The Petitioner, Carlos Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Appellant, Frank Edward Sharp Jr., contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his original sentence in confinement. The Appellant acknowledges that he violated the terms of his probation and argues that the trial court should have given him a sentence of split confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction in case number 17-CR-125 to reflect that the Appellant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Trial Court conducted a trial and entered an order finding that the statutory ground of abandonment existed for termination of the father’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Because a court reporter was not present, the Trial Court approved a statement of the evidence for purposes of appeal. We determine that the Trial Court failed to make sufficient findings of fact relevant to the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to visit the child and failure to provide financial support for the child that were in effect at the time of the 2017 termination petition, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k), and that the statement of the evidence approved by the Trial Court is insufficient for us to review the termination on appeal. Therefore, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment terminating the father’s parental rights. We remand for the Trial Court to enter an order with sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on each of the statutory grounds for the termination of the father’s parental rights and the best interest analysis. If there is a subsequent appeal of that order, the Trial Court shall develop a more detailed statement of the evidence reflecting a complete account of the testimony and evidence presented during trial. If a detailed statement of the evidence is not possible, the Trial Court shall conduct additional proceedings as necessary to prepare a sufficient record for appeal, including a new trial if necessary.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Pedro Silvestre-Gregorio challenges his conviction for unlawful reentry of a removed alien by bringing a collateral attack against his underlying removal order from nineteen years ago. Silvestre-Gregorio alleges that the government violated his due-process rights at his 2001 removal proceeding by failing to provide him with counsel even though he was a juvenile at the time, and by failing to inform him that discretionary relief might be available. The district court rejected both claims and our precedent resolves each issue. Because this court has held that there is no constitutional right to government-provided counsel at civil removal proceedings and that an alien does not have a constitutional right to be informed of discretionary relief, we must AFFIRM.

The Lincoln County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Christopher Ryan Simmons, for aggravated burglary in count one; vandalism less than $1,000 in count two; theft of property valued between $2,500 and $10,000 in counts three and four; evading arrest by motor vehicle in count five; and evading arrest on foot in count six. Following a trial, the jury convicted Defendant on all counts as charged. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of a mother and a father. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination had been proven and that termination was in the best interest of the two children. The mother and the father separately appealed. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services “does not defend” some of the grounds that the trial court concluded were established. However, DCS maintains that three grounds for termination were sufficiently proven against the mother and that one ground was sufficiently proven against the father. We conclude that two of the remaining grounds for termination alleged against the mother were sufficiently proven, but we do not find clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the sole remaining ground alleged against the father was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. As such, we reverse the termination of parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed dismissal of this case and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees owed to the appellee due to the appellant’s frivolous appeal. On remand, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay the sum of $11,901.35. The appellant then filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing, for the first time, that the trial court’s order was “void ab initio” because it was “adjudicated by an adjudicator with compromised neutrality in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” As support for this claim, the appellant pointed to comments made by the trial judge during hearings in a separate but related case in 2010 and 2012. The appellant argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required the trial judge to disqualify herself sua sponte and that her failure to do so rendered all subsequent orders entered by the trial judge void. The trial court treated this as a request for recusal “embedded” in the motion to alter or amend and denied the motion in all respects. The appellant has appealed. We affirm.

Two men were driving along I-40 in Memphis when their cars collided. One driver sued the other driver for damages, alleging negligence, and the other driver counter-sued, also alleging negligence. The defendant filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to supplement his discovery responses. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to serve his supplemental discovery on the defendant’s attorney by August 2, 2019, and stated that the case would be dismissed if he failed to comply. The plaintiff failed to meet the deadline or ask for an extension, and the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jim Hudgins, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree premediated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to present evidence that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent for premeditation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order dismissing a claim of false imprisonment against a hospital and two of its employees, wherein the trial court found that the acts alleged all constituted “health care services” as defined by the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act. Specifically, the trial court found that the Appellant failed to provide pre-suit notice and failed to file a certificate of good faith as required by statute. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Appellant’s claims with prejudice. The Appellant now appeals the trial court’s decision. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court.