On behalf of the estate of his mother, one son, as substitute personal representative, filed suit against his brother, the previous personal representative, seeking return of funds alleged to be missing from the decedent’s accounts. Upon summary judgment, the trial court found in favor of the defendant, the initial administrator of the estate. We reverse and remand for trial.

A patient filed a health care liability claim against a hospital, asserting the hospital was vicariously liable for injuries she suffered as a result of the anesthesia providers’ conduct. The hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing that the anesthesia providers were not employed by the hospital and the hospital was, therefore, not liable for the anesthetists’ actions as a matter of law because the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff’s direct claims against the anesthesia providers by the time the plaintiff filed her complaint against the hospital. The trial court granted the hospital’s motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, relying on the common law set forth in Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare- Memphis Hospitals, 325 S.W.3d 98 (Tenn. 2010). Acknowledging the conflict between provisions of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act and the common law, we hold that the statute prevails. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

Buddy Ray Small, Petitioner, was indicted for first degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and arson. He pled guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder in addition to the other charges as listed in the indictment in exchange for an effective sentence of thirty-five years at 100%. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, Petitioner challenges the denial of post-conviction relief. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. However, because there are clerical errors in the judgment forms, we remand to the post-conviction court for correction of the judgment forms.

Police officers filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of a municipal board’s decision to approve a monthly amount of pension benefits for each officer. The petitioners alleged that the municipal board erred in calculating their benefits and in failing to provide them with a hearing in compliance with the contested case procedures in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Upon the city’s motion, the trial court dismissed the petition as improperly filed and remanded the matter to the municipal board for a written determination after a hearing. Because the trial court erred in dismissing the petition, we vacate that portion of the judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their two children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of multiple statutory grounds for termination. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parent’s parental rights was in each child’s best interest. Although the court’s factual findings related to one of the grounds were lacking, clear and convincing evidence supports the remaining statutory grounds for termination and the best interest determination. So we affirm.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. The State Bank in Fenton, Michigan faced financial challenges during the 2008 Great Recession. It hired Daniel Wollschlager, a banking executive and lending officer, to steady the ship. As an enticement, the Bank’s holding company offered to pay Wollschlager roughly two years’ salary if the Bank fired him prematurely—a golden parachute arrangement that Congress requires the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to approve when it comes to troubled banks. That risk materialized in 2011, when Wollschlager and the Bank parted ways. The Bank sought permission from the FDIC to pay Wollschlager the first installment of this money, roughly a year’s salary. The FDIC approved the request. When the Bank later asked permission to pay the last installment, however, the FDIC declined on the ground that golden parachute arrangements should not exceed one year’s salary, particularly for someone who had worked at the bank for just three years. Wollschlager sued the agency, alleging that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act by refusing to permit the second payment. The district court granted the FDIC’s motion for judgment on the administrative record. Because the FDIC’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, we affirm.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. David Felten appeals the district court’s partial dismissal of his first amended complaint alleging that William Beaumont Hospital (“Beaumont”) violated the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Felten claims that Beaumont blacklisted him after he filed a qui tam complaint, in which he alleged that the hospital violated certain federal and state laws. Notably, the alleged blacklisting occurred after Felten’s termination from Beaumont, and Felten’s anti-retaliation claim challenges only Beaumont’s post-termination actions. The district court dismissed the claim because it held that the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision covers only retaliatory actions taken during the course of a plaintiff’s employment. The district court certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision protects a relator from a defendant’s retaliation after the relator’s termination. That question is an issue of first impression in our circuit. Because we hold that the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision protects former employees alleging post- termination retaliation, we vacate the district court’s dismissal order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Termaine York, of first degree premeditated murder for a shooting he committed at his former workplace. The Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of first degree premeditated murder because the State failed to establish premeditation. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Ronnie Lucas Wilson, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm; attempted first degree murder; two counts of employing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; driving while the privilege to do so was canceled, suspended, or revoked; evading arrest in a motor vehicle and creating a risk of death or injury; two counts of initiating or making a false report to a law enforcement officer; and employing a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of a dangerous felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307(b)(1) (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (firearm possession by a convicted felon), 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39- 12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-17-1324(b) (2018) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony), 55-50-504(a)(1) (2017) driving while privilege canceled, suspended, or revoked), 39-16-603(b)(1), (b)(3)(B) (2018) (evading arrest); 39-16-502 (2018) (a)(1), (a)(2) (false report). The jury found that the Defendant was a member of a criminal gang, and the trial court enhanced his sentences for being a felon in possession of a firearm and attempted first degree murder, which qualified as Criminal Gang Offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121. The court merged the convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm into a single count, merged the convictions for employing a firearm into a single count, and merged the convictions for initiating or making a false report into a single count. The court imposed an effective fifty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder and the criminal gang enhanced verdicts, (2) the gang enhancement counts violate the Defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and expressive association, (3) the court erred in denying his motion to continue after severing the codefendant’s case on the morning of the trial, and (4) he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of cumulative trial error. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we vacate the jury’s findings regarding the Criminal Gang Offenses Statute, and we modify the Defendant’s sentences for being a felon in possession of a firearm and remand for entry of corrected judgments for attempted first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The Petitioner, Juan LaSean Perry, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He asserts on appeal, as he did in his petition, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment for second degree murder. He also asserts for the first time that the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors during sentencing. Following careful review, we affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition.