MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The demands on government increase the more it intrudes into its people’s liberty. The government, for example, must meet a lower standard to indict and detain criminal defendants before trial (probable cause) than the standard it must meet to convict and imprison them after trial (proof beyond a reasonable doubt). See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311–12 (1959). Likewise, the government may use hearsay to establish probable cause, but must permit defendants to confront the witnesses against them at trial. See id.; U.S. Const. amend. VI. To protect defendants before trial, therefore, the Framers added other procedural safeguards, including the right to a speedy trial and against excessive bail. U.S. Const. amend. VI, VIII. Nevertheless, given the reduced burdens imposed on the government at this pretrial stage, the Supreme Court has recognized that cases will inevitably arise in which the government validly establishes the probable cause necessary for a pretrial detention, but later falls short in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979).

This is one of those cases. A witness told Detective Keith Roberts that her former boyfriend, Eugene Baker, and one of Baker’s friends whom she knew as “Desean” had robbed and murdered a competing drug dealer. After this witness identified a photo of the plaintiff, Duzuan Lester, as the “Desean” who had accompanied Baker to the murder, Kentucky prosecutors indicted Baker and Lester. When confronted face-to-face with Lester at trial, however, the witness suggested that Lester did not look like Baker’s accomplice. Finding that the prosecution had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury acquitted Lester. He now claims that Detective Roberts violated the Fourth Amendment and Kentucky tort law by inadequately investigating the murder before helping initiate the criminal case. Yet the Fourth Amendment and Kentucky law required only probable cause for Lester’s pretrial detention and prosecution. And this witness’s earlier identification of Lester—combined with corroborating evidence like DNA at the scene—sufficed to meet that standard. We thus affirm the grant of summary judgment to Roberts.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Federal prisoner Jeffrey Hampton seeks compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He is not alone in that respect. Current public health conditions have generated many similar requests, which the district courts have worked expeditiously to resolve.

Over time, we too have lent a hand. Beginning largely with our decision in United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020), we have issued a series of opinions articulating how district courts, following enactment of the First Step Act, should analyze defendant-filed motions seeking release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). In resolving those motions, district courts now face two questions: (1) whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances merit a sentence reduction; and (2) whether the applicable § 3553(a) factors warrant such a reduction. United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1006–07. A third consideration, the § 1B1.13 policy statement, is no longer a requirement courts must address in ruling on defendant-filed motions. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; United States v. Elias, --- F.3d ---, No. 20-3654, 2021 WL 50169, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021) (citing Jones, 980 F.3d at 1108).

Here, the district judge, who was not the original sentencing judge, denied Hampton’s motion in a two-sentence order. Order, United States v. Hampton, No. 1:09-cr-145 (N.D. Ohio June 5, 2020). Citing “the reasons stated in the [government’s] brief,” the order concluded that Hampton failed to meet the requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Id. At the time of that decision, however, neither the district court nor the parties had the benefit of our current interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A). And in measuring that order against our current case-law backdrop, we do not know whether the district court denied Hampton’s motion based upon permissible grounds advanced by the government under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—that Hampton failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances—or instead denied Hampton release due to a strict application of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which the government invoked, but which is no longer a mandatory step Hampton must satisfy. As a result, in this unique instance, the district court’s assessment does not provide for “meaningful appellate review.” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1116; see also United States v. Gaston, --- F. App’x ---, No. 20-3769, 2020 WL 6867187, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 2020). We therefore remand this case to the district court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Tammy Lynn Walker, was convicted of passing a worthless check, a Class D felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that she made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to counsel and by requiring her to proceed pro se at trial when she had not executed a written waiver to the effect. The State, after initially contending that the trial court did not err, alternatively argues that the Defendant implicitly waived her right to counsel by failing to retain counsel in a timely manner. In addition, the Defendant, as a separate issue, contends that the trial court violated her constitutional rights when it compelled her to testify against herself. We conclude that the non-indigent Defendant knowingly and voluntarily explicitly waived her right to counsel by her statements and conduct and that she was not compelled to testify against herself. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Aggrieved of the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of the sentence of probation imposed for his 2016 guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated assault, the defendant, Jarvis Tyvon Morgan, appeals. He argues that the trial court deprived him of due process by basing its decision on a ground not alleged in the violation warrant. Discerning no error, we affirm.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Federal prisoner Jeffrey Hampton seeks compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He is not alone in that respect. Current public health conditions have generated many similar requests, which the district courts have worked expeditiously to resolve.

Over time, we too have lent a hand. Beginning largely with our decision in United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020), we have issued a series of opinions articulating how district courts, following enactment of the First Step Act, should analyze defendant-filed motions seeking release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). In resolving those motions, district courts now face two questions: (1) whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances merit a sentence reduction; and (2) whether the applicable § 3553(a) factors warrant such a reduction. United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1006–07. A third consideration, the § 1B1.13 policy statement, is no longer a requirement courts must address in ruling on defendant-filed motions. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; United States v. Elias, --- F.3d ---, No. 20-3654, 2021 WL 50169, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021) (citing Jones, 980 F.3d at 1108).

Here, the district judge, who was not the original sentencing judge, denied Hampton’s motion in a two-sentence order. Order, United States v. Hampton, No. 1:09-cr-145 (N.D. Ohio June 5, 2020). Citing “the reasons stated in the [government’s] brief,” the order concluded that Hampton failed to meet the requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Id. At the time of that decision, however, neither the district court nor the parties had the benefit of our current interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A). And in measuring that order against our current case-law backdrop, we do not know whether the district court denied Hampton’s motion based upon permissible grounds advanced by the government under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—that Hampton failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances—or instead denied Hampton release due to a strict application of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which the government invoked, but which is no longer a mandatory step Hampton must satisfy. As a result, in this unique instance, the district court’s assessment does not provide for “meaningful appellate review.” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1116; see also United States v. Gaston, --- F. App’x ---, No. 20-3769, 2020 WL 6867187, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 2020). We therefore remand this case to the district court.

Week of January 11, 2021 - January 15, 2021

Defendant, Terrill J. Whitelow, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury on three counts: Count 1, attempted carjacking; Count 2, aggravated burglary; and Count 3, evading arrest. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty as charged on Counts 2 and 3. Defendant received an effective sentence of ten year’s incarceration. Defendant filed a motion for new trial in which he argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a judgment disposing of Count 1 of the indictment.

James Howard Theus, III, Defendant, was indicted for four counts of violating the sex offender registry. He pled guilty to the charges as stated in the indictment with an agreed upon sentence of three years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

A Gibson County jury convicted the defendant, Torey Jay Estes, of attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-five-years, eleven months, and twenty- nine days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted first-degree murder and an evidentiary ruling regarding the admissibility of the victim’s 9-1-1 call into evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that courts should look to the common law to establish the rules for constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the statute “creates a species of tort liability.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (citation omitted). Yet the Court has just as repeatedly said that § 1983 does not permit courts to create rights in common-law fashion because the statute merely vindicates rights found elsewhere—in the Constitution or other federal laws. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). This case requires us to grapple with how the first principle comports with the second.

Police officers with the City of Knoxville detained Calvin Dibrell and found drugs in his possession. The state convicted him of drug-trafficking offenses. An appellate court reversed, finding that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by detaining Dibrell without reasonable suspicion before uncovering the drugs. Dibrell brought two Fourth Amendment claims against the officers under § 1983: one for “false arrest” and “false imprisonment” and the other for “malicious prosecution.” Yet the Fourth Amendment does not codify the common law of torts; it prohibits “unreasonable” “seizures.” Dibrell’s claims thus shared a common constitutional premise: that he was detained (seized) without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that he committed a crime. Section 1983 nevertheless establishes different statutory rules depending on the type of seizure. And Dibrell’s challenge to his initial seizure was untimely under § 1983’s rules governing the accrual of a claim—even if, as the state court believed, a portion of this seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. His malicious-prosecution claim, by contrast, fails on its constitutional merits because the state had probable cause to initiate the criminal case once the officers found the drugs. We thus affirm the grant of summary judgment to the officers and the city.