that it did not and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appeals that decision.

FACTA reflects Congress’s concern with preventing identity theft, and its belief that truncating card numbers is the most effective means of doing so. But a violation of the truncation requirement does not automatically cause an injury in fact. And the complaint in this case fails to establish that Defendants’ technical violation of the statute caused harm or presented any material risk of harm. We therefore affirm the lower court’s ruling.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. When an Ohio county forecloses on a tax-delinquent property, it ordinarily sells the property at an auction, keeps enough of the proceeds to cover the outstanding taxes, and returns any leftover funds to the owner. To stem a tide of vacant homes and to transfer ownership of them more efficiently, Ohio enabled its municipalities to take another route when it comes to abandoned tax-delinquent property. Instead of selling the property and collecting the taxes owed, counties may surrender their tax interest and transfer the property with clear title to land banks. The land banks may revitalize the abandoned property, sell it to a private buyer, or demolish the home to pave the way for new neighborhoods. No auction occurs when counties choose the land bank route, and any surplus equity held by the original owner vanishes.

Alana Harrison inherited a partial interest in her mother’s home in Dayton. Due to a nearly $20,000 property tax delinquency, Montgomery County’s treasurer started foreclosure proceedings in 2017. The County Board of Revision handled the foreclosure and transferred the home to the County’s land bank. The home had an estimated fair market value of $22,600 at the time of the transfer, roughly $3,000 more than the property taxes owed. Harrison never received the surplus equity because the statute offers no way to pay it.

Harrison filed an action against Montgomery County under the Takings Clause of the Fifth (and Fourteenth) Amendment of the United States Constitution. On top of seeking relief for herself, she also sought relief on behalf of a purported class of similarly situated landowners. The County moved to dismiss her claim, arguing that claim preclusion barred Harrison’s lawsuit because she could have raised a federal takings claim at several points during the foreclosure process. The district court agreed. In view of the intricate issues presented and the potential invalidity of an Ohio law, we solicited the participation of the Ohio Attorney General, whose office helpfully filed an amicus brief and participated in the oral argument in support of the County. We now reverse.

Defendant, Bradley Robinson, appeals his Knox County convictions for facilitation of first degree felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-seven years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.