This is an appeal from an order entered on September 21, 2020, dismissing the husband’s petition seeking to set aside a 2014 judgment. Because the husband did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order appealed, we dismiss the appeal.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether a claim for wrongful termination of employment can be asserted under the Teacher Tenure Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 49-5-501 to -515, by classifying a tenured teacher’s resignation as a constructive discharge rather than a voluntary quit. The plaintiff tenured teacher in this appeal quit her teaching position and sued for wrongful termination under the Tenure Act. We conclude that the doctrine of constructive discharge is inconsistent with the robust procedural framework in the Act, intended to give tenured teachers ample opportunity to be heard and ensure that dismissal decisions are made methodically, with transparency, and by consensus of professional educators. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge to the plaintiff’s claims, and we hold that constructive discharge is not applicable to wrongful termination claims under the Tenure Act. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of those claims. We also affirm the lower courts’ dismissal of the plaintiff teacher’s tort claims against the school system and individual school officials.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. The passage of the First Step Act in 2018 expanded access to compassionate release by allowing inmates to bring compassionate-release motions on their own behalf. Prior to that Act, only the Bureau of Prisons could bring compassionate-release motions. However, the removal of the Bureau of Prisons as the sole gatekeeper to compassionate release raised questions of whether the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, remained applicable to inmate-filed motions. This Court spoke on those questions recently, stating that § 1B1.13 is not applicable to inmate-filed compassionate- release motions. United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020). We follow that reasoning here.

In 2016, Lisa Elias was convicted of a drug-related conspiracy. This year, she utilized the expanded compassionate release process by moving for compassionate release on her own behalf, arguing that her hypertension placed her at an elevated risk of death if she were to contract COVID-19. The district court denied her motion, finding that Elias failed to show “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction as the statute requires. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Elias claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion. We find her arguments to be without merit and AFFIRM.

Tennessee Bonding Company, Appellant, surrendered the defendant, Larry Patton, to the Lewis County Sheriff’s Department but failed to notify the trial court of the surrender. Five weeks later, the trial court sua sponte entered an order exonerating Appellant on the bond but requiring Appellant to return “any and all premiums previously paid” and discharging the defendant from any remaining obligation for payment on the bond. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider asking for a hearing, which was summarily denied by the court. In this extraordinary appeal, Appellant claims the trial court erred by denying Appellant a hearing. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Julio Enrique Fernandez, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Maury County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Juan Ramon Chaves-Abrego, of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and he received an effective forty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Appellant’s convictions and effective sentence but remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment of conviction in count two, rape of a child, to reflect that the trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II offender.

This appeal arises out of a boundary dispute. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the plaintiffs established the boundary line based on an oral boundary agreement between the parties’ predecessors in interest. On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the trial court’s finding that the parties to the oral boundary agreement were uncertain of the location of the original boundary at the time they entered into the agreement. The defendant also takes issue with the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs’ deed was not void for champerty based on the court’s conclusion that the remnants of the fence the defendant relied on to establish the property line met none of the requirements of adverse possession. After reviewing the evidence presented at the trial, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

In this interlocutory appeal, the employer asserts the trial court erred in ordering it to provide additional medical benefits as recommended by the authorized treating physician, arguing that the need for additional surgery arose primarily from the employee’s pre- existing medical condition. The employer further asserts the trial court erred in awarding temporary partial disability benefits pending a final determination of maximum medical improvement or the employee’s return to work. Upon careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Jankie Jackson and Peter Combs pleaded guilty to participating in a cocaine distribution ring. Both defendants received elevated sentences, Jackson due to his role as a leader in the drug-distribution conspiracy, and Combs due to his career-offender status. Seeing no error in the district court’s conclusions, we affirm defendants’ respective sentences.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. This alleged breach-of-contract case arises out of General Motors’s (“GM”) bankruptcy. In 2007, GM sold a power plant to an energy company, DTE Energy Pontiac North, LLC (“DTEPN”). GM also leased the land under the plant to DTEPN for ten years. For its part, DTEPN agreed to sell utilities produced at the plant to GM, to maintain the plant according to specific criteria, and to take care of any environmental issues caused by the plant. DTEPN’s parent company, DTE Energy Services, Inc., (“DTE Energy”)1 guaranteed that DTEPN would meet GM’s utility needs and its environmental and maintenance responsibilities, or DTE Energy itself would step in to fulfill DTEPN’s obligations.

The trust’s claims against DTEPN are not before us. Instead, we focus on the trust’s attempts to hold DTE Energy responsible for its subsidiary’s alleged wrongs. As relevant here, the district court dismissed the claims against DTE Energy because (1) the trust’s allegations did not support piercing the corporate veil under Michigan law, and (2) DTE Energy’s guaranty terminated after GM rejected the associated contracts in bankruptcy. We conclude that the district court erred in both of its rulings. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint regarding DTE Energy; REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach-of-Associated-Agreements claim regarding DTE Energy; and REMAND to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.