In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). While Appellant does not appeal the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest, we are required to review that question. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case is a cautionary tale on the ethical problems that can befall lawyers on social media. The attorney had a Facebook page that described him as a lawyer. A Facebook “friend” involved in a tumultuous relationship posted a public inquiry about carrying a gun in her car. In response to her post, the attorney posted comments on the escalating use of force. He then posted that, if the Facebook friend wanted “to kill” her ex-boyfriend, she should “lure” him into her home, “claim” he broke in with intent to do her harm, and “claim” she feared for her life. The attorney emphasized in his post that his advice was given “as a lawyer,” and if she was “remotely serious,” she should “keep mum” and delete the entire comment thread because premeditation could be used against her “at trial.” In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that the attorney’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(a) and (d). It recommended suspension of his law license for sixty days. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, § 15.4, this Court determined that the punishment imposed by the hearing panel appeared inadequate and, after briefing, took the matter under advisement. We now hold that the sanction must be increased. The attorney’s advice, in and of itself, was clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. In addition, his choice to post the remarks on a public platform amplified their deleterious effect. The social media posts fostered a public perception that a lawyer’s role is to manufacture false defenses. They projected a public image of corruption of the judicial process. Under these circumstances, the act of posting the comments on social media should be deemed an aggravating factor that justifies an increase in discipline. Accordingly, we modify the hearing panel’s judgment to impose a four-year suspension from the practice of law, with one year to be served on active suspension and the remainder on probation.

The petitioner, Ronald L. Cosper, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal stems from a petition to remove a co-conservator for a person with a disability. Several years ago, the ward’s brother and her personal attorney were appointed as co- conservators of the ward’s person and estate. Subsequently, the ward’s remaining siblings filed this action to remove the brother as a co-conservator, alleging that the brother had failed to act in the best interest of the ward. After a hearing on the petition, the trial court dismissed the petition to remove the brother as a co-conservator and awarded the co- conservators attorney’s fees. Some of the siblings appealed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand.

The trial court granted the Tennessee Attorney General’s petition seeking to compel the respondent corporation, Law Solutions Chicago LLC d/b/a UpRight Law (“UpRight”), to provide information regarding the identities of consumers who had paid for but allegedly not received UpRight’s services. In so ruling, the trial court determined that the attorney general had established that UpRight’s practices, if proven, would likely constitute violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court also determined that the information sought was not protected by the attorney-client privilege. UpRight has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The Appellant, who is the former spouse of the Appellee, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for “Rule 60” relief seeking residential time with the Appellee’s child. There is no dispute that the Appellant has been excluded as the father of the child based upon DNA testing he requested. Discerning no error on the part of the trial court, we affirm its judgment.

Bradley Nelson, a federal prisoner proceeding through counsel, appeals his sentence for distributing child pornography. The parties have waived oral argument, and this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

This is an appeal of a case seeking judicial determination of child support. Because the appellant, Donald R. Wright (“Appellant”) attempted to raise an issue regarding a separate case, which was not timely appealed, and all issues with regard to the instant case were waived, we dismiss this appeal.

In this dependency and neglect action, the mother appealed the determination made by the Knox County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) that the two minor children at issue were dependent and neglected to the Knox County Circuit Court (“trial court”). The father of the children had initiated the action by filing a petition for dependency and neglect against the mother in the juvenile court, alleging, inter alia, the mother’s inability to properly care for the children due to ongoing mental health issues. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) had intervened in the juvenile court proceedings, and following entry of an adjudicatory order, the juvenile court had awarded legal and physical custody of the children to the father. In a separate proceeding not at issue in this appeal, the juvenile court subsequently awarded temporary custody of the children to the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother. Following a de novo bench trial on the mother’s appeal, the trial court determined that the children were dependent and neglected as to the mother and maintained custody of the children with the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother. The mother has appealed to this Court.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This case involves a divorce that was granted in January, 2019. As a part of their divorce, the parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement which was thereafter incorporated into the final decree of divorce. Subsequently, the Appellant filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the Appellee was in noncompliance with his obligations under the marital dissolution agreement and requested, among other relief, attorney’s fees for having to file the petition. The trial court found that while the Appellee had been noncompliant with the marital dissolution agreement, the noncompliance was not willful and therefore concluded that the Appellant was not entitled to attorney’s fees. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s decision to not award the Appellant her attorney’s fees and additionally award the Appellant her attorney’s fees on appeal.