The petitioner, Howard Burnett, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of first degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Because the petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s representation, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal concerns the potential personal liability of the owner of a corporation, which was engaged as the contractor in a multi-million-dollar construction project. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the construction company’s owner, determining that the owner could not be held personally liable for the corporation’s alleged violations of either the Tennessee Contractors Licensing Act, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the Tennessee Trust Fund Statute, or the Prompt Pay Act. The plaintiff has appealed. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the corporation’s owner.

Question 1: Is the Tennessee State Guard a militia, as contemplated by the Constitution of Tennessee, or is it part of the Army of this State, similar to the National Guard?

Opinion 1: The Tennessee State Guard, like the Tennessee National Guard, is a militia under the Constitution of Tennessee.

Question 2: Is a militia currently authorized under the laws of this State to deploy and defend persons or property during a civil disorder or riot, a declared civil emergency, or a curfew?

Opinion 2: While Tennessee Code Ann. § 58-1-301 provides that the governor may call the militia into service at any time that "public safety" requires it, that law does not appear to comport with article III, section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution.

Question 3: Using the definition of "militia" as a group of private citizens who are armed and trained for military service apart from the regular armed forces, does the Constitution of Tennessee prohibit Tennessee residents from organizing into local or regional militias?

Opinion 3: Yes. The Constitution of Tennessee prohibits a group of private citizens who are armed and trained for military service apart from the regular armed forces from organizing into local or regional militias.

Question 4: Do any state statutes, including Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-17-314, prohibit or otherwise restrict Tennessee residents from organizing into local or regional militias or the activities such militias may undertake?

Opinion 4: Yes. Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-17-314 prohibits Tennessee residents from participating in paramilitary activities that are undertaken in furtherance of a "civil disorder." Additionally, any number of provisions of Tennessee's Criminal Code could apply depending on the circumstances in which paramilitary activities are undertaken.

Question 5: Do the answers to Questions 3 and 4 differ if the only firearms training that is conducted by a militia is focused on self-defense or intended to teach the safe handling and use of firearms?

Opinion 5: No. As explained in Opinion 3, the Constitution of Tennessee prohibits private individuals from organizing into local or regional militias. While the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution confers an individual right to possess a firearm and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home, the Second Amendment does not include the right to form and train as private, independent militias.

The state statutes referred to in Opinion 4 that prohibit paramilitary activities could apply depending on the circumstances in which the paramilitary activities are undertaken.

Question 6: May a local government organize, coordinate, or partner with a militia for civil defense, including defending persons and property, during a civil disorder or riot, a civil emergency, or curfew?

Opinion 6: No. As explained in Opinion 3, the Constitution of Tennessee prohibits private individuals from organizing into local or regional militias; thus, a local government may not coordinate or partner with such a militia. Moreover, local governments may not organize their own militias because they lack the authority to do so.

Question 7: If a local government were to organize or enter into an official arrangement with a local or regional militia, would the militia be considered a governmental military force as defined in Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-17-314(a)(2)(B) and exempt from the training restrictions described in that statute?

Opinion 7: In light of Opinion 6, this question is moot.

Question 8: If a local government were to organize or enter into an official arrangement with a local or regional militia, would the local government be liable for any acts of the militia within the scope of the arrangement? Would members of the militia be considered to be agents of the local government?

Opinion 8: In light of Opinion 6, this question is moot.

Question 9: If a militia engages in the armed defense of persons or property, is the militia subject to laws regarding the use of deadly force and the possession and carrying of firearms under Chapter 11, Part 6 and Chapter 17, Part 13 of the Tennessee Code? Does the answer differ if militia is organized by or in coordination or partnership with a local government?

Opinion 9: In light of Opinions 3, 4, 5, and 6, these questions are moot.

The Defendant, Andrew G. Walsh, pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful photography, and he agreed to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and judicial diversion and ordered the Defendant to register as a sex offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in making its sentencing decisions. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Marterious O’Neal, of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range II offender. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for imposition of sentences as a Range I, standard offender.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first-degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. As a result of his convictions, the defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-six years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the shooter and insufficient to support a finding of premeditation. Upon our thorough review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs, we affirm the jury’s verdict.

After being indicted for one count of sexual battery, Mannan Mehdi, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea with no agreement as to the sentence. The trial court denied judicial diversion, ordering Defendant to a one-year sentence, suspended to probation. The trial court also ordered Defendant to serve periodic confinement of “6 weekends in jail over the course of the probation.” Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion. After a review, we determine that the trial court considered irrelevant factors in denying diversion. As a result, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Curry, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a thorough review of the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner failed to state a colorable claim and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Keith Clark, was convicted at trial of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective sentence of four years in confinement followed by eight years on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, that the trial court violated his right to confront the State’s witness during cross-examination, and that the State improperly commented on his decision not to testify in its closing argument. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Rashawn Boseman-Humes, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation with respect to his convictions for attempted possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver and introduction of contraband into a penal facility. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he violated the terms of his probation and in ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.