This is an appeal from a trial court’s order dismissing a claim of false imprisonment against a hospital and two of its employees, wherein the trial court found that the acts alleged all constituted “health care services” as defined by the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act. Specifically, the trial court found that the Appellant failed to provide pre-suit notice and failed to file a certificate of good faith as required by statute. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Appellant’s claims with prejudice. The Appellant now appeals the trial court’s decision. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees upon remand from this court. The defendant church requested attorney’s fees, to which the plaintiff lessee asserted that such fees were not warranted given the nature of the action. The trial court denied the request for fees, holding that an award of attorney’s fees was conditioned upon the need to hire counsel for the enforcement of the lease agreement and that the action at issue was one for declaratory judgment. We reverse and hold that attorney’s fees are warranted pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the 2019 presentment charging the defendant, Teresa Ann Norwood, with a single count of passing a worthless check, arguing that the trial court impermissibly ruled on the sufficiency of the evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Brandon Middlebrook, appeals his 2015 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and arguing that the trial court erred by permitting the State to use the non-testifying co-defendant’s statement to question the defendant at trial. We hold that the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross-examine the defendant using the statement of his co-defendant but that the error can be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of attempted first degree murder. Because the defendant’s previous felony convictions do not qualify as prior convictions under the terms of Code section 39-17-1324, the defendant’s convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony in Counts 3, 7, 11, 15, 19, and 23 are vacated and those charges dismissed. The case is remanded to the trial court for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting the proper merger of the remaining convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the imposition of a six-year mandatory minimum period of incarceration for each of those convictions. See T.C.A. § 39-17- 1324(h)(1). The judgments of the trial court are otherwise affirmed.

Week of December 28, 2020 - December 30, 2020

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. To establish the “standing” required for jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must allege the “invasion of a legally protected interest.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (citation omitted). To establish a violation of the Takings Clause on the merits, plaintiffs must similarly prove that the government has taken a “cognizable” property interest. Coal. for Gov’t Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 365 F.3d 435, 481 (6th Cir. 2004). Given these overlapping requirements for jurisdiction and the merits, what happens if a plaintiff fails to prove the required property interest? Does it show the lack of the “legally protected” interest necessary for jurisdiction? Or does it instead show the lack of a “cognizable” interest necessary for the merits of the takings claim?

This case implicates these questions. According to the complaint of CHKRS, LLC, the City of Dublin violated the Takings Clause when it tore out a property’s driveway and replaced it with a defective driveway without paying compensation. CHKRS had a lease interest in the property at the time and now owns it outright. The district court nevertheless held that CHKRS failed to establish Article III standing. The court reasoned that issue preclusion barred CHKRS from asserting any protectable interest in the property because state courts had already found that it lacked such an interest. Yet Article III standing was not the correct doctrine. As long as a plaintiff has asserted a colorable legal claim (and has met standing’s other elements), the plaintiff has satisfied Article III and the court may resolve the claim on its merits. And here, CHKRS has established its standing by alleging a colorable interest in the property for its takings claim. The district court misread Ohio issue-preclusion law in reaching the contrary result. We thus reverse the district court’s standing-based dismissal of CHKRS’s takings claim, but we affirm the court’s dismissal of CHKRS’s due-process claims on separate forfeiture grounds.

This is a product liability action stemming from occupational exposure to asbestos. Pertinent to this appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Coffman (“Appellees”) asserted claims against the manufacturers of certain equipment (“Equipment Defendants”) under the Tennessee Products Liability Act for failing to warn of dangers for exposure to asbestos-containing products that the Equipment Defendants did not themselves manufacture or sell. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Equipment Defendants and the Court of Appeals reversed. This Court granted the Equipment Defendants’ application in part and directed the parties to address: “Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Equipment Defendants had a duty to warn of the dangers associated with the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing materials manufactured and sold by others.”2 We have concluded that the Equipment Defendants had no duty to warn on the facts and law applicable here. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner Angela Y. brought this action to terminate the parental rights of Melissa V. (“Mother”) to her child John A. (“Child”). Petitioner is the sister of Child’s father. Petitioner has had custody and taken care of the Child since April 25, 2017, when the Child was a little over one year old. The trial court terminated Mother’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support Child. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned Child by willfully failing to visit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Appellant, a Lineman with the Nashville Electric Service (“NES”), filed a grievance with Appellee Electric Employees’ Civil Service and Pension Board (the “Board”) after the NES revoked Appellant’s unauthorized raise. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held that the facts supported the NES’ decision to withdraw the raise, and the Board adopted that finding. Appellant appealed to the Chancery Court of Davidson County (“trial court”). The trial court held that there was substantial and material evidence to support the Board’s decision and that the decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Indicted for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, Defendant, Laron Rashawn Lumpkin, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years for voluntary manslaughter and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery to be served concurrently for an effective twenty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery but reverse and vacate his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. In doing so, we impose a conviction for the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide and remand the case to the trial court for a sentencing hearing on the newly imposed conviction.