The Defendant, Trammel Williams, pleaded guilty to aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault, and he agreed to serve an effective sentence of eight years on probation. A violation of probation warrant was issued, and following a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court lacked substantial evidence to find that he violated the terms of his probation and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the fourth appeal involving this particular dispute. In this case, the trial court dismissed a motion filed by the defendants seeking relief from a final judgment as an independent action under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we conclude that an independent action was improper under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on different grounds.

Mother, who physically abused two of her children and pled guilty to an eight-year sentence for attempted aggravated child abuse, appeals the termination of her parental rights. We affirm the grounds for termination as well as the trial court’s best interest finding.

This appeal concerns a prenuptial agreement that protected each spouse’s premarital property and waived the right to alimony. The couple signed the agreement on the day it was drafted, 11 days before their wedding. Seven years later, after the husband filed for divorce, the wife sought to set aside the agreement, asserting that she did not sign it knowledgeably and freely. The wife alleged that the husband took her to the attorney’s office without notice or an opportunity to seek independent counsel. The trial court concluded that the agreement was valid because the couple lived together for six years before getting engaged, the wife knew the husband would not marry her without a prenuptial agreement, and the wife was not pressured or coerced into signing the agreement. We affirm.

In this parental termination case, we review the trial court’s application of the missing witness rule to a party in a non-jury trial, the trial court’s reliance on the doctrine of unclean hands, and whether the trial court erred in terminating parental rights on the grounds of abandonment. A mother and stepfather petitioned the trial court to terminate a father’s parental rights and allow the stepfather to adopt the child. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights based on a finding of abandonment by willful failure to support, willful failure to make reasonable or consistent support payments, and willful failure to visit. The trial court also found termination was in the child’s best interest. In reaching these conclusions, the trial court presumed that because the father—a missing witness— did not appear for trial, his testimony would have been unfavorable to him. In addition, the trial court ruled that under the doctrine of unclean hands, the father should be “repelled at the courthouse steps” because he made false statements in his interrogatory answers. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court erred by applying the missing witness rule in a non-jury trial and by applying the doctrine of unclean hands. The Court of Appeals also held the mother and stepfather’s evidence of abandonment was less than clear and convincing. We hold: (1) the missing witness rule may apply in a non-jury trial, although here the trial court misapplied the rule; (2) the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of unclean hands to the father because he was defending against a petition for statutory relief while seeking no equitable relief, and his alleged misconduct was collateral to the issue of abandonment; and (3) the evidence of abandonment was not clear and convincing. Thus, we hold the trial court erred in terminating the father’s parental rights. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Homeowners Gerald and Kathleen Pierce sued Ocwen Loan Servicing and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company to prevent them from foreclosing on their home. The district court granted summary judgment to Ocwen and Deutsche Bank. The Pierces appealed. Thinking the Pierces waited too long to file the notice of appeal, the banks filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We disagree with the banks’ position and deny the motion.

We deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. In Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that administrative law judges (ALJs) at the Securities Exchange Commission are “Officers of the United States” for purposes of the Appointments Clause in Article II of the Constitution. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). As “Officers of the United States,” those ALJs are subject to the Appointments Clause’s exclusive methods of appointment: by the President, by a department head, or by a court of law. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. When an ALJ holds her post in violation of the Appointments Clause, and a party timely objects, any adjudication she presided over must be vacated and assigned for rehearing before a different, properly appointed ALJ. 138 S. Ct. at 2055.

In resolving these lingering questions regarding ALJ appointments, Lucia left open at least one other: when is an Appointments Clause challenge timely? With nearly two thousand ALJs spanning agencies across the Executive Branch, that question has been raised with some frequency in Lucia’s wake. Today’s case is one example.

As part of a consolidated appeal, three coal mine operators challenge an adverse black lung benefits determination made by the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board. We must resolve whether a litigant forfeits an Appointments Clause challenge before the Board (and, as a consequence, before us) by not pressing the issue during earlier proceedings before an ALJ. Honoring the Board’s customary requirement that issues be raised first with the ALJ, we hold that the operators failed to preserve their Appointments Clause challenge. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

A trial court held two attorneys in contempt, assessing damages and sanctions against them. Shortly before another hearing in which the court was to consider a supplemental award of attorney’s fees, the judge of the trial court made comments in an unrelated case about one of the attorneys held in contempt. That attorney moved to recuse based, in part, on the judge’s comments. The trial court denied the motion to recuse and later entered a supplemental order of damages against the attorneys. Because the judge’s comments provide a reasonable basis for questioning his impartiality, we reverse the denial of the motion to recuse. And because retroactive recusal is appropriate, we also vacate the contempt and damages orders.

This appeal arises from the modification of a parenting plan in a post-divorce action, upon a petition filed by the minor child’s father. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the mother moved more than fifty miles from the father and find that the parental relocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108, does not apply in this case. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that there was a material change of circumstances under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6- 101(a)(2)(C) and that modification of the parenting schedule was in the best interest of the child. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order in all other respects.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. In Hicks v. Commissioner of Social Security, a majority of this panel concluded that the government’s process for redetermining plaintiffs’ eligibility for social security benefits was constitutionally and statutorily deficient. 909 F.3d 786, 791-92 (6th Cir. 2018). So we remanded the eleven cases that we had consolidated on appeal to three district courts for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. After remand, those plaintiffs, as well as forty-six other plaintiffs whose cases had been stayed pending a decision in Hicks, filed motions for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The district courts unanimously denied fees because they concluded that the government’s position in the Hicks litigation was “substantially justified.” We agree and affirm.